Filed 10/8/19 Hernandez v. Salvatore CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

VICTOR M. HERNANDEZ, JR., as Trustee; etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SIOBHAN DEE ANN SALVATORE,

Defendant and Appellant.

H043871

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 1-14-PR-174652)

This action concerns an inter vivos revocable trust (Trust) involving Victor M. Hernandez, Jr. (Victor) and his now deceased wife, Juanita Hernandez (Juanita). Juanita passed away in March 1992, and Victor alleged that the Trust was created prior thereto and that its sole asset was the couple’s townhouse. He alleged further that under the terms of the Trust, as the surviving settlor, he had sole authority over the disposition of the townhouse, and that if he sold it during his lifetime, he had sole control over the sales proceeds. In 2003, Victor sold the townhouse. He alleged further that he discarded the Trust instrument thereafter, having had no further need of it. Years later, in July 2014, Victor’s and Juanita’s youngest child, Siobhan De Ann Salvatore (Siobhan), filed a petition with the probate court. In her petition, she sought a copy of the Trust instrument and claimed that prior to Juanita’s death, she had told Siobhan that she was a beneficiary under the Trust. Siobhan ultimately dismissed without prejudice her petition in May 2015. However, Siobhan’s claims and her petition prompted Victor, as trustee, to file a petition with the probate court pursuant to Probate Code section 17200 to confirm the Trust’s existence and its terms, and to confirm that he had acted properly in taking action to dispose of the Trust’s sole asset, the townhouse. Siobhan filed an objection to Victor’s petition to confirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the probate court granted Victor’s petition, overruled Siobhan’s objection, and entered judgment in favor of Victor on November 24, 2015.

Siobhan challenged the judgment by filing a notice of appeal. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and will therefore affirm the judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Siobhan’s Prior Petition and Victor’s Opposition

On July 3, 2014, Siobhan filed a petition with the superior court in which she sought to obtain “cop[ies] of mothers [sic] assets & beneficiaries of assets [sic], as part of the Hernandez Family Trust.” In her petition, Siobhan stated under penalty of perjury that Victor had failed and refused to provide her with a copy of the Trust instrument. She stated further that “[p]rior to my mothers [sic] passing she verbally informed me that I was in fact a beneficiary of her Living Trust.”

On August 1, 2014, Victor filed an objection to Siobhan’s petition. In connection with this objection, Victor filed three responsive declarations in August 2014, namely his declaration, the declaration of his daughter, Maria Carrasco (Maria), and the declaration of his son, Victor Hernandez III (Victor III). In opposing Siobhan’s petition, Victor stated in his declaration, inter alia, that (1) he and Juanita, who passed away on March 9, 1992, created a living trust (Trust); (2) the only asset was their San Jose townhouse located on Meadowgate Way (hereafter the townhouse); (3) under the Trust, Victor was given sole authority over the townhouse, and if he owned it at the time of his death, it would pass in equal shares to his children, but if he sold it, the Trust would have no control over the sales proceeds and Victor could dispose of them as he wished; (4) under the Trust, Victor, upon Juanita’s death, had the power to revoke the trust; (5) sometime after Juanita’s death, he sold the townhouse, and after doing so, he “had no reason to retain the Trust declaration” and did not retain a copy of it; (6) in August 2012, Siobhan e-mailed him and referred to “ ‘the money that mom left for [her] and/or [her] children,’ ”; and (7) Victor responded to Siobhan’s e-mail that there was no money that had been set aside for Siobhan or her children.

In November 2014, Siobhan filed an “Amended Complaint,” in which she again sought production of the Trust “instrument, any and all other legal documents where notice to interested persons in association to an heir are required by law.” In December 2014, Victor filed an objection to this pleading. After an intervening status hearing in December 2014, in March 2015, the court, upon Siobhan’s request, scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Amended Complaint for May 14, 2015.

On April 22, 2015, the court denied Siobhan’s ex parte application to continue the evidentiary hearing to August 2015. On May 5, 2015, Siobhan filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of her petition. She captioned it a “request for dismissal & preservation of evidence,” and included as an attachment a statement in which she, inter alia, sought “to compel the court to rule in favor of the preservation of records and evidence . . .”

B. Victor’s Petition to Confirm Trust and Siobhan’s Objection

On June 17, 2015, Victor filed a petition to confirm terms of trust and the termination of the trust pursuant to section 17200 (hereafter petition to confirm). He alleged that the filing of the petition to confirm was prompted by Siobhan’s prior court filings (discussed above), including her allegations of Victor’s breach of fiduciary duty and claims regarding assets she asserted to have been part of the Trust. Victor stated that “the only way to bring closure of this matter for himself and his family is to obtain a court order establishing the historical administration of the Trust, confirming the terms of the Trust, and confirming its termination by [Victor] as a Trustor and Trustee.” Victor sought an order, inter alia, confirming that Victor and Juanita created the Trust; the Trust’s sole asset was the townhouse; under the Trust, Victor as surviving settlor, had the sole discretion to dispose of the proceeds of the sale of the townhouse; Victor exercised that discretion by distributing the proceeds to himself; and Victor revoked the Trust on July 29, 2014.

At a hearing on August 12, 2015, Victor’s counsel requested that the petition to confirm be set for trial. The court, after hearing from Siobhan that she was not represented by counsel and was not ready to move forward, set the case for a three-hour evidentiary hearing on October 29, 2015.

On October 9, 2015, Siobhan filed an objection to Victor’s petition to confirm the terms of the Trust. She alleged, inter alia, that Victor had not fulfilled his fiduciary duties as trustee to give notice and an accounting to heirs of the Trust. On the same date, Siobhan filed a “notice of hearing” (capitalization omitted) in which she sought to remove Victor as trustee and to appoint “a Probate Referee to assess and reconcile the true inventory and value of the surviving assets left by [decedent].”

C. Hearing on Victor’s Petition to Confirm and Judgment

The petition to confirm by Victor and Siobhan’s objection came on for an evidentiary hearing on October 28, 2015. At the outset, the court denied Siobhan’s request for a stay of the proceedings based upon her filing of a separate family law proceeding brought by Siobhan against Victor, individually, concerning the paternity of Siobhan. The court heard testimony from five witnesses.

1. Victor’s Testimony

Victor testified that he and Juanita were married for approximately 33 years, and they had three children. Juanita passed away on March 9, 1992 after a lengthy illness with cancer. Prior to her death, Juanita and Victor retained a San Mateo attorney, John G. Clark, to prepare a living trust. Their motivation for establishing the Trust was that if the couple passed away at the same time, their townhouse would pass to their children without having to go through probate. The couple were cotrustees and the Trust gave them the power of revocation. Under the Trust, the beneficiaries were Juanita and Victor, and upon the death of both of them, the three children would become the beneficiaries of the only Trust asset, the townhouse.

Victor testified that he sold the townhouse in 2003, depositing the proceeds into the bank and using a portion to pay bills. Sometime later, he disposed of his copy of the Trust instrument, believing the Trust was “no longer effective” because the only asset had been sold. On July 29, 2014, Victor revoked the Trust by written instrument. After Siobhan initiated proceedings in probate court, Victor attempted to locate the original Trust instrument by contacting Attorney Clark; Victor was unsuccessful, as it did not appear that Clark was still practicing law.

Juanita was told that her cancer was terminal approximately one year before she passed away. During the year before her death, she and Victor discussed her desires concerning monies that would go to Victor upon her death (life insurance proceeds, funds from her credit union, and stock associated with her employer). She told Victor that even though they had not formally established an inheritance, she asked Victor to assist Maria in purchasing a home. Juanita told Victor that she did not believe Victor III needed financial help. She also told Victor she did not want him to give money to Siobhan because at the time, Siobhan was married to a man who did not work and, from what Juanita and Victor could determine, had no intention of working.

In August 2012, Siobhan contacted Victor by e-mail, stating that “in the future when she needed money, she wanted [Victor] to deposit the money directly into her bank accounts from monies left to her by her mother.” Victor advised Siobhan by return e-mail that in the months preceding Juanita’s death, she and Victor had had private conversations, they had never set aside any monies for any of the children, and that it was left up to Victor to do what he could as time went on.

Subsequent to that e-mail exchange, Siobhan sent a certified letter to Victor in which she claimed there had been a family meeting in which Juanita stated what she wanted done with her assets. Victor testified that such a meeting “never occurred.”

2. Maria’s Testimony

Maria testified that during the last few years of Juanita’s life, Maria had daily contact by telephone and in person with her mother. During Juanita’s last few months, Siobhan had limited contact with her mother. One day when Maria was taking care of Juanita, Maria was cleaning up paperwork and saw the Trust instrument and read it. She recalled that it provided that if both her mother and father died, the Trust asset would be distributed equally to her and her two siblings. Maria stated that the Trust instrument provided further that if one spouse predeceased the other, the surviving spouse would have the asset “to do with [it as] he or she wishes—. . . as it would be theirs.” Maria recalled that the instrument further provided that upon the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse would have the right to amend or revoke the Trust. During Juanita’s lifetime, she was never present during any discussions about the disposition of her parents’ estate. Maria testified specifically that there was no family meeting in which Juanita explained how she wanted her assets disposed of after she passed away.

3. Victor III’s Testimony

Victor III testified that in the five years before his mother passed away, he visited her nearly every day after work. While Juanita was alive, Victor III’s father informed him that his parents had created a Trust that had their townhouse as an asset. His father explained that if both parents died at the same time, the townhouse would go to the three children in equal shares without having to be probated. Victor gave Victor III a copy of the Trust instrument during Juanita’s lifetime. Victor III reviewed it to some extent. He testified “it was a revocable trust that [had] pretty common language” and had the townhouse “in it.” Victor III testified that before Juanita passed away, there were no discussions with her or Victor about the disposition of their assets. Likewise, during his mother’s life, Victor III had no discussions with his siblings about the disposition of their parents’ estate.

4. William Banuelos

William Banuelos was called as a witness by Siobhan. Banuelos was married to Lourdes, who was Juanita’s sister. Lourdes passed away in approximately 2011. Banuelos testified that before Lourdes died, Maria sued her concerning a claim that she was entitled to a greater inheritance from her grandmother, but later dropped the suit.

5. Siobhan Salvatore

Siobhan testified that after the family learned that Juanita had cancer—about five years before her death—Siobhan had a difficult time dealing with it “during the beginning years,” and she “probably wasn’t around as often.” In the last two years of Juanita’s life, Siobhan “was there all the time.” Juanita was very close to Siobhan’s son, Michael, and Siobhan would often bring him over to the townhouse to visit after daycare. Siobhan testified, “[W]e were there every day.” Contrary to Victor’s testimony that he had discussions with Juanita concerning the joblessness of Siobhan’s husband, Siobhan testified that he was employed by Syntex Corporation during the period before Juanita’s death.

Siobhan testified that within six months before Juanita passed away, she called the children to the townhouse for a family meeting. Siobhan, her siblings, and her father were present. During the meeting, Juanita talked about her desires after she passed away. Juanita stated that if Victor at some point needed to sell the townhouse, the three children would have the option to buy him out. She told the family further that if the children could not buy out Victor and they decided to sell the townhouse, Juanita’s one-half of the proceeds should be split equally between the three children. Juanita stated she had approximately $80,000 in Treasury bonds, and that she wanted to use those funds for the college education of her grandchildren. Juanita told the family further that from the proceeds of her life insurance policy, she wanted one-half to go to Victor and the other half to go to Siobhan’s grandmother.

Siobhan testified that Victor issued her son, Michael, a check for $10,000 “from the trust in 2003 for college.” Siobhan testified that Juanita had “even mentioned that [she] and [Victor] had gone back to see the attorney after [Siobhan’s] second son, Carmine, was born.” Siobhan also acknowledged that in 2007, she called Victor to ask for a loan because she and her husband were in danger of losing their home in Southern California, and he provided a loan of $5,000.

6. Ruling and Judgment

After hearing the evidence, the court ruled from the bench in favor of Victor. As reflected in the formal judgment (recited below), the court made eight findings concerning the existence and terms of the Trust and concerning Victor’s actions as trustee. The court held that, as a result of these findings, Siobhan’s petition to remove trustee was moot.

The court entered judgment in favor of Victor on November 24, 2015. The court, as recited in the judgment, found that (1) the Trust was created by Victor and Juanita; (2) the only Trust asset was their San Jose townhouse on Meadowgate Way; (3) the Trust provided that Victor, as surviving settlor, was the sole income and principal beneficiary; (4) the Trust provided that Victor, as surviving settlor, had the power to amend, revoke, or terminate the Trust; (5) the Trust provided that Victor had the sole and absolute discretion to dispose of the proceeds from the sale of the townhouse, the Trust’s sole asset, if it were sold before his death; (6) Victor received the proceeds from the sale of the townhouse and exercised his discretion by distributing them to himself; (7) Victor revoked the Trust on July 29, 2014; and (8) Victor did not breach any fiduciary duty to any beneficiary as a result of his disposition of the Trust instrument.

Siobhan filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

The California Supreme Court has succinctly described the nature of an inter vivos revocable trust, the Trust at issue in this case, as follows: “A revocable trust is a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime. The beneficiaries’ interest in the trust is contingent only, and the settlor can eliminate that interest at any time. When the trustee of a revocable trust is someone other than the settlor, that trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the settlor, not to the beneficiaries, as long as the settlor is alive. During that time, the trustee needs to account to the settlor only and not also to the beneficiaries. When the settlor dies, the trust becomes irrevocable, and the beneficiaries’ interest in the trust vests.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1062, fn. omitted; see also Prob. Code, § 15800 [while trust is revocable and settlor is competent, settlor, not beneficiary, has sole power to revoke and trustee owes duties to settlor].) Thus, the “ ‘[p]roperty transferred into a revocable inter vivos revocable trust is deemed . . . the property of the settlor . . . .’ [Citations.] Any interest that beneficiaries of a revocable trust have in trust property is ‘merely potential’ and can ‘evaporate in a moment at the whim of the [settlor].’ [Citations.]” (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319-1320, original italics, fn. omitted.)

Under section 17200, the trustee or beneficiary may petition the probate court with respect to matters pertaining to the internal affairs of the trust or to determine its existence. Such matters include, without limitation, the determination of issues concerning the construction of a trust instrument (id., subd. (b)(1)), the existence of powers, duties or rights under a trust instrument (id., subd. (b)(2)), passing upon the acts of a trustee, including discretionary acts (id., subd. (b)(5)), and approving or directing the modification or termination of the trust (id., subd. (b)(13)). “The probate court has wide discretion to make any order and take any action necessary or proper to dispose of matters presented by a petition under section 17200. (§ 17206.)” (Manson v. Shepherd (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1258 (Manson).)

B. Standard of Review

“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, original italics.) An appellant is charged with the burden of overcoming the presumption of the correctness of the judgment. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 822.)

The standard of review of an order under section 17200 is whether the probate court abused its discretion. (Manson, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns. omitted.)

C. No Error in Granting Petition to Confirm

1. Appellant’s Noncompliance with Rules of Appellate Procedure

We will address below the substance of Siobhan’s claims of error presented in her appeal to the extent we can ascertain her arguments and they are ones that are cognizable. At the outset, however, we must note that in the submission of her appellate briefs, Siobhan has failed to comply with the rules of appellate procedure in a number of respects. This noncompliance is significant because it materially affects this court’s ability to address Siobhan’s claims of error.

Siobhan’s opening brief is replete with references to the procedural history of this case and to factual matters presented at the evidentiary hearing below that are unsupported by citations to the appellate record. For instance, in the statement of the case section of her opening brief, Siobhan provides no citations to the record. And in the six-page statement of facts, Siobhan recites numerous purported facts without citations to the reporter’s transcript showing where the facts may be found in the hearing testimony. Siobhan’s failure to include citations to the record in her appellate brief constitutes a violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), which requires that every brief “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” “When an appellant’s brief makes no reference to the pages of the record where a point can be found, an appellate court need not search through the record in an effort to discover the point purportedly made. [Citations.] We can simply deem the contention to lack foundation and, thus, to be forfeited. [Citations.]” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407; see also Yeboah v. Progeny Ventures, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 443, 451 [factual statements in briefs “not supported by references to the record are disregarded” by the reviewing court].)

Siobhan additionally makes a number of references to purported evidence that was not presented at the evidentiary hearing. This includes references to declarations of witnesses, including Victor, and other documents filed prior to Victor’s filing of the petition to confirm. But the record shows that the court expressly stated that it would consider only the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on October 28, 2015, and that documents previously filed, including declarations, would not be considered. Thus, Siobhan’s reference to factual matters outside of those presented in the evidentiary hearing is improper.

Further, Siobhan’s opening and reply briefs contain a number of legal arguments without citation to legal authority supporting the argument. Under rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), an appellate brief must “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” The failure to cite legal authority for position in appellate brief “amounts to an abandonment of the issue.” (People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Building Permit Consultants, Inc. (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 284 (20th Century Ins.).)

Lastly, Siobhan’s appellate briefs contain a number of perfunctory, undeveloped arguments in her appeal of the judgment. Examples of such perfunctory arguments include claims that (1) the trial court denied Siobhan due process; (2) the court did not allow her sufficient time to prepare for a hearing on her prior, ultimately dismissed petition or for the evidentiary hearing; (3) the substance of Victor’s testimony “disclose[d] selective memory”; (4) the court denied “[a]ll efforts [by Siobhan] to produce verifiable documents through court enforced subpoenas”; (5) “none of the duties of the Trustee were [sic] performed in accordance with California Probate and Trust laws”; (6) “[t]he Trustee of a joint trust cannot be the sole beneficiary of a joint trust without accountability to heirs and beneficiaries”; and (7) a reporter’s transcript was incomplete. Arguments in briefs raised in perfunctory fashion will be deemed by the appellate court to be abandoned. (Nisei Farmers League v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1018 (Nisei Farmers League).) This is true because an appellate court has no obligation to “develop the appellants’ arguments for them.” (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1.)

We mention these deficiencies in Siobhan’s briefing because they have a direct impact upon this court’s ability to address any claims of error she attempts to present. And in noting the deficiencies, we are aware that Siobhan is not an attorney. However, the rules of civil procedure apply with equal force to self-represented litigants as they do to those represented by attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Thus, “[w]hen a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he [or she] is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 (Nwosu).)

We now address to the extent we are able Siobhan’s claims of error, which are identified in her opening brief as four separate arguments.

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s Findings

The second and third arguments identified by Siobhan in her opening brief are interrelated, and they address the evidentiary showing made by Victor at the hearing in support of the petition to confirm. As we understand Siobhan’s position in her second argument, Victor failed to meet his burden of proof, and, as she argues, “[t]he trial court erred in the judgment . . . [because it was] based solely on the hearsay evidence provided by [Victor] and witnesses thereof [sic].” And Siobhan’s position in her fourth argument is that the evidence she presented was strong and included that of a disinterested third party (Banuelos), while the court erred by “giving greater weight to hearsay testimony of benefactors [sic].”

Although not expressed specifically in such terms, we perceive Siobhan’s arguments to consist of a claim that the court’s findings in support of the judgment concerning the existence of the Trust and the terms of the Trust were not supported by substantial evidence. In addressing this substantial evidence contention, however, we are compelled at the outset to identify Siobhan’s further noncompliance with appellate rules of procedure. Siobhan clearly challenges the probative value of the testimony presented on Victor’s behalf. But in arguing that the court’s conclusion was not based upon substantial evidence, Siobhan fails to present a summary of the substance of the evidence both favorable to, and unfavorable to, her position. Such a summary is required under the law.

“ ‘A party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is insufficient.’ ” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738, original italics.) As a panel of this court has explained, “[A]n attack on the evidence without a fair statement of the evidence is entitled to no consideration when it is apparent that a substantial amount of evidence was received on behalf of the respondent. [Citation.] Thus, appellants who challenge the decision of the trial court based upon the absence of substantial evidence to support it ‘ “are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed waived.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246, original italics.)

Siobhan in this instance has failed to present argument with the required evidentiary support for her claim that there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s findings in favor of Victor’s petition to confirm. She has thus waived the claim of error. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)

But even were we to overlook such waiver, Siobhan’s contentions are without merit. “In a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, the appellate court will ‘consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings]. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations. [Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment. [Citation.]” (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 76.) We give deference to the trial court’s factual findings “because those courts generally are in a better position to evaluate and weigh the evidence. [Citation.]” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385 (Haworth).)

The evidence presented by Victor, namely, his testimony and the testimony of Maria and Victor III, supported the court’s findings concerning the existence of the Trust, the terms of the Trust, and that the actions taken by Victor as successor trustee and settlor were consistent with the terms of the Trust. Siobhan challenges the probative value of Victor’s evidence, characterizing it as consisting of “testimony of offspring witnesses that benefitted from tens of thousands of dollars from [Juanita’s] estate,” and was “hearsay evidence without cross[-]examination or third-party verification.” She argues further that the court gave less weight to the evidence she presented—which she described as including “the only third-party witness [who was] not a direct heir of [Juanita]” and Siobhan’s “consistent” testimony—than the weight it gave to Victor’s evidence.

Siobhan’s argument fails because it asks this court to do three things an appellate court is expressly prohibited from doing in considering a substantial evidence challenge. First, her argument suggests that we reweigh the evidence presented before the trial court and then conclude that the evidence she presented was more probative than the evidence presented on Victor’s behalf. In a substantial evidence review, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. (Estate of Young, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 76.) Second, Siobhan’s position would require us to assess the credibility of the witnesses who provided testimony at the hearing on the petition to confirm. The determination of the credibility of witnesses is exclusively a function of the trial court. (Ibid.) Third, Siobhan’s argument, if accepted, would require that we ignore our obligation to give considerable deference to the court’s factual findings, the trial court being “in a better position to evaluate and weigh the evidence. [Citation.]” (Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th 385.)

3. Performance of Duties by Victor as Trustee

Siobhan contends in her opening brief (identified by her as her first argument) that “none of the duties of the Trustee were performed in accordance with California Probate and Trust laws.” In support of this position, she asserts that “[t]he Trustee of a joint trust cannot be the sole beneficiary of a joint trust without accountability to heirs and beneficiaries.” Siobhan provides no specific argument, cites no case law, and cites no particular statute in support of her position. We therefore, reject her contention on the basis that it is an argument that is perfunctory and undeveloped (Nisei Farmers League, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1018), and is unsupported by legal authority (20th Century Ins., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 284).

4. Due Process Claim

Siobhan argues (identified by her as her fourth argument) that the court below deprived her of “due process throughout the probate proceedings in both the first and second parts of the case proceedings.” She cites no case authority in support of this constitutional challenge, as required under rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). We need not address this perfunctory, unsupported due process challenge. (See People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1412, fn. 5 [appellate court declines to address due process where appellant presented “no constitutional analysis or authority other than saying a conviction based on insufficient evidence violates due process”].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of November 24, 2015, granting the petition under Probate Code section 17200 is affirmed.

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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

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ELIA, ACTING P. J.

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MIHARA, J.

Hernandez v. Salvatore

H043871