Case Number: 14UA0335 Hearing Date: May 01, 2014 Dept: A11

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTH DISTRICT

WEST PARK VILLAS, LLC, )
) Case Number 14UA0335
Plaintiffs, )
) ORDER AFTER HEARING
V )
) Date of Hearing:
KEVIN D. HAYNES, ) May 1, 2014
) Dept. A-11
Defendants. ) Judge Randolph A. Rogers
____________________________________)

Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees came on for hearing on May 1, 2014. Plaintiff West Park Villas, LLC appeared through its counsel of record, ________________. Defendant Kevin Haynes appeared through his counsel of record, ________________. The Court, having received and reviewed the pleadings of record and evidence submitted and having considered argument of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED:

The Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,200.00 to Defendant.

SO ORDERED this the _____ day of May, 2014.

______________________
RANDOLPH A. ROGERS,
JUDGE

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTH DISTRICT

WEST PARK VILLAS, LLC, )
) Case Number 14UA0335
Plaintiffs, )
) ORDER AFTER HEARING
V )
) Date of Hearing:
KEVIN D. HAYNES, ) May 1, 2014
) Dept. A-11
Defendants. ) Judge Randolph A. Rogers
____________________________________)

The Court bases the Order After Hearing of this date upon the following Statement of Decision:

1. The present motion, concerns an unlawful detainer case filed by Plaintiff West Park Villas, LLC (“Plaintiff”) on February 3, 2014. After a trial held on Mach 25, 2014, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant Kevin Haynes (“Defendant”).

2. Defendant brought the present motion on April 1, 2014, arguing that he is the prevailing party, and that under the lease agreement, he is entitled to recover attorney’s fees.

3. Plaintiff filed its opposition on April 23, 2014, arguing that although Defendant is the prevailing party, the terms of the lease limit recovery of attorney’s fees to $1,200.00. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to $4,905.00 in fees.

4. Discussion – Cal. Civ. Code §1717 governs entitlement to attorney fees for “action[s] on a contract.” The statute provides in relevant part: “(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs . . . [¶] (b)(1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b)(1).

5. “[W]hen the results of the litigation on the contract claims are not mixed – that is, when the decision on the litigated contract claims is purely good news for one party and bad news for the other – the Courts of Appeal have recognized that a trial court has no discretion to deny attorney fees to the successful litigant. Thus, when a defendant defeats recovery by the plaintiff on the only contract claim in the action, the defendant is the party prevailing on the contract under section 1717 as a matter of law. [Citations.] Similarly, a plaintiff who obtains all relief requested on the only contract claim in the action must be regarded as the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of attorney fees under section 1717.” Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 875-76; see also F.D.I.C. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 357. Section 1717 applies only to contract claims. Cal. Civ. Code, § 1717(a); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615. “If an action asserts both contract and tort or other noncontract claims, section 1717 applies only to attorney fees incurred to litigate the contract claims.” Santisas, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 615, 619; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 708. In determining which party, if any, prevailed on a contract claim for purposes of section 1717, the court does not consider the parties’ success or failure on non-contract claims. Dintino, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.

6. There appears to be no contest as to Defendant’s status as the prevailing party. Indeed, any argument thus would be futile. As Defendant correctly notes, a Defendant who retains possession of the property is the prevailing party in an unlawful detainer action. See Mitchell Land and Imp. Co. v. Ristorante Ferrantelli, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 479, 484-5 (“Plaintiff’s objective in bringing this litigation was to obtain the relief requested in the complaint. The objective of the. . . defendants in this litigation was to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining that relief. . . . The object of Mitchell’s unlawful detainer action was to summarily terminate the lease and regain possession of the premises.”) Therefore, Defendant is the ‘prevailing party’ as recognized by the statute.

7. Defendant contends that he is entitled to $4,905.00 in attorney’s fees, representing 16.35 hours of work. Motion, Exhibit I. Moreover, the lease agreement also contains an attorney’s fee provision allowing the prevailing party to recover all costs, including attorney’s fees. Id. at Exhibit A. As such, Defendant contends by the terms of the lease, he is entitled to Plaintiff’s payment.

8. In opposition, however, Plaintiff points out that the attorney’s fees provision is expressly limited by the attorney’s fee cap specified in the variable lease term section. Motion, Exhibit A. In that section of the lease, there is an explicit cap of $1,200.00 for attorney’s fees. Id. As such, the Defendant is only entitled to a maximum of $1,200.00, regardless of the hours his attorney worked and regardless of the rates charged.

9. Because Defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees by statute, his claim rests under Civil Code §1717 and the attorney’s fees provision in the contract. As stated by the Supreme Court in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, “the statutory right should be no greater than the contractual right.” Id. at 130. The contract clearly limits the right to fees at $1,200.00 irrespective of who is the prevailing party.

10. Therefore, under the contract, Defendant (or Plaintiff, had it been the prevailing party), is only entitled to recover a maximum of $1,200.00 under the contract.

11. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant $1,200.00 pursuant to the lease agreement.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the ______ day of May, 2014.

_____________________________
RANDOLPH A. ROGERS, JUDGE