Case Number: BC530218 Hearing Date: May 01, 2014 Dept: 1
#1 – Kelleher v. Glasscoe (BC 530 218)
This is essentially a defamation action in which Plaintiff in propria persona, Dr. William J. Kelleher, has asserted counts of libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy against Defendant Margaret T. Glasscoe and up to ten DOE defendants. The Plaintiff alleges that he, though a member of the church’s Adult Children of Alcoholics (ACA) support group, was barred from the All Saints Episcopal Church in Pasadena because church employees and officials came to believe that he had violated the church’s “safe campus” policy. Specifically, the Plaintiff had purportedly threatened to commit a violent act against a certain woman with whom he and the Defendant were acquainted. See ¶¶ 19 – 24 of Plaintiff’s Judicial Council Form Complaint, dated December 11, 2013. The Plaintiff denies having threatened anyone with violence, and alleges that church employees and officials came to believe he was capable of violence because they had received false and defamatory e-mail communications from the Defendant, who in turn sought to retaliate against the Plaintiff for disagreeing with her over the administration of the ACA support group. The Plaintiff commenced his litigation against the Defendant on December 11, 2013, in the Central Judicial District.
The Defendant now moves this court, pursuant to LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2), to transfer the case to the Northeast Judicial District, Pasadena, or – in the alternative – to the North Central Judicial District, Glendale. The Defendant argues that all of the events at issue in this case occurred in or around Pasadena, that the Plaintiff himself will not be prejudiced by the proposed transfer, and that the Defendant’s anticipated witnesses – including Ana M. Camacho Lomeli and Reverend Zelda Kennedy, both employees of the All Saints Episcopal Church – would find it less burdensome if either the Pasadena courthouse or the Glendale courthouse were the litigation forum. See Motion, Declaration of Justin A. Graham, ¶¶ 6 – 8. In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that Local Rule 2.3 does not include within its scope district transfers for the convenience of parties and party witnesses. The Plaintiff also maintains that, regardless of Local Rule 2.3, the Defendant has not carried her burden in this regard, given that she relies on the declaration of her attorney, Justin A. Graham. The Plaintiff contends, moreover, that he would be greatly prejudiced by a transfer, since he relies on the Los Angeles County Law Library for his litigation resources. In reply, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has relied on inapposite venue-related authorities or authorities that are non-existent. The Defendant also contends that the Plaintiff has demonstrated no genuine prejudice to himself for the proposed transfer.
Nonetheless, regardless of his authorities, the Plaintiff has the better part of the argument, since his choice of forum is presumptively correct [Easton v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 243, 247] and – in this instance – is actually correct. The Plaintiff has alleged IIED and defamation counts that are not governed by the mandatory filing requirements of LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(A), but by the optional filing requirements of Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B). Under the optional filing requirements, IIED and defamation suits may be filed either in the Central Judicial District or where the cause of action arose [LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B)]. The Central Judicial District is thus an entirely legitimate forum for this litigation.
Consequently, just as in motions for change of proper venue, a defendant acting under the authority of LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) should bear the burden of proof if he/she seeks a district transfer out of a presumptively and actually correct forum for the convenience of witnesses or to promote the ends of justice. See Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401. That burden of proof should, moreover, call for affidavits that contain more than generalities and conclusions. See Hamilton v Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 418, 424. Such affidavits or declarations, like those for change of venue under CCP § 397(c), ought to show the name of each witness, the expected testimony of each witness, and facts showing why the attendance of said witnesses at trial would be inconvenient or why the ends of justice would be served by a transfer. See Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 17. Convenience to non-party witnesses alone should be the key to the success of the motion, and not the convenience of parties or employees of parties. Id. The convenience of non-party witnesses is not, however, adequately established by the Defendant’s moving papers, which have not offered the actual testimony of prospective non-party witnesses to count against the Plaintiff’s lawful choice of the Central Judicial District as a litigation forum under LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B).
Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion is hereby DENIED.