SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

WILLIAM SHUFF, an individual; and JOHN HOWLAND, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

STEVENS CREEK QUARRY, INC., a California corporation; RICHARD A. VOSS, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.
Case No. 2018-1-CV-322077

TENTATIVE RULING RE: DEMURRER TO CLASS ALLEGATIONS IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

The above-entitled action comes on for hearing before the Honorable Thomas E. Kuhnle on August 3, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 5. The Court now issues its tentative ruling as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a putative class action arising out of various alleged Labor Code violations. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed on March 29, 2018, sets forth the following causes of action: (1) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods; (2) Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (4) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (5) Failure to Pay all Wages Due to Discharged and Quitting Employees; (6) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (7) Failure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties; and (8) Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices. Defendants Stevens Creek Quarry, Inc. and Richard A. Voss (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the class allegations in the FAC on the basis that plaintiffs William Shuff and John Howland (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel from pursuing the class allegations in the FAC.

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request judicial notice of a number of documents from the case of Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, 1-12-CV-227103. The Court can take judicial notice of the documents as court records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) Accordingly, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue this case is essentially the same as the case of Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, which was also filed in this Court, and thus should be dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is a doctrine which prevents relitigation of issues previously argued and resolved in a prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) For this doctrine to apply: (1) the issue must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision must have been final and on the merits; and (5) preclusion must be sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481, citation omitted.)

In Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a class action complaint on behalf of Miguel Tellez and similarly situated former employees. The complaint named as defendants Rich Voss Trucking, Inc., Stevens Creek Quarry, Inc. and Richard A. Voss. In September 2013, the Court denied Tellez’s motion for class certification. Tellez appealed and the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the motion and articulate the reasons for its decision. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1065.) On March 29, 2017, the Court denied the new motion for class certification. (Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Demurrer to Class Allegations in First Amended Complaint, Ex. H.) The Court also denied motions for leave to amend the complaint to add Christopher Hart and William Shuff as class representatives.

Defendants note that eight causes of action in this case are identical to eight of the ten causes of action in Tellez and that in Tellez Plaintiffs already sought to certify a class of the same employees that are included in this action.

Defendants rely on the case of Alvarez v. May Dept. Stores Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1223, for the proposition that collateral estoppel may bar a later class action on behalf of the same putative class on the same claims against the same defendant, even if the plaintiff in the latter action was not a party to the earlier proceeding. The Alvarez court found that if collateral estoppel were not applied, “every motion denying class certification could be relitigated until the desired result was reached. The losing class plaintiff could merely insert the name of a different individual to be the potential class representative.” (Id. at p. 1240.)

Defendants acknowledge, however, that there is authority contrary to Alvarez –

Bridgeford v. Pacific Health Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1034. In Bridgeford, the court held “the denial of class certification cannot establish collateral estoppel against unnamed putative class members on any issue because unnamed putative class members were neither parties to the prior proceeding nor represented by a party to the prior proceeding so as to be considered in privity with such a party for purposes of collateral estoppel.” (Id. at p. 1044.) Bridgeford acknowledged it came out differently than Alvarez. Bridgeford explained, however, that it followed the reasoning in Smith v. Bayer Corp. (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2011) 564 U.S. 299, which it found persuasive.

While there is some merit to the view espoused in Alvarez, the Court finds the more recent case of Bridgeford should be followed here. The named plaintiffs in this action were not parties in the Tellez matter because the Court never certified a class in that case. Under Bridgeford they were not in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. Collateral estoppel cannot apply here because this essential element is missing.

The Court also finds that the issues being litigated in this action are different than those in Tellez. Plaintiffs now seek to certify a smaller subset of the class for which certification was sought in Tellez by dropping Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. as a defendant. The Court previously denied certification because it found Tellez was not an adequate representative of employees for Stevens Creek Quarry and because Tellez did not establish common issues of law of fact would predominate in light of the fact that Rich Voss Trucking and Stevens Creek Quarry are separate companies.

(Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Demurrer to Class Allegations in First Amended Complaint, Ex. H.) Because Rich Voss Trucking is not a named defendant in this action, and because Tellez is no longer the class representative, the deficiencies identified in Tellez do not exist, and consequently it is possible Plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate class certification is appropriate.
Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED.

The Court will prepare the final order if this tentative ruling is not contested.