Case Name: Willow TV International Inc. v. Elephant Capital PLC, et al.

Case No.: 1-14-CV-266294

Defendants Elephant Capital PLC (“Elephant”), an Isle of Man corporation, and Global Cricket Ventures Limited (“GCV”), a Mauritius corporation, (collectively “Defendants”) move the Court for an order quashing the service of summons and temporary restraining order in this action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

When a defendant moves to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4^th 1054, 1062.)

California’s long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10; Luberski, Inc. v. Oleificio F.LLI Amato S.R.L. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4^th 409, 413 (“Luberski”).) Two categories of personal jurisdiction exist—general and specific. (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 134 S. Ct. 746, 754.) General jurisdiction exists “only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” (Bauman, supra, 134 S. Ct. at p. 751, emphasis added, quoting Goodyear, supra, 131 S. Ct. at p. 1851; see also Young v. Daimler, 2014 Cal.App. LEXIS 703 [discussing Bauman].) Specific jurisdiction may be asserted where the following three conditions are met: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed him or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Pavlovich v. Super. Ct. (2002) 29 Cal.4^th 262, 269.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not carried its burden of setting forth facts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over GCV. First, it is undisputed that GCV is incorporated in Mauritius. Moreover, while Plaintiff has asserted that GCV’s principal place of business was in California during the months of January through the first week of March 2010, Plaintiff has set forth no facts indicating that GCV’s principal place of business was in California at the time the parties executed the contract at issue in this case. In other words, California does not fit the paradigm for general jurisdiction. (See Bauman, supra, 134 S. Ct. at p. 760.) Second, the execution of a handful of contracts over a two-month period with foreign business entities concerning services wholly unrelated to the state of California do not constitute “constant and pervasive” contacts or give rise to “exceptional circumstances” under which this Court should exercise general jurisdiction. (Id.)

The following hypothetical helps illustrate why general jurisdiction does not exist in this case. Imagine that a California resident on vacation in Mauritius walks into GCV’s headquarters, slips and falls, and injures herself. According to Plaintiff, the hypothetical vacationer could return home to California and sue GCV in state court based upon a handful of contracts entered into by GCV in California four years ago. This is precisely the type of hypothetical scenario the U.S. Supreme Court posed and rejected in Bauman.

Plaintiff has also failed to set forth facts warranting the exercise of specific jurisdiction over GCV. As GCV points out, this action seeks the enforcement of an agreement between Elephant and non-party Keraton Holdings Ltd. GCV is not a party to that contract and none of GCV’s actions taken in California during the months of January through March in 2010 have anything to do with whether Elephant breached that agreement.

Similarly, Plaintiff has not set forth facts warranting the exercise of general jurisdiction over Elephant. Put simply, the facts asserted by Plaintiff—that an agent of Elephant visited California on two occasions and authorized actions to be taken on behalf of GCV on a limited basis over the span of two or three months—do not constitute “constant and pervasive” contacts that approximate physical presence. (Bauman, supra, 134 S. Ct. at p. 751; see also Young v. Daimler, 2014 Cal.App. LEXIS 703 [finding that general personal jurisdiction did not exist notwithstanding the fact that the accident at issue in the case occurred in California, the product at issue was purchased in California, and a United States subsidiary of the nonresident defendant manufactured the product].)

The Court does find, however, that Elephant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction. By agreeing to have California law govern the agreement at issue in this case, Elephant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of this forum. (Safe-Lab, Inc. v. Weinberger (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1055.) The controversy is related to Elephant’s contacts with the forum: Elephant sent a representative to California concerning Srinivasan and Mehta’s duties associated with GCV and agreed to compensate Srinivasan and Mehta by executing the agreement.[1] Finally, the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4^th at p. 269.) The only witnesses identified by Defendants as having knowledge of the agreement at issue in this case, other than Burman, are residents of California. Given the location of the witnesses in this case, and the fact that corporations often have more interstate activities, greater resources, and better ability to defend in a distant forum, (see Ruger v. Super. Ct. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 427, 433-434), the balance tips in favor of exercising jurisdiction.

Based upon the above discussion, Defendants’ motion to quash is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to defendant GCV and DENIED as to defendant Elephant. Consequently, the summons served on GCV and the temporary restraining order, which prohibits GCV from taking certain actions, is quashed.

[1] Elephant disputes the assertion that it entered into the agreement to compensate Srinivasan. But whether Plaintiff’s assertion is true is not the operative question. Plaintiff is only required to supply the Court with competent evidence demonstrating the existence of jurisdictional facts. In the declarations submitted by Srinivasan and Mehta, both individuals declare under the penalty of perjury that Elephant entered into the agreement to compensate them for their work with GCV. The declarations constitute competent evidence. (See BBA Aviation PLC v. Super. Ct. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4^th 421, 428-429.)