Case Name: Xiaotian Sun, et al. v. Csaba Mester, et al.
Case No.: 17-CV-305995

I. Background

This lawsuit arises from a dispute between neighbors over a public utility easement that runs between their homes. Xiaotian Sun and Wei Luo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) own property adjacent to property owned by defendants Csaba and Marta Mester (collectively, “Defendants”) in the Apollo Heights subdivision of Saratoga, California. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶¶ 1-2; FAC, Ex. A [subdivision map].) Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ property is encumbered by a public utility easement dedicated for public use, and that defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Company (“PG&E”) constructed utilities on that land. (FAC, ¶ 6.)

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege there is a PG&E electrical pole and service lines in the area of the easement, which must be accessed in order to upgrade their electric service. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendants refused to let anyone access the electrical equipment to perform the work and claim the equipment is in fact located beyond the boundary of the public utility easement and on their unencumbered property. (FAC, ¶ 7.) When Plaintiffs and PG&E requested access to investigate Defendants’ claim about the location of the electrical equipment, Defendants again denied them access. (FAC, ¶ 7.)

Consequently, Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit in which they assert causes of action against Defendants for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) quiet title to express easement; (3) quiet title to prescriptive easement; (4) quiet title to equitable easement; and (5) interference with easement. Plaintiffs also name PG&E as a defendant for purposes of the first cause of action “only because the dispute between Plaintiffs and [Defendants] involves the rights, duties, and obligations relating to a public utility easement. . . .” (FAC, ¶ 3.)

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ demurrer to each cause of action in the FAC on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

II. Demurrer

A. First Cause of Action

Defendants state the following in support of their demurrer to the first cause of action for declaratory relief: “All of the questions sought to be adjudicated via declaratory relief are dependent on [Plaintiffs] having an easement; thus, if the court finds that [Plaintiffs] [have] no easement, the first cause of action must be dismissed.” (Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 9:13-17.) Defendants do not support this assertion with any explanation or legal authority, and so they do not substantiate their demurrer to the first cause of action. (See People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282 [“‘Where a point is merely asserted by counsel without any argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.’ [Citation.]”].)
Significantly, Defendants do not actually identify the pleading standard applicable to a claim for declaratory relief, and it appears their argument is based on an incorrect assumption of law. Implicit in Defendants’ argument is the assumption that a plaintiff must allege facts showing he or she is entitled to a favorable declaration of rights to state a claim for declaratory relief. This is not the law. To state a claim for declaratory relief, a plaintiff need not allege facts showing he or she is “entitled to a favorable judgment.” (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 29.) In actuality, a plaintiff must allege there is “an ‘actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties,’ not an abstract or academic dispute.” (Ibid., quoting Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 746-47, original italics; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) Here, Plaintiffs allege there is a controversy over ownership and rights to access and use land. Thus, Plaintiffs adequately plead their claim for declaratory relief.

In conclusion, the demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

B. Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action

The second, third, and fourth causes of action are all quiet title causes of action, although each is based on a different type of easement. The second cause of action is to quiet title to an express easement, while the third and fourth causes of action are based on a prescriptive easement and an equitable easement, respectively.

Defendants argue Plaintiffs do not state “cause[s] of action for” express easement, prescriptive easement, or equitable easement. (Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at pp. 5:3, 6:14, 7:19.) They proceed as though the property rights and the causes of action based thereupon are one and the same. Defendants’ approach is misguided because an easement is a property right, not a cause of action. (See Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2001) 24 Cal.4th 871, 880-81.) Defendants do not address the pleading standard for the quiet title claims actually alleged. Thus, Defendants’ analysis is, in the first instance, inadequate.

Instead, Defendants argue and attempt to prove, through reliance on extrinsic facts such as the statement of dedication for the easement, the easement at issue is a public utility easement that benefits the public but not Plaintiffs. (Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at pp. 6:12-13, 7:1-3.) Defendants’ argument is problematic for several reasons.

First, the extrinsic facts upon which Defendants rely to support their argument are not properly before the Court. In general, a court may consider matters subject to judicial notice for purposes of a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) Even so, “[a]ny request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document listing the specific item for which notice is requested and must comply with rule 3.1306(c).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(l).) As required by rule 3.1306(c) and to provide the Court with sufficient information to determine if notice should be taken, “[a] party requesting judicial notice of material under Evidence Code sections 452 or 453 must provide the court and each party with a copy of the material.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(c); see also Evid. Code, § 453(b) [requesting party must furnish the court with sufficient information to determine if notice should be taken].)
In their memorandum of points and authorities, Defendants generically state “[f]or purposes of this demurrer, all facts are taken from the FAC, exhibits attached to the FAC, and/or other matters of which this court can take judicial notice.” (Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 3, fn. 2.) Because the statement of dedication Defendants quote is not in the pleading or the exhibits attached thereto, the Court can deduce they likely believe it is a proper subject of judicial notice. Nevertheless, Defendants did not file a separate request for judicial notice, identify the matters subject to judicial notice, provide a copy of any materials, or otherwise provide the Court with sufficient information to determine what, if anything, may properly be noticed. Consequently, the Court does not take judicial notice of the statement of dedication or any other matters within the scope of Defendants’ generic footnote, and to the extent they in fact intended it as a request for judicial notice, their request is denied.

Second, Defendants’ argument is problematic because it is appears they misunderstand the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. With respect to the second cause of action, it is fundamentally unclear why Defendants attempt to prove the easement is a public utility easement. Defendants proceed as though perhaps that fact is inconsistent with the allegations in the pleading; perhaps Defendants believe Plaintiffs are claiming individual and exclusive ownership of the easement. Plaintiffs do not, however, make such a claim. They clearly and consistently allege the easement is a public utility easement for the benefit of the public and seek to stop Defendants’ obstruction of PG&E’s access to the public infrastructure. Thus, Defendants’ argument and introduction of extrinsic materials is of no significance.

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action based on a prescriptive and an equitable easement, the significance of Defendants’ argument is also unclear because these causes of action specifically arise from the dispute over land beyond the scope of the express public utility easement.

For context, unlike an express easement, prescriptive and equitable easements arise through conduct. (See, e.g., Lithicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 268-73.) A prescriptive easement, similar to an interest in property acquired through adverse possession, arises through use of property “which has been open, notorious, continuous and adverse for an uninterrupted period of five years.” (Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 570.) Similarly, “[f]or well over 75 years, the California courts have had the discretionary authority to deny a landowner’s request to eject a trespasser and instead force the landowner to accept damages as compensation for the judicial creation of an easement over the trespassed-upon property in the trespasser’s favor, provided that the trespasser shows that (1) her trespass was innocent rather than willful or negligent, (2) the public or the property owner will not be irreparably injured by the easement, and (3) the hardship to the trespasser from having to cease the trespass is greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused the owner by the continuance of the encroachment.” (Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) “[The requirement of disproportionate hardship] also prevents equitable easements from becoming a means of obtaining an adverse easement without having to satisfy the more onerous requirements of prescriptive easements, including the requirement of five years of adverse use.” (Id. at p. 21.)

To summarize, equitable and prescriptive easements, by definition, arise when a person uses another’s land without express permission to do so. According to the allegations in the FAC, Defendants asserted that the electrical equipment was installed on their unencumbered land and was not installed in the portion of their property burdened by the express public utility easement. Consequently, the existence of the express public utility easement does not demonstrate Plaintiffs cannot attempt to establish an equitable or prescriptive easement that covers the land outside the bounds of the express easement.

Finally, Defendants’ argument is problematic because they do not explain or cite authority to support the conclusion that no quiet title cause of action has been stated.

Quiet title claims are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020, which requires a plaintiff to set forth the following five elements in a verified complaint: (1) a description of the property; (2) the plaintiff’s interest in the property; (3) the defendant’s adverse claim; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for the determination of the plaintiff’s interest in the property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subds. (a)-(e).) A plaintiff need not plead facts with particularity, “a cause of action to quiet title may be pleaded in general terms.” (Lucas v. Sweet (1956) 47 Cal.2d 20, 22; accord Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 292.)

Because Defendants fail to address the pleading standard for quiet title claims, it is not clear what allegations they believe are insufficient. The Court will, for the sake of argument, assume Defendants’ position is that Plaintiffs do not adequately allege an interest in the property.

Due to their focus on the public nature of the easement (whether express, equitable, or prescriptive), it appears Defendants’ position is that Plaintiffs must allege they have an individual and exclusive right to use the encumbered property in order to state a quiet title claim. Defendants do not, however, discuss or appear to understand the distinction between easements in gross or easements appurtenant, a distinction which is significant for purposes of evaluating both the creation and running of the right to use the encumbered property. (See Elliott v. McCombs (1941) 17 Cal.2d 23, 28-29.) Furthermore, Defendants cite no authority that either directly or indirectly supports their position. Generally speaking, an easement may be non-exclusive and “‘[w]hen an easement is “non-exclusive,” the common users must accommodate each other.’” (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1422, quoting Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 767.) Thus, it is not obvious Plaintiffs’ allegation that the easement is for the benefit and use of the public is necessarily deficient.

Defendants otherwise make unsupported assertions about whether Plaintiffs allege with sufficient particularity the requisite elements needed to prove entitlement to a prescriptive or equitable easement. But Defendants do not cite any authority to support the proposition that a plaintiff must allege each element of a prescriptive or equitable easement with particularity, and the general rule with respect to a quiet title claim is that its elements may be pleaded in general terms. (Lucas, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 22.) Consequently, Defendants’ assertions do not substantiate the conclusion that Plaintiffs do not adequately plead a property interest or that the demurrer is otherwise sustainable.

Ultimately, Defendants’ argument might be more appropriately characterized as a standing argument. In other words, Defendants’ position may be that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim to quiet title to a public utility easement. But because Defendants do not clearly advance such an argument and it is not obvious such an argument would be meritorious, the Court does not endeavor to present and address this argument for them. (See Dougherty, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 282 [a court need not address arguments lacking foundation or support]; see also Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. Patterson (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 184, 186-87 [association had third-party standing to assert claim to quiet title to recreational easement].)

In conclusion, Defendants do not substantiate their demurrer. The demurrer to the second, third, and fourth causes of action is therefore OVERRULED.

C. Fifth Cause of Action

The fifth cause of action is for interference with easement. As with the first cause of action, Defendants simply conclude this cause of action must be dismissed if the Court determines there is no easement and sustains the demurrer to the other causes of action. (Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 9:8-12.) The Court did not reach such a conclusion and Defendants otherwise fail to support their argument with any explanation or authority. Accordingly, Defendants do not substantiate their demurrer to the fifth cause of action. (See Dougherty, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 282.) The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is therefore OVERRULED.