As an initial matter the Court in ruling on a demurrer or motion to strike considers only the pleading under attack, any attached exhibits (part of the “face of the pleading”) and any facts or documents for which judicial notice is properly requested and may be granted. Any purported requests for judicial notice that do not comply with Rule of Court 3.1113(l) are denied. The Court cannot consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a demurrer or motion to strike. Accordingly, the Court has not considered the declarations of Defense Counsel Kelly Kerr and Plaintiff’s Counsel Oscar Roesler or any attached exhibits.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the criminal complaint filed June 9, 2012 in Alameda County Superior Court in the matter of People v. Michael Robert Rabbiosi and other records from that matter (Ex. A) is GRANTED pursuant to Evid. Code §452(d). While the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of court records in general, court orders may be noticed as to their contents and legal effect. Among the records in Ex. A is a copy of the minute order for the Alameda Superior Court’s October 2, 2012 hearing, which establishes that Defendant Rabbiosi entered a plea of no contest to a violation of Vehicle Code §20002(a), was found guilty, and was placed on three years probation.

Defendant’s motion to strike those portions of Paragraph GN-1 of Plaintiff’s First Amended Form Complaint that describe the police investigation of Defendant and the Alameda County District Attorney’s decision to charge Defendant with misdemeanor violations of the Vehicle Code is DENIED. Defendant’s argument that such allegations must be struck as irrelevant or improper solely because the reports they refer to may be inadmissible as hearsay if offered at a later trial is unpersuasive. The allegations are not irrelevant as they clearly support the claim that Defendant was negligent. Defendant offers no real argument that they are “improper” apart from the assertion of inadmissibility and the allegations are clearly not “false” as judicially noticeable material confirms that Defendant was charged with and found guilty of at least one misdemeanor violation of the Vehicle Code stemming from his leaving the scene of the accident.

Defendant’s motion to strike the FAC’s request for punitive damages in paragraph 14.a.(2) of the judicial council form and the exemplary damages attachment is GRANTED with 10 days’ leave to amend. Paragraph 14.a.(2) of the FAC simply references the exemplary damages attachment. The exemplary damages attachment in turn simply describes Defendant’s driving as “reckless” and repeats that he left the scene of the accident. Defendant’s leaving the scene of the accident cannot serve as a basis for punitive damages as it has nothing to do with the injury suffered by Plaintiff, which was complete before Defendant left the scene. The mere allegation that Defendant’s driving was “reckless,” without more is not a basis for punitive damages. Also contrary to the opposition’s arguments the monetary amount of the damages to Plaintiff’s property or the fact that a minor child was in Plaintiff’s car are not in themselves relevant factors.

For pleading purposes, “[t]o support punitive damages, the complaint…must allege ultimate facts of the defendant’s oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal. App. 3d 306, 316-317, internal citation omitted. Only “malice” could potentially be applicable here. “Malice” is defined in Civ. Code §3294(c)(1) as: “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Emphasis added. As there is no allegation that Defendant acted with the intent to cause injury only “despicable” conduct could be the basis for an award of punitive damages. Despicable as used in §3294(c)(1) is an additional requirement applied to actions taken in disregard of others’ rights or safety before the perpetrator can be found subject to punitive damages. Punitive damages are appropriate only if a defendant’s acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant (such as that involved in misdemeanor violations of the Vehicle Code) does not justify their imposition. Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. See Food Pro Internat., Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2008) 169 Cal App 4th 994 (6th Dist.), citing among others Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269. See also Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal App 4th 1188, 1212 (unintentional tort case involving a reckless snowboarding collision; court held that punitive damages could not be awarded because conduct was not “despicable” as defendant lacked “base or evil intent.”)