Case Number: BC427326 Hearing Date: March 29, 2018 Dept: 46

Case Number: BC427326
YOLANDA PENNY VS SAN DIMAS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ET AL

Filing Date: 12/04/2009
Case Type: Other Employment Complaint

04/02/2018
Motion for Attorney Fees
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action

TENTATIVE RULING

Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and of Class Representative Payment is GRANTED.

OSC Re: Dismissal After Settlement is set for hearing on 5/30/2018 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 46.
Discussion

On 2/24/10, Plaintiff filed her SAC for (1) Recovery of Unpaid Wages and Penalties (Violation of Labor Code §§ 204, 206, 218, 226, 510, 1194 and 1198); (2) Violation of B&PC §17200, et seq.; (3) Violation of Labor Code § 200, et seq.; (4) Failure to Allow Rest Breaks; (5) Failure to Allow Meal Breaks; (6) Violation of Labor Code § 226; (7) Failure to Keep Accurate Records (Labor Code § 1174); and (8) Violation of PAGA (Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698-2699) against D Prime Healthcare Services—San Dimas, LLC, (hereinafter, “Prime”) and DOES 1-100. On 4/7/10, following D’s peremptory challenge, the case was transferred from Judge Mel Red Recana to Judge Abraham Khan. On 4/14/10, Defendant Prime filed its Answer.

“It is the court’s duty, before finally approving the settlement, to conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement (CRC 3.769(g)). The court may design procedures to ascertain fairness, including in-chambers conferences, examination of documents or witnesses, consideration of objections by class members, and any other appropriate evidence.” Weil & Brown, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Tr. (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 14:139.12.

“The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the settlement is fair. In exercising that discretion, it normally considers the following factors:

— strength of plaintiff’s case;

— risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation;

— risk of maintaining class action status through trial;

— amount offered in settlement;

— extent of discovery completed and stage of the proceedings;

— experience and views of counsel;

— presence of a governmental participant; and

— reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

[Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 CA4th 1794, 1801, 56 CR2d 483, 488; In re Microsoft I-V Cases (2006) 135 CA4th 706, 723, 37 CR3d 660, 673; see Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 CA4th 116, 130, 85 CR3d 20, 31-32—“The most important factor is the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement” (internal quotes omitted)]

The above list is not exclusive and the court is free to balance and weigh the factors depending on the circumstances of the case. [Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 CA4th 224, 244-245, 110 CR2d 145, 162].” Id. at ¶ 14:139.13.

“Courts are cautious about inferring support for a complex settlement from lack of objections. Particularly where the stake of the individual class member is small, class members are unlikely to make their positions known. [See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. (3rd Cir. 1995) 55 F3d 768, 812].” Id. at ¶ 14:139.13a.

“The proponent bears the burden of proof to show the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. [7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 CA4th 1135, 1165-1166, 102 CR2d 777, 797-798; see also Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., supra, 91 CA4th at 245, 110 CR2d at 162; Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 CA4th 116, 132, 85 CR3d 20, 33—if some relevant information is privileged, other data must be provided that will enable court to make an independent assessment of adequacy of settlement terms]…A presumption of fairness exists where:

— the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining;

— investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently;

— counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and

— the percentage of objectors is small. [In re Microsoft I-V Cases, supra, 135 CA4th at 723, 37 CR3d at 674; 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp., supra, 85 CA4th at 1146, 102 CR2d at 784].

The presumption of fairness does not mean a court can rubber-stamp a settlement that displays these criteria. The court must still be provided with sufficient information to assess the settlement’s fairness. [Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., supra, 168 CA4th at 130, 85 CR3d at 31; see Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 CA4th 785, 803, 96 CR3d 441, 455—court could not simply accept class counsel’s unsupported and unexplained statement that particular claim had “absolutely no” value]” Id. at ¶ 14:139.14, 14:139.15.

The presumption of fairness arises here, as the settlement was reached through arm’s length bargaining, investigation and discovery have been more than adequate, counsel is quite experienced, and the percentage of objectors is zero. (Declarations of Amanda Myette, Kevin T. Barnes, and Joseph Antonelli).

Given the extreme length and heat of this contest, the significant amounts offered, and the overwhelmingly favorable reaction of the class members, this settlement is fair.

Plaintiffs have submitted in a separate packet sufficient evidence to justify their fee awards. The Declaration of Yolanda Penny details a quantum of time and effort expended sufficient to justify the Enhancement Award.

Therefore, in consideration of the above-stated factors, the motion is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Frederick C. Shaller, Judge