Case Name: Yun Jin Sun, et al. v. Sequoia Yacht Club, Inc., et al.
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-278493 (consolidated with case nos. 2015-1-CV-279274 and 2016-CV-293221)

Demurrer by Cross-Defendant Yun Jin Sun to the Cross-Complaint of Cross-Complainant James Bartone

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff and cross-defendant Yun Jin Sun, individually, and as the personal representative of and successor in interest to the Estate of Yong Sun (“Yun”). (See Second Amended Complaint [“SAC”] at ¶¶ 3-4, 6.) On April 16, 2014, defendants Ted Eberle (“Eberle”) and the Sequoia Yacht Club invited Yong Sun (“Yong”) , the decedent, to participate in an event known as a “Beer Can Race.” (Id. at ¶¶ 5 and 24.) During the race, Eberle requested Yong’s assistance in the operation of a sailing vessel. (Id. at ¶ 32.) While Yong was attempting to assist with the operation, Eberle negligently steered the vessel into a concrete marker located in the channel. (Ibid.) The sailing vessel collided with the marker causing the mast on the sailing vessel to break. (Ibid.) The mast came down forcefully on Yong’s head resulting in his death. (Ibid.)

Yun filed a SAC against defendants setting forth the following causes of action: (1) wrongful death action for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages under the general maritime law; (2) wrongful death action for pecuniary damages under the Jones Act; (3) negligence; and (4) joint venture.

On April 21, 2016, defendant and cross-complainant James Bartone (“Bartone”) filed a cross-complaint for contribution against cross-defendants Eberle, Yun, and John Dilg (“Dilg”). Bartone alleges that he was on aboard the Bella, the sailing vessel, along with Yong, Eberle, and Dilg during the Beer Can Race. (See Cross-Complaint at ¶ 7.) Bartone alleges that Yong, Dilg, and Eberle were negligent in operating the Bella and contributed to causing the vessel to allide with the marker. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-11.)

Currently before the Court is a demurrer to the cross-complaint by cross-defendant Yun on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) Yun filed a request for judicial notice in conjunction with the motion. Bartone filed written opposition. Yun filed reply papers.

Demurrer to Cross-Complaint

Yun argues that the cross-complaint for contribution is barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a).
Request for Judicial Notice

Yun’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Stepan v. Garcia (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 497, 500 [the court may take judicial notice of its own file].)

Legal Standard

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurer, we are guided by long settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213–214.)

“The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. … [I]t is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 845, 850.)

Statute of Limitations

“Statute of limitations is the collective term applied to acts or parts of acts that prescribe the periods beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action.” (V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 499, 509.) “A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action. In other words, statutes of limitation do not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.” (Id. at pp. 509-510 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)
“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar…to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 [citation omitted].)

“A timely filed claim is a condition precedent to filing an action against a decedent’s estate.” (Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 provides for an outside time limit of one year for filing any type of claim against a decedent. This section provides in pertinent part: ‘If a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.’” (Id. at p. 535.)

“This uniform one-year statute of limitations applies to actions on all claims against the decedent which survive the decedent’s death. This limitations period, however, is tolled by (1) the timely filing of a creditor claim; (2) the filing of a petition for payment of debts, claims or expenses from the decedent’s revocable trust; or (3) a proceeding to judicially construe a ‘no contest’ provision.” (Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.)

With respect to the cross-complaint, Bartone seeks contribution against the decedent’s estate. According to the SAC in the underlying action, Yong died on April 16, 2014 as a result of the incident on the sailing vessel. Thus, Bartone was required to file his cross-complaint against the estate on or before April 16, 2015. Since Bartone did not file the cross-complaint until April 21, 2016, Yun claims that the action is untimely.

However, Bartone correctly points out in opposition that this action is governed by federal maritime law, not state law. “A party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction ‘over a tort claim must satisfy both a location test and a connection test.’ [Citations.] The tort must occur on navigable waters and bear a ‘significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.’ [Citation.]” (In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1124, 1126.) Furthermore, “[a] state court is not free to apply its own substantive law to a maritime cause of action simply because the state court has subject matter jurisdiction. The applicable law is not determined by the choice of forum. General substantive maritime law must be applied even though suit is brought in the state court. [Citations.]” (Blevins v. Sfetku (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 527, 532.)

Here, Bartone alleges that the Bella was a vessel operating on the navigable waters of Redwood Creek and its Redwood Creek Channel within the territorial waters of the State of California. (See Cross-Complaint at ¶ 6.) Also, according to the SAC in the underlying action, Yun alleges that “the incident that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, had an actual impact on maritime commerce, involves a traditional maritime activity, and is therefore subject to the admiralty tort jurisdiction.” (See SAC at ¶ 1.) The Court takes judicial notice of these allegations on its own authority as Yun alleges that this action is governed by federal maritime law. (See Nulaid Farmers Ass’n v. LaTorre (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 788, 791 [“It is settled that a court may take judicial notice of its own records when ruling on a demurrer.”].) For purposes of demurrer, the Court finds that the action is governed by federal maritime law.

Absent a specific contractual or statutory provision, the equitable doctrine of laches dictates the timeliness of maritime claims. (See Pierre v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. (3d. Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 445, 450 [“[D]elay in bringing suit on an admiralty claim is barred by laches, not by any statute of limitations.”]; Hill v. W. Bruns & Co. (2d Cir. 1974) 498 F.2d 565, 568 [“In an admiralty suit state statutes of limitations are not strictly applied; instead, the doctrine of laches controls.”].) Because admiralty law contains no express statute of limitations for contribution, laches controls the timeliness of Bartone’s action against Yun. Unlike traditional limitations periods, the doctrine of laches requires the presence of both inexcusable delay and prejudice. (See Stevens Technical Services, Inc. v. SS Brooklyn (9th Cir. 1989) 885 F.2d 584, 588.)

In reply, Yun argues that even claims under maritime law are governed by state statutes of limitations. In doing so, Yun cites to Longfellow v. Presidente Miguel Aleman (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 508 for the proposition that “[f]ederal law does not require a state to make room for admiralty claims in its courts. When a state chooses to make its court available for the vindication of admiralty rights, the procedural rules governing state litigation are generally applied.” (Id. at p. 513.) However, the appellate court in Longfellow upheld the trial court’s application of the maritime doctrine of laches rather than the state statute of limitations. (Id. at pp. 513-514.) In fact, the court’s opinion cited to Curbelo v. Matson Navigation Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 305 where the First Appellate District Court held that the admiralty doctrine of laches, not the California statute of limitations, was applicable to an action for personal injuries sustained aboard a vessel in navigable waters. (Id. at p. 308.) Thus, both Longfellow and Curbelo would suggest that maritime claims in California are governed by laches, not by the state statute of limitations.

Even if the Court were to apply the doctrine of laches, Yun asserts that the claim for contribution would still be barred. (See Reply at pp. 2-4.) However, the Court declines to consider the merits of this argument as it is being raised for the first time in reply. (See Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [points raised for the first time in reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument]; see also Younger v. State of California (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 806, 813 [“[A] point raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present such point before.”].) Furthermore, the existence of laches is generally “a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the applicable circumstances.” (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1417.) Therefore, Yun may renew his laches argument in a motion for summary judgment with supporting evidence or during the time of trial.

Finally, Yun argues that the cross-complaint fails because the estate no longer exists. (See Reply at pp. 4-5.) The Court also declines to consider this argument as it raised for the first time in the reply papers.

Therefore, the demurrer to the cross-complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim is OVERRULED.