Zosima-Susie A. Andrada v. Teresa Andrada Agustin-Baghbanbashi

Case Name: Andrada v. Agustin-Baghbanbashi
Case No.: 2017-1-CV-317951

Plaintiff Zosima-Susie A. Andrada (“Plaintiff”) is the sister of decedent Estela Adrada Agustin (“Decedent” or “Estela”). (See complaint, p.1:17.) Although it is not abundantly clear, the allegations of the complaint allege that Decedent and Plaintiff’s parents purchased a house in November 1981 with Decedent, Manuel Bautista Agustin and Priscila Andrada Untalasco. (See complaint, p.3:54-58 , exh. 1.) The house was sold, and the parents’ proceeds of the sale were entrusted to Decedent, who used the proceeds to purchase certain other real properties. (See complaint, pp.3:59-66, 4:67-68.) In 2005, Estela asked Plaintiff to sign an agreement regarding distribution of her parents’ interest in the rental properties on Plaintiff’s mother’s death, but Estela refused to sign it, due to a perceived threat by Priscila Andrada Untalasco that she would report Estela for financial elder abuse if she signed the agreement. (See complaint, p.4:72-85.) On July 7, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that her ARAG Legal Plan “was compromised and used by the defendants to void an agreement between Estela and Plaintiff’s mother. (See complaint, pp.4:86-87, 5:1-108.)

On October 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Teresa Andrada Agustin-Baghbanbashi (“Teresa”), John Andrada Agustin (“John”), Arman Baghbanbashi (“Arman”), Thy Agustin (“Thy”), Leonides “Onie” Agustin (“Onie”) and Fortunata Que Andrada (“Fortunata”), asserting causes of action for:

1) “concealment of written agreement or contract left by my deceased sister Estela and deceased mother Gerundina”;
2) forgeries;
3) “deceptive suspicious acts. Two DVDs were created and recorded.”
4) “lack of cooperation and refusal of the defendants Teresa and John to open a money talk conversation among the siblings”;
5) “deceptive act of defendant Arman Baghbanbashi”;
6) “breach of trust, deception, and lack of cooperation among family members towards these rental properties”;
7) “intervention and deceptive act of defendant Leonides ‘Onie’ Bautista”;
8) “other intervention and deceptive acts of defendant Leonides Agustin”;
9) “intervention and deceptive acts of Fortunata Que Andrada acting as a financial advisor of defendants Teresa and John”; and,
10) “deceptive acts defendant Fortunata Que Andrada and defendant Arman Baghbanbashi”.

Defendants Teresa and Arman demur to each cause of action on the ground that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. Defendant Fortunata separately demurs to the ninth and tenth causes of action on the ground that they are uncertain. Defendants Teresa and Arman also move to compel initial responses to form interrogatories.

Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to the demurrers or the motion to compel initial responses to form interrogatories. Instead, it appears that Plaintiff has been randomly filing documents with the court, often with a reason that is not immediately apparent. For example, on March 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Document 12.” In this document, Plaintiff apparently complains that she would like her deposition to be at the Court as opposed to defendant Arman’s counsel’s office because she was a victim of a hit-and-run accident, and she believes that Arman implicated her in a child molestation case which is somehow related to purportedly illegal activities by Arman that will be fraudulently ratified by the Court. Somehow, these concerns relate to her need to have her “deposition to be scheduled inside the court room in front of a judge to relieve [her] feeling of being harm [sic].” On March 26, April 3 and 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed interrogatories to defendants Arman, Fortunata, and Thy and Onie, respectively. These documents address neither Plaintiff’s lack of initial responses to the form interrogatories propounded by Teresa and Arman, nor the demurrers. Thus, the demurrers and motion to compel initial responses are unopposed.

Teresa and Arman’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories

As the motion to compel initial responses is unopposed, and there is no indication that Plaintiff has provided initial responses to Teresa and Arman’s form interrogatories, Teresa and Arman’s motion to compel initial responses to form interrogatories is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified, code-compliant responses to the form interrogatories without objections within 20 days of notice of entry of the Court’s signed order.

In connection with the motion, Teresa and Arman request monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $540.00. The request is code-compliant. Teresa and Arman have substantially prevailed on their motion. There are no circumstances that would make imposition of the sanctions unjust. However, the amount of sanctions requested is excessive. Accordingly, Teresa and Arman’s request for monetary sanctions in connection with their motion to compel initial responses to form interrogatories is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff shall pay counsel for Teresa and Arman $200.00 within 20 days of notice of entry of the Court’s signed order.

The demurrers

As to the demurrers, the Court agrees with Defendants that the causes of action are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10 requires that a complaint state “the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language… [and include a] demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) “If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) Each cause of action must specifically state its number, its nature, and the parties to whom it is directed. (See Rule of Court 2.112.) A failure to identify the nature of the claim, or to allege facts in ordinary and concise language subjects the pleader to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) Additionally, if a cause of action fails to allege facts that do not support the elements for a cause of action, then it is subject to a general demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)

The purported first cause of action is somehow related to an ARAG Legal Plan, but it is entirely unclear as to what damages to Plaintiff occurred or what relief Plaintiff is seeking. Other causes of action appear to involve Plaintiff’s family members, but they fail to allege: how the alleged misconduct relates to Plaintiff; how Plaintiff might have been otherwise damaged; and/or any relief sought by Plaintiff. It is impossible for the defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s allegations as it is unclear as to what Plaintiff seeks. To the extent that the causes of action are asserting a cause of action for fraud, the elements of a cause of action for fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation, which includes a concealment or nondisclosure; (2) knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation, i.e., scienter; (3) intent to induce reliance on the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damages. (See Lazar v. Super. Ct. (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.) (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638.) Moreover, a fraud cause of action must “allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.) Here, it is unclear what particular misrepresentation or concealment relied on by Plaintiff is alleged to have resulted in damages to Plaintiff. Accordingly, as the defendants argue, the causes of action also fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Teresa and Arman’s demurrer to each cause of action on the grounds that they are both uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend after notice of entry of the Court’s signed order. Fortunata’s demurrer to the ninth and tenth causes of action is likewise SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend after notice of entry of the Court’s signed order.

The Court will prepare the Order.

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