Pamela Behm v. Clear View Technologies, et al.		CASE NO. 111CV206163
DATE: 16 January 2015	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 2

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.882.2310 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 15 January 2015.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 16 January 2015, the following motions were argued and submitted: (1) the motion of defendant Paul Mula (“Mula”) to compel plaintiff Pamela Behm (“Behm”) to provide further responses to special interrogatories (“SI”), set three, and (2) Mula’s motion to compel plaintiffs Linda Pokarney (“Pokarney”), Robert DeLuca (“DeLuca”), and Robert Cisneros (“Cisneros”) to respond to SI, set one and Pokarney to respond to request for production of documents (“RPD”), set one. Behm, Pokarney, Deluca, and Cisneros filed formal oppositions to the motions.

1. Statement of Facts

This action arises from Behm’s investment in defendant Clear View Technologies (“CVT”). A stay-at-home mother until her divorce in 2010, Behm attempted to reenter the workforce by beginning an unpaid internship at CVT that same year. While interning at CVT, CVT’s officers, including Mula, allegedly tricked Plaintiff into investing $200,000 into the company based on fraudulent misrepresentations that CVT owned valuable patents and a functioning prototype of its BarMaster system, designed to measure each pour from a bottle of alcohol to within 1/20^th of an ounce. When Behm discovered that these representations were false, she attempted to rescind her investment. When CVT refused, she filed the present action.

In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts causes of action against CVT, Mula, and other CVT officers and shareholders for (1) rescission, (2) fraud and deceit, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) violation of Corporations Code sections 25400 and 25500, (5) violation of Corporations Code sections 25401, 25501 and 25504.1, (6) violation of Corporations Code section 25504, and (7) unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

On 9 April 2014, the matter was consolidated with Pokarney, et al. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, et al., case number 1-13-CV-255461 (the “Pokarney case”). In the Pokarney case, Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros sought the investment advice of defendant Daniel Carpenter (“Carpenter”), who held himself out as an agent for defendant Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Northwestern”). Carpenter advised Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros to invest in CVT based on a number of fraudulent misrepresentations concerning CVT patents and the BarMaster system. Mula, Dong and Zevgolis repeated these misrepresentations to induce Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros to invest in CVT. In reliance on these misrepresentations, Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros invested over $1.3 million.

In their operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros assert seven causes of action against Carpenter, Northwestern, Mula, and other CVT officers and shareholders for (1) fraud and deceit, (2) fraud and deceit, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) violation of Corporations Code section 2501.5, (5) violation of Corporations Code sections 25400 and 25500, (6) violation of Corporations Code sections 25401, 25501 and 25504.1, and (7) violation of Corporations Code section 25504.

1. Discovery Disputes
2. Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, Set One, and RPD, Set One

On 12 June 2014, Mula served SI, set one, and RPD, set one, on the each plaintiff in the Pokarney case. On 7 August 2014, each plaintiff served his or her responses to the SI and RPD, consisting of both objections and substantive responses.

On 18 September 2014, Mula’s counsel, J. Mark Thacker (“Thacker”), sent a meet and confer email to Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros’s counsel, indicating that their objections lacked merit and requesting further responses.

On 7 November 2014, counsel for the parties participated in an extensive conference call to discuss the responses to the SI and RPD, but were unable to informally resolve the dispute. On 17 November 2014, Mula filed his motion to compel Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros to provide further responses to SI, set one, and RPD, set one. Pokarney, DeLuca and Cisneros filed their opposition to the motion on 5 January 2015. On 9 January 2015, Mula filed his reply.

1. Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, Set Three

On 5 August 2014, Mula served SI, set three, on Behm. Approximately one month later, on 8 September 2014, Behm served her responses to SI, set three, consisting of both objections and substantive responses.

On 13 October 2014, Thacker sent a meet and confer letter to Behm’s counsel, indicating that Behm’s objections lacked merit and requesting further responses. Roughly one month later, on 7 November 2014, Behm’s counsel sent a letter in response, indicating that the objections were justified and refusing to provide further responses.

As the parties were unable to informally resolve the dispute, Mula filed his motion to compel Behm to provide further responses to SI, set three on 17 November 2014. On 5 January 2015, Behm filed her opposition. Mula filed his reply on 9 January 2015.

1. Discussion
2. Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, Set One and RPD, Set One

Mula moves to compel Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca to provide further responses to SI, set one, Nos. 28-30. In addition, Mula moves to compel Pokarney to provide further responses to SI, set one, Nos. 44-45 and RPD, set one, No. 13.

2. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the SI

SI Nos. 28-30 request information concerning the first date each plaintiff in the Pokarney case had any communications with the Grellas Shah LLP law firm (“Grellas Shah”) relating to CVT (SI No. 28), the date each plaintiff retained Grellas Shah in relation to this lawsuit (SI No. 29), and the date each plaintiff had any communications with Grellas Shah relating to Behm (SI No. 30). SI Nos. 44-45 ask Pokarney whether she was issued a life insurance policy (SI No. 44), and if she was not, to state all facts upon which her response to SI No. 44 is based (SI No. 45). Pokarney, Cisneros, and DeLuca’s responses to the SI consisted solely of objections.

Mula argues that further responses are warranted to SI Nos. 28-30 (as to all plaintiffs in the Pokarney case) and 44-45 (as to Pokarney) because Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca’s objections are without merit. Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca oppose the motion on the ground that their objections are meritorious.

1. Legal Standards

A party propounding interrogatories may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) The burden is on the responding party to justify any objections. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

 

1. Good Cause

As a threshold matter, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca argue that the motion to compel further responses to the SI should be denied in its entirety because Mula does not establish that good cause exists for the discovery sought by the SI. (See Opposition, pp. 7:16-28, 12:6-7.)  A motion to compel further responses, however, to interrogatories does not require any showing of good cause in support of a motion.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300; see also Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) Accordingly, Mula is not required to establish that good cause exists for the discovery sought by the SI.

1. Objections  

Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca raised a number of objections to the SI at issue. In their opposition, however, they only attempt to justify their objections on the grounds of relevance (as to SI Nos. 28-30 and 44-45), privacy (as to SI Nos. 44-45), and attorney-client privilege (as to SI Nos. 28 and 30). The remaining objections are therefore overruled. (See Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221.)

1. Relevance

Discovery is allowed for any matter that is not privileged, relevant to the subject matter involved in the action, and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The “relevance to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” standards are applied liberally with any doubt generally resolved in favor of discovery. (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.) Moreover, for discovery purposes, information is “relevant to the subject matter” if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

1.             SI Nos. 28-30

With regard to SI Nos. 28-30, which seek information concerning the dates each plaintiff contacted, retained, and communicated with Grellas Shah relating to this lawsuit, Mula contends that this information is relevant to a potential statute of limitations defense. (See Mula’s Sep. Statement, pp. 8:9-11, 10:25-27, 13:13-15.) Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca argue that Mula’s argument is flawed for several reasons.

First, they assert that the statute of limitations for a fraud claim begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the fraud, not when the plaintiff consults his or her attorney. (See Opposition, p. 8:2-6.) Thus, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca reason that the dates of initial contact and retention are irrelevant. This argument lacks merit. Under the discovery rule, a fraud cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, a cause of action. (See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements. (Id.) Information concerning when Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca’s consulted an attorney in relation to this matter could assist Mula in determining when they suspected a factual basis for the present claim.

Next, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca argue that their action could not possibly be time-barred because the statute of limitations for fraud is three years, each plaintiff made their initial investment in 2010, and they filed their lawsuit in 2013. (See Opposition, pp. 8:27-28, 9:1-3.) This argument is not persuasive. In the FAC, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca assert claims under the Corporations Code which are subject to a two-year statute of limitations from the discovery of the facts constituting a violation. (See Corp. Code, § 25506, subd. (b).) Accordingly, these causes of action could be time-barred.

In light of the foregoing, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca’s objections to SI Nos. 28-30 on the ground of relevance are unjustified. As such, these objections are overruled.

1. SI Nos. 44-45

With regard to SI Nos. 44-45, which seek information concerning whether Pokarney was issued a life insurance policy, Mula asserts that Pokarney specifically alleged that after several meetings with Carpenter, she applied for life insurance. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:20-23.) Given that the life insurance application is part of Pokarney’s relationship with Carpenter and Pokarney alleges that Mula is a co-conspirator with Carpenter, Mula argues that he is entitled to obtain information regarding the application. (See Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:23-28.) In opposition, Pokarney contends that the allegations regarding life insurance merely provide background information concerning the manner in which Carpenter first approached her. (Opposition, p. 12: 22-24.) Pokarney’s argument is persuasive. Pokarney’s action against Carpenter and Mula solely concerns their roles in fraudulently inducing her to invest over a million dollars in CVT. In this regard, Pokarney does not assert a cause of action against Carpenter or any other defendant regarding her application for life insurance. As such, it is unclear how information related to her application for life insurance is relevant to the subject matter of this action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, Pokarney’s objections to SI Nos. 44-45 on the ground of relevance are justified. As such, these objections are sustained.

1. Privacy

Pokarney objects to SI Nos. 44-45, which seek information concerning whether Pokarney was issued a life insurance policy (SI No. 44) and if she was not, all facts upon which her response to SI No. 44 is based (SI No. 45), on the ground that they intrude upon her right to privacy. Pokarney asserts that the life insurance application process involved the disclosure of highly sensitive information, including her medical information, and her responses to the interrogatories would reveal such information. (Opposition, pp. 13:27-28, 14:1-10.)

The right to privacy protects an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370.) It is well-established that the right to privacy extends to an individual’s medical information. (See Brillantes v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 323, 339.) Where a serious invasion of the right to privacy is shown, the proponent of the discovery must demonstrate that the information sought is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 850; see also Binder v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 893, 901 [holding “direct relevance” requires something more than an assertion that the requested discovery might lead to admissible evidence].) Once direct relevance has been demonstrated, the proponent of discovery must show that the information sought is not available through less intrusive means. (Allen v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 449.) The court must then carefully balance the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right of civil litigants to discover facts, on the other. (Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 371.)

Here, it does not appear from the face of the interrogatories that they necessarily call for the disclosure of any sensitive information. SI Nos. 44-45 merely seek the disclosure of whether Pokarney received a life insurance policy and the basis for the denial. While Pokarney asserts that the denial of life insurance could be based on her private medical information, she provides no evidence indicating that the denial was in fact based on private information or that responding to the interrogatories would reveal such information. Thus, Pokarney fails to justify her objections to SI Nos. 44-45 on the ground of privacy. As such, the objections on this ground are overruled.

1. Attorney-Client Privilege

Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca claim that SI Nos. 28 and 30, which request the dates each plaintiff communicated with Grellas Shah regarding CVT (SI No. 28) and Behm (SI No. 30), seek information subject to the attorney-client privilege. (Oppostion, p. 9:23-25.) Mula argues that no privileged information is sought by these interrogatories because they seek only independent facts related to attorney-client communications, not the substance of the communications themselves. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:12-17.)

Under Evidence Code section 954, a client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer. “However, the attorney-client privilege only protects disclosure of communications between the attorney and the client; it does not protect disclosure of underlying facts which may be referenced within a qualifying communication.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 639.)

Pokarney, Ciseneros and DeLuca acknowledge that underlying facts regarding attorney-client communications are not subject to the privilege. (Opposition, pp. 9:28, 10:1-3.) They, however, assert that SI Nos. 28 and 30 ask them to disclose the dates they spoke to their attorneys about CTV and Behm, which necessarily concerns the substance of the communications. Thus, Pokarney, Ciseneros and DeLuca contend that the interrogatories seek the contents of privileged communications. This argument is not persuasive.

In Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d 210, 219-220, the Court of Appeal addressed this exact issue. The interrogatory at issue in Coy, supra, read as follows: “When did you first discuss Mr. Coy’s obligation to you with [your attorney]?” (Id. at p. 219.) The Court of Appeal held that the interrogatory did not seek to elicit any communication or conversation between attorney and client and thus, the information sought by the question “is not a matter within the purview of the attorney-client privilege, even though it refers to [the attorney-client] relationship.” (Id. at p. 220.)

Just as the interrogatory in Coy, supra, SI Nos. 28 and 30 do not seek to elicit the substance of attorney-client conversations. They only seek to establish the date each plaintiff communicated with counsel concerning this matter. Accordingly, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca’s objections to SI Nos. 28-30 on the ground of the attorney-client privilege are unjustified. As such, these objections are overruled.

1. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, as Pokarney’s relevance objections to SI Nos. 44 and 45 are sustained, the motion to compel further responses to SI Nos. 44-45 is DENIED. As all objections to SI Nos. 28-30 are overruled and Pokarney, Ciseneros and DeLuca have provided no substantive responses to these interrogatories, the motion to compel further responses to SI Nos. 28-30 is GRANTED.

1. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD No. 13

RPD No. 13 seeks all documents relating to the life insurance application referred to in paragraph 59 of the first amended complaint. Pokarney’s response to RPD No. 13 consisted solely of objections.

Mula argues that a further response to RPD No. 13 is warranted because Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca’s objections are without merit. Pokarney opposes the motion on the ground that her objections are meritorious.

1. 1. Legal Standards

A party propounding a request for production of documents may move for an order compelling a further response if it deems that an objection in the response is without merit or too general.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subds. (a)(1)-(3).)  The motion must set forth “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)  Good cause is established simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.  (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)  If good cause is shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections.  (Id.)

2. Good Cause

Discovery is allowed for any matters that are not privileged, relevant to the subject matter involved in the action, and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)  The “relevance to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” standards are applied liberally with any doubt generally resolved in favor of discovery.  (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)  Moreover, for discovery purposes, information is “relevant to the subject matter” if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

Mula argues that good cause exists for RPD No. 13 because Pokarney specifically alleges in the FAC that she applied for life insurance. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:20-23.)  As previously discussed in connection with Pokarney’s relevance objections to SI Nos. 44-45, the allegations regarding life insurance merely provide background information concerning the manner in which Carpenter first approached her, and Pokarney does not assert a cause of action against Carpenter or any other defendant regarding her application for life insurance. As such, it is unclear how information related to her application for life insurance is relevant to the subject matter of this action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, good cause does not exist for RPD No. 13.

 

3. Conclusion  

Based on the foregoing, the motion to compel a further response to RPD No. 13 is DENIED.

1. Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, Set Three

Mula moves to compel Behm to provide further responses to SI, set three, Nos. 261-264. SI Nos. 261 and 262 request information concerning all persons with whom Behm, and all persons acting on her behalf, had any communications relating to the “joint filing” referenced in a 7 July 2011 email identified as document No. BEH000683. SI Nos. 263 and 264 ask Behm to identify all shareholders or investors of CVT with whom she communicated regarding this lawsuit and all documents related to those communications. Behm’s responses to SI Nos. 261, 262 and 264 consisted solely of objections. Behm responded to SI No. 263 with both objections and a substantive response.

Mula argues that further responses are warranted to the SI because Behm’s objections are without merit and her substantive response to SI No. 263 is incomplete. Behm opposes the motion on the ground that her objections are meritorious and the substantive response to SI No. 263 is complete.

1. 1.         Legal Standards

A party propounding interrogatories may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems an objection is without merit or too general and/or a response is evasive or incomplete.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) The burden is on the responding party to justify any objections. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

2. Good Cause

As a threshold matter, Behm argues that the motion to compel further responses to the SI should be denied in its entirety because Mula does not establish that good cause exists for the discovery sought by the SI. (See Opposition, pp. 3:11-13, 5:25-27.) As previously indicated, a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories does not require any showing of good cause in support of a motion.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300; see also Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) Accordingly, Mula is not required to establish that good cause exists for the discovery sought by the SI.

3. Objections  

Behm raised a number of objections to the SI at issue. In her opposition, however, she only attempts to justify her objections based on the violation of the stipulated protective order (as to SI Nos. 261 and 262) and the attorney work product protection (as to SI Nos. 263 and 264). The remaining objections are therefore overruled. (See Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221.)

1. Violation of the Stipulated Protective Order

Behm claims that SI Nos. 261 and 262, which request information concerning persons with whom Behm has had communications relating to the “joint filing” referenced in document No. BEHM000683, violate section 12 of the stipulated protective order entered into by the parties because they expressly refer to a privileged document that was clawed-back. (Opposition, p. 3:14-16.) In this regard, Behm’s counsel declares the following: On 18 June 2013, the Court (Hon. Kevin McKenney) approved a stipulated protective order governing the use of confidential information. (Shah Decl., ¶ 2.) Document No. BEHM000683 was inadvertently produced on 25 November 2013. (Shah Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) On 14 July 2014, Behm’s counsel emailed Mula’s counsel, Thacker, indicating that BEHM000683 contained a communication subject to the attorney-client privilege and requesting that counsel destroy all copies in his possession. (Shah Decl., ¶ 5.)

Mula does not contest, at least for the purposes of this motion, that BEM000683 is privileged. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:2-3.) He asserts, however, that referring to BEHM000683 in SI Nos. 261 and 262 does not constitute an improper “use” of the document.  (Reply, p. 3:2-3.) This argument is not persuasive. Section 12 of the protective order prohibits the use of inadvertently produced information “for any purpose….”[1] (Shah Decl., Ex. A.) Given the all-encompassing language of the provision, the Court finds that the drafting of discovery requests referencing an inadvertently produced document constitutes a “use” of the information. As such, the objections to SI Nos. 261 and 262 on this ground are justified and are therefore sustained.

2. Attorney Work Product Protection

Behm asserts that SI Nos. 263 and 264, which ask her to identify all shareholders or investors of CVT with whom she, and all persons acting on her behalf, communicated regarding this lawsuit and all related documents, intrudes upon the attorney work product protection to the extent that it requires her to disclose the individuals with which her attorney communicated regarding the lawsuit.  (Opposition, p. 6:1-4.) Mula contends that the list of witnesses with whom her attorney communicated would not implicate the work product doctrine because they would not reveal counsel’s mental processes. (Reply, p. 4:13-15.)

“California’s civil work product privilege is codified in section 2018.030.  Subdivision (a) provides absolute protection to any ‘writing that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.’  Such a writing ‘is not discoverable under any circumstances.’”  (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488.)  “Section 2018.030 subdivision (b) provides qualified protection for all other work product.  Such material ‘is not discoverable unless the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result in an injustice.’”  (Id.)

Information concerning the identity of interviewed witnesses is not automatically protected by the attorney work product doctrine. (See McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 474.) Instead, an objecting party may only be entitled to the protection “if it can make a preliminary or foundational showing that answering the interrogatory would reveal the attorney’s tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case, or would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney’s industry or efforts.” (Coito, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 502.) If such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the propounding party to demonstrate that denial of the discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result in an injustice. (Id. at p. 488.)

While Behm asserts that requiring it to divulge the witnesses her counsel spoke to would permit Mula’s counsel to “unfairly free ride off of [her attorney’s] efforts” (see Behm’s Sep. Statement, pp. 8:22-25, 12:28, 13:1-2), she provides no evidence indicating that her counsel expended significant time and effort in identifying these witnesses and securing their  willingness to speak. As such, she fails to make a preliminary showing that answering SI Nos. 263 and 264 would result in the disclosure of information entitled to attorney work product protection. Thus, the objections to SI Nos. 263 and 264 on this ground are unjustified and are therefore overruled.

1. Substantive Response to SI No. 263

In response to SI No. 263, which asks Behm to identify all shareholders or investors of CVT with whom she, and all persons acting on her behalf, communicated regarding this lawsuit, Behm identified all persons she personally communicated with regarding her claim and withheld the list of shareholders and investors with whom her attorney communicated based on the attorney work product protection.

Mula contends that a further response should be compelled because Behm does not identify the investors or shareholders with whom her counsel communicated regarding the lawsuit. This argument is persuasive. An interrogatory response must be as complete and straightforward as the information available to the responding party permits.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a).)  Here, Behm does not identify all investors or shareholders with whom persons acting on her behalf communicated, which is the call of the question, and Behm’s objection on the ground of the attorney work product protections has been overruled. As such, a further response to SI No. 263 is warranted.

1. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, as Behm’s objections to SI Nos. 261 and 262 based on the violation of the stipulated protective order are sustained, the motion to compel further responses to SI Nos. 261 and 262 is DENIED. As all objections to SI Nos. 263 are overruled and Behm’s substantive response is incomplete, the motion to compel a further response to SI No. 263 is GRANTED. As all objections to SI No. 264 are overruled and Behm provided no substantive response to this interrogatory, the motion to compel a further response to SI Nos. 264 is GRANTED.

1. Conclusion and Order

Mula’s motion to compel Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca to provide further responses to SI, set one, and RPD, set one is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion to compel Pokarney to provide further responses to SI Nos. 44-45 and RPD No. 13 is DENIED. The motion to compel Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca to provide further responses to SI Nos. 28-30 is GRANTED. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order, Pokarney, Cisneros and DeLuca shall each serve verified code-compliant further responses, without objections, to SI Nos. 28-30.

Mula’s motion to compel Behm to provide further responses to the SI, set three, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to SI Nos. 261 and 262. The motion is GRANTED as to SI Nos. 263 and 264. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order, Behm shall serve verified code-compliant further responses, without objections, to SI Nos. 263 and 264.

 

 

[1] The provision reads, in pertinent part: “If a claim of inadvertent production is made with respect to information then in the custody of another party, such party shall promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information if the party disclosed it before being notified. Such information shall not be used by the Receiving Party for any purpose other than in connection with a motion to compel (which shall be filed under seal). The party returning such material may then move the Court for an Order compelling production of the material, which shall be filed under seal, and said motion shall not assert as a ground for entering such an Order the fact or circumstances of the inadvertent production.” (See Shah Decl., Ex. A.)