Case Number: 14K00422    Hearing Date: September 16, 2014    Dept: 77

Defendant/Judgment Debtor The Amanda Foundation’s Motion to Vacate Sister-State Judgment is GRANTED. CCP § 1710.40.

Each party’s request for judicial notice is granted in part. The Court may take judicial notice of official acts of a state or federal agency and records in the pending action, or in any other action pending in the same court or any other court of record in the U.S. Evidence Code § 452(c) and (d). Accordingly, judicial notice is taken of Defendant’s Exhibits 2-6 and of Plaintiff’s Exhibits 3-5.

This motion is timely per CCP § 1710.40(b). CCP § 1710.40 is the proper means to challenge registration of a sister-state judgment on jurisdictional grounds, and its 30-day limitations period is inapplicable to challenges based on lack of fundamental jurisdiction. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Renda (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 14.

A motion to vacate the judgment may be based on any ground that would be a defense to an action in California on the sister state judgment, including the ground that interest accrued on the sister state judgment and included in the judgment is incorrect. CCP § 1710.40(a). One ground to vacate is where the judgment debtor had not received notice or been afforded an opportunity to be heard in the action as required by constitutional due process. See Commercial National Bank of Peoria v. Kermeen (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 396, 399.

Here, defendant has shown that service in the Illinois action was improper. Diana Gomez was served on behalf of the defendant company, but she did not have authority to accept service on behalf of defendant. Although plaintiff argues that Gomez’s declaration is self-serving and that at the time she indicated that she was authorized to accept service, she in fact was an office secretary and not the agent for service.

Plaintiff’s argument that the method of service was reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of the pending lawsuit in Illinois is not persuasive, as service on an office secretary was not the statutory method of service in Illinois. There is a sound basis for the statutory method of requiring service upon an officer or authorized agent of a company: to help ensure that the individual receiving service understands the nature of what is received and handles it appropriately. In contrast, the testimony of the office secretary here is that she did not understand the nature of what she had received and did not “deliver it to her employer.” Accordingly, this motion is granted.

Moving party to give notice.