Case Number: BC533679    Hearing Date: October 31, 2014    Dept: 92

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

CAITLYNN LAWSON,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
ACHAEL SHEFTER, ET AL.,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: BC533679

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Dept. 92
1:30 p.m. — #3
October 31, 2014

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is Denied. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within ten days.

1. Facts
Plaintiff, Caitlynn Lawson filed this action against Defendant, Rachael Shefter for damages arising out of an automobile accident.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains a prayer for punitive damages based on the allegation that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the subject accident. Plaintiff alleges Defendant ingested both alcohol and ambien immediately prior to driving, and that when Defendant arrived at the hospital, she remembered neither driving nor being involved in an accident.

2. Motion to Strike
Defendant moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages and the related allegations from the complaint.

Allegations that a defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others are sufficient to show malice. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-96.) The Taylor court concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. “One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.” (Id., at p. 897.)

To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff simply needs to “establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Id., at p. 896.) If the essential gravamen of the complaint is that “Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby” then this is sufficient to allege punitive damages. (Id.) While a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases. (Id.)

Taylor justified imposing punitive damages upon the ¿deliberate¿ drunk driver for many reasons, including the high degree of foreseeability of injury and damage flowing from driving while intoxicated. The court says the essential allegation is that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. The decision also discusses the grave havoc wrought by intoxicated drivers nationwide and equates the act of deliberately driving while under the influence with a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others which may be described as willful or wanton. Such conduct, the court said, has traditionally been a basis for awarding punitive damages. (Herrick v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 787, 790.)

¿There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [Citation.] One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or nor the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.¿ (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896-897.) ¿¿[T]he fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so may of the more serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents.¿¿ (Id., at p. 897.)

Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” Id. at 892. Emphasis added.

Notably, a subsequent decision held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from Mardian’s conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable.” Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82.

Further complicating the matter, in 1987 the legislature amended Civil Code §3294 to include a requirement that conduct in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages. Absent additional allegations, the Court cannot find Defendant’s alleged behavior to meet the standard for imposition of punitive damages.

The Court is left with a dearth of authority on the issue of exactly what does, and what does not, constituted “despicable” conduct in the context of driving under the influence. This trial court is of the opinion that it must be something more than mere consumption of alcohol prior to driving; again, however, it is not clear how much more that consumption of alcohol is required. In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant consumed alcohol concurrently with ambien, a sleep aid that should not be consumed with alcohol and should not be consumed before driving. Plaintiff has also alleged that Defendant did so in such quantities that she did not remember, when she arrived at the hospital, that she had been driving or that she had been involved in an automobile accident.

The Court is not determining, as a matter of law, that the alleged conduct constitutes malice and justifies imposition of punitive damages. The Court is determining, instead, that the alleged conduct is susceptible to a finding of malice, and that is for the jury, rather than the Court, to make that determination. The motion to strike is therefore denied.

Dated this 31st day of October, 2014

Hon. Elia Weinbach
Judge of the Superior Court