Case Number: BC543439    Hearing Date: October 31, 2014    Dept: 93

Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 93

GINA LYNN WOOD and TOP GUN, LTD.,

Plaintiffs,
v.

SATNAM SINGH, ET AL.,

Defendants. Case No.: BC543439

Hearing Date: October 31, 2014

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO RECLASSIFY AND TRANSFER ACTION TO LIMITED JURISDICTION

Defendants’ Motion to Reclassify and Transfer Action to Limited Jurisdiction is denied.

Background

This action arises out of an automobile collision between a taxicab driven by Defendant Satnam Singh (“Singh”) and a Mercedes Benz being operated by Plaintiff Gina Lynn Wood (“Wood”) and owned by Plaintiff Top Gun, Ltd (“Top Gun”). The incident occurred on or about April 18, 2014, on Centinela Avenue in Culver City, California. Plaintiff Wood alleges that as a result of Singh’s negligent and careless operation of his vehicle, she has sustained personal injuries resulting in disability, pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and hospital and medical expenses. FAC, ¶ 8-9. Plaintiff Top Gun also alleges damages by way of cost of repair in the sum of $7,129.96, replacement care rental expense in the amount of $1,356.70, and diminution in value of the vehicle. FAC, ¶ 10.

Plaintiffs’ FAC for personal injury and property damage was filed on June 9, 2014. Defendants filed an answer to the FAC on July 2, 2014.

On September 23, 2014, Defendants brought the present Motion for Order Reclassifying and Transferring Action to Limited Jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition brief, but instead has filed a Declaration of Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr. in Opposition to the Motion.

Discussion

Under the Walker standard, a matter may be reclassified as a limited civil action when: (1) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (2) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will “necessarily” result in a verdict below the superior court’s jurisdictional amount. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262.) In deciding whether a matter should be transferred due to lack of amount in controversy sufficient to meet jurisdictional requirement, the court must look beyond pleadings but not so far as to trespass into province of trier of fact. (Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 401.)

This standard involves an evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and requires a “high level of certainty that [the] damage award will not exceed $25,000.” (Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 269. The trial court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the demand. (Id. at 270; see also Maldonado, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at 402 (“the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.”)

Thus, a motion to reclassify must be denied unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be less than $25,000. Viewed from the perspective of the party opposing reclassification, to defeat the motion the party must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility that the verdict will exceed $25,000. (See Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)

Defendants argue that the amount in controversy in this action necessarily falls below the $25,000 jurisdictional limit because the evidence does not support an award greater than $25,000. Following the collision, Plaintiff treated with Matthew Araghi, DC, for a total of thirteen chiropractic visits between April 30, 2014 and June 16, 2014, totaling $2,360.00 in medical expenses. (See Sullivan Decl., Ex. A.) Dr. Araghi opined in his June 16, 2014 Final Exam Report that Plaintiff had reached 90% of her pre-injury status with regard to her cervical spine, fully recovered with regard to her lumbar spine and left shoulder, and that no further treatment is recommended. (See Sullivan Decl., Ex. B.) In addition, Plaintiff Wood’s responses to Defendants’ Form Interrogatories confirm that she is making no claim for any loss of earnings or lost income as a result of the collision. (See Sullivan Decl., Ex. D.)

Defendants contend that, even if the Court were to account for Plaintiffs’ cost of repair for her vehicle in the amount of $7,692.01, of which $5,156.46 was covered by insurance, the verdict will “necessarily” fall short of the jurisdictional requirement of a claim exceeding $25,000.00.
In opposition, Plaintiffs filed the October 16, 2014 Report of Special Orthopaedic Examination and Consultation prepared by William J. Mealer, M.D., who found that Plaintiff Wood sustained a 5mm disc protrusion at L4-5 as well as a 2.5 mm disc protrusion at C5-6 as a direct result of the accident. (See Franceschi Decl., ¶ 3.) Dr. Mealer opines that the reasonable anticipated future medical costs for Wood is $39,900.00, which exceeds the jurisdictional maximum that may be awarded in a limited jurisdiction court. (Franceschi Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)

In their Reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have only suddenly and conveniently come forward with the new report indicating that she is expected to incur near $40,000.00 in future medical expenses, even though Plaintiffs have had several opportunities throughout discovery to put forth her total medical expenses or reference this report and medical provider. In fact, Dr. Mealer’s report was prepared and dated October 16, 2014, only days before Plaintiffs filed their Opposition brief, and the report indicates that Plaintiff Wood was last seen in the office “on December 6, 2014,” a date that will not occur for another several weeks. Thus, the report by Dr. Mealer is nothing but a last-ditch effort to unnecessarily bolster Wood’s medical expenses.

The Court finds that Defendants have not shown Plaintiffs’ damages necessarily fall below $25,000. In particular, Plaintiffs’ FAC asserts damages for “pain and suffering,” which is unquantifiable at this stage of the proceedings and is not addressed in Defendants’ moving papers. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ October 16, 2014 Report of Special Orthopaedic Examination and Consultation prepared by Dr. Mealer, although perhaps suspect for the reasons stated in Defendants’ Reply brief, demonstrates that the total medical expenses in this case remain unclear. This Court cannot say as a matter of law that it is not “possible” that the total damages will exceed $25,000. In fact, the FAC was only filed on June 9, 2014 and a trial date has not yet been set, so the fact that Plaintiffs only recently produced the October 16, 2014 report does not appear to be in bad faith. Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiffs can supplement their responses with new medical reports.

Conclusion

Defendants’ Motion to Reclassify and Transfer Action to Limited Jurisdiction is denied. Plaintiffs to give notice.

DATED: October 31, 2014
_________________________
Hon. Gail Ruderman Feuer
Judge of the Superior Court