Case Name: Hoang O. Meeuwissen v. Daley’s Drywall and Taping, Inc., et al.
Case No.: 2013-1-CV-253206

Currently before the Court is plaintiff Hoang O. Meeuwissen’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to compel defendant Daley’s Drywall and Taping, Inc. (“DDT”) to provide a further response to form interrogatory (“FI”) No. 17.1 and for an order awarding monetary sanctions.

I. Factual Background and Discovery Dispute

This is a personal injury action. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she tripped over drywall negligently placed by DDT and defendant Lyncon Construction, Inc. (“Lyncon”) during a construction project at her place of employment, Lockheed Martin.

Plaintiff served DDT with requests for admission (“RFA”) and FIs. DDT subsequently served responses, consisting of both objections and substantive responses. Dissatisfied with the responses, Plaintiff’s counsel sent opposing counsel a meet-and-confer letter, in which he stated that the responses were incomplete and evasive and requested supplemental responses. DDT served supplemental responses to some of the discovery requests but refused to supplement its response to FI No. 17.1. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel a further response to FI No. 17.1.

II. Motion to Compel a Further Response to FI No. 17.1

Plaintiff moves to compel DDT to provide a further response to FI No. 17.1 with respect to RFA Nos. 5-6 and 8-9. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(1) [stating that a party propounding interrogatories “may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems” an answer to an interrogatory “to be evasive or incomplete”].) FI No. 17.1 asks DDT to: (a) identify all responses to the RFA that are not unqualified admissions; (b) state all facts on which an identified response is based; (c) identify all persons with knowledge of those facts and provide their contact information; and (d) identify all documents that support each response and provide the contact information of the person who has each document. DDT provided a substantive response to FI No. 17.1.

A. RFA Nos. 5-6

RFA Nos. 5-6 asked DDT to “[a]dmit the plaintiff frequently entered the area of work during the subject project prior to the fall” and “[a]dmit that at least six Lockheed security officers entered the area of work during the subject project on a daily basis,” which DDT denied. DDT responded to FI No. 17.1 with respect to these RFA by stating that DDT is unaware of how often Plaintiff and other Lockheed security officers entered the work areas, identifying Craig Daley as the only person who has knowledge of these facts, and indicating that no documents exist supporting the RFA.

Plaintiff contends that the response with respect to these RFA is incomplete and evasive because DDT did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information necessary to respond to this interrogatory from the only percipient witness to the incident, its former employee, Santos Jimenez. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c) [stating that “[i]f the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party”].) This argument lacks merit. While a party has a general duty to conduct a reasonable investigation to obtain responsive information, it must only furnish information from individuals under its control. (Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1504; Gordon v. Sup. Ct. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 157, 167; Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 782.) A party has no duty to obtain the information from independent witnesses. (Holguin v. Sup. Ct. (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 812, 821 [finding that a responding party was not required to interview individuals in the coroner’s office who participated in an autopsy in order to provide complete answers to interrogatories].) Given that DDT no longer employs Mr. Jimenez, it has no duty to obtain information from him in order to respond to FI No. 17.1. Since Plaintiff does not otherwise indicate that the response is incomplete and evasive, no further response is warranted.

B. RFA No. 8

RFA No. 8 asked DDT to “[a]dmit that materials impeding entry at a doorway for any length of time during the subject project constitutes negligence,” which DDT denied. DDT responded to FI No. 17.1 subpart (b) with respect to this request by stating that the drywall installation was occurring around the doorway area, drywall was necessary to perform the work, Plaintiff negligently stepped into the construction zone without ensuring the area was clear of construction materials, Lockheed Martin failed to train Plaintiff regarding proper conduct in and around construction areas, and Lockheed Martin negligently required the placement of opaque coverings over doorways in the construction zone.

Plaintiff claims that the answer to FI No. 17.1 subpart (b) is incomplete because DDT does not provide specific facts demonstrating that impeding the entry of the doorway was necessary to install the drywall. This argument is not well-taken because there is no indication that DDT is in possession of such additional facts. A party is only obligated to provide a complete and straightforward response to the extent the information available to the party permits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a).) Here, DDT states all of the facts in its possession it contends supports the denial of RFA No. 8 in a clear and straightforward manner. Since Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that DDT possesses additional facts supporting its denial, no further response is warranted.

C. RFA No. 9

RFA No. 9 asked DDT to “[a]dmit that Lockheed’s contractor safety rules precluded obstruction of any doorway at any time during the subject project,” which DDT denied. DDT responded to FI No. 17.1 with respect to this request by stating that “[i]t is not clear from the request for admission as to which or what plaintiff is referring to by ‘Lockheed’s contractor safety rules’” and it is unaware of any rules “speaking to ‘obstruction of any doorway.’”

Plaintiff asserts that the response to FI No. 17.1 subpart (b) is incomplete and evasive because DDT does not clearly and ambiguously state any facts supporting its denial of the RFA No. 9. In opposition, DDT contends that RFA No. 9 is so “poorly stated” that it is not obligated to provide a clear and straightforward response. DDT’s argument lacks merit on several grounds. First, the request at issue is clear and explicit. It merely asks DDT to admit or deny that Lockheed’s safety rules preclude contractors from obstructing doorways at the subject project. Second, to the extent DDT somehow finds the wording of the request to be ambiguous, it is still obliged to provide as clear and straightforward an answer as the information available to it permits. (See Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 783 [stating that answers to discovery requests must be complete and responsive even where the question is somewhat ambiguous].) Accordingly, since DDT appears to acknowledge that its response to FI No. 17.1 is not as clear and straightforward as the information available to it permits, a further response is warranted.

D. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel DDT to provide a further response to FI No. 17.1 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to FI No. 17.1 with respect to RFA Nos. 5-6 and 8. The motion is GRANTED as to FI No. 17.1 subpart (b) with respect to RFA No. 9. Accordingly, within 20 days of the date of the filing of the order, DDT shall serve a verified code-compliant further response, without objection, to FI No. 17.1 subpart (b) with respect to RFA No. 9.

III. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

A. Plaintiff’s Request

Plaintiff requests $1,320 in monetary sanctions against DDT and its counsel under two different statutes.

First, Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.020, which states that “[n]otwithstanding the outcome of a particular discovery motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” Plaintiff contends that this section provides a basis for monetary sanctions because opposing counsel did not attempt to resolve the dispute informally, which necessitated the filing of the instant motion. This argument is not persuasive. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.020 only applies if a party or attorney “fails to confer as required.” A party is not required to meet and confer before opposing a motion to compel a further response to an interrogatory. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.310, subd. (b) [stating that the meet and confer requirement applies only to the party moving to compel further responses].) Thus, this section does not provide a basis for monetary sanctions.

Second, Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), which provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Here, Plaintiff was only partially successful on her motion, and DDT’s opposition was substantially justified since the motion is denied as to FI No. 17.1 with respect to RFA Nos. 5-6 and 8. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary sanctions under this statute.

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

B. DDT’s Request

In its opposition, DDT requests monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in an unspecified amount. The request is not code-compliant because it is unaccompanied by a declaration setting forth the facts supporting the request as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040. Accordingly, DDT’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.