Case Number: 19STCV22625 Hearing Date: September 09, 2019 Dept: 4A

Motion to Strike without Demurrer

Having considered the moving, opposing, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2019, Plaintiff John Durzi (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant Rouhaini Brarman (“Defendant”) alleging negligence and premises liability for a garage door malfunctioning and causing Plaintiff’s right bicep to be torn away and ruptured on September 14, 2017.

On July 25, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to strike punitive damages pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 435.

Trial is set for December 28, 2020.

PARTY’S REQUEST

Defendant asks this Court for an order striking punitive damages from the FAC pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436 and Civil Code section 3294.

LEGAL STANDARD

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole complaint or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) Conclusory allegations are subject to motions to strike. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 303 (superseded on other grounds by Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771).)

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

“‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

“As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (footnote omitted).)

DISCUSSION

The complaint alleges Defendant’s garage door malfunctioned and that Defendant knew it was defective. (Compl., pp. 4-5.)

The complaint has not stated sufficient facts to withstand a motion to strike punitive damages. There is no allegation that Defendant intended Plaintiff’s harm. There are no facts alleged indicating Plaintiff was aware of but ignored the dangerous consequences of having a defective garage door.

Additionally, knowledge that a garage door is defective before it malfunctions and harms an individual cannot be considered despicable conduct. Nothing in the complaint reflects the nature or severity of the defect in the garage door. The Court simply cannot find that a party’s knowledge of a garage door that was not working properly and their failure to fix it is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people or as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.

The motion to strike is GRANTED.

The Court strikes the language at paragraph 11.g. on page 3 of the complaint, which states “Punitive Damages.”

The Court also strikes the language at paragraph 14.a.(2) on page 3 of the complaint, which states “punitive damages.”

The Court further strikes the language on page 6 of the complaint, which states “Finally, that Defendant Brarman, and each defendant includ9ing DOES 1 to 50, knew that the garage door was broken and/or defective and consciously chose not to disclose the dangerous condition conveys lack of care (Gross Negligence) and an extreme departure from what a reasonably prudent person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or other such that punitive damages are warranted and demanded.”

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.