Case Name: JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Jose D. Landin, et al.
Case No.: 1-11-CV-209898

After full consideration of the evidence, the separate statements submitted by each party, and the authorities submitted by each party, the court makes the following rulings:

Currently before the Court is plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action in its first amended complaint (“FAC”) and all affirmative defenses.

A. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants Jose D. Landin (“Landin”) and Melchor L. Ramirez’s (“Ramirez”) (collectively, “Defendants”) objections to Plaintiff’s evidence in support of its motion are OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s objections to Defendants’ evidence are untimely filed (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(a)) and otherwise lack merit. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED.

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

In support of its motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) two grant deeds recorded on May 31, 1996; (2) a grant deed recorded on March 23, 1999; (3) a deed of trust recorded on March 23, 1999; (4) a short form deed of trust recorded on August 18, 2000; and (5) a deed of trust recorded on June 21, 2007. The request is GRANTED as to the existence and recordation of the deeds. (See Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265 [courts may take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of real property records].)

C. First Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that the 2006 quitclaim deed (the “Quitclaim Deed”) is deemed recorded as of December 18, 2006, the 2006 deed of trust (the “DOT”) encumbers the subject property (the “Property”) in the first priority position as of December 22, 2006, and the DOT is a valid lien on the entirety of the Property in the first priority position.

Although there are no triable issues as to the validity of the Quitclaim Deed and the DOT, there are triable issues of material fact as to the priority of the DOT and the recordation of the Quitclaim Deed. (See Thaler v. Household Finance Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1099 [stating that a conveyance recorded first generally has priority over later recorded conveyances]; Civ. Code, § 1170 [stating that an instrument is deemed recorded when deposited with the Recorder’s office]; Gov. Code, § 27201, subd. (a) [stating that it is the duty of the County Recorder to accept documents for recordation].) As Plaintiff fails to establish that it is entitled to all of the declaratory relief requested, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the first cause of action for declaratory relief is DENIED.

D. Second Cause of Action for Imposition of an Equitable Lien

Plaintiff asks the Court to create an equitable lien on the Property because it asserts that such a lien is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. As discussed previously in connection with the first cause of action for declaratory relief, there are no triable issues of material fact as to the validity of the Quitclaim Deed and the DOT. Thus, Plaintiff received “the exchange which [it] expected” and, therefore, does not demonstrate that the creation of an equitable lien is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. (Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593 [stating that there is no equitable reason for unjust enrichment when plaintiff receives exchange which it expected]; see also Cal. Medical Ass’n v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of Cal. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172 [“[A]s a matter of law, a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist and define the parties’ rights.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for the imposition of an equitable lien is DENIED.

E. Third Cause of Action for Reformation

Plaintiff asserts that the intent of all parties was for the DOT to encumber the entirety of the Property. (See UMF, No. 14.) As the agreement was mistakenly misplaced and not recorded, Plaintiff claims that the parties’ intention was never carried into effect. (See UMF, No. 21.) In order to carry out this intent, Plaintiff requests that the Court add Ramirez as a trustor to the DOT.

Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit because Plaintiff produces no evidence indicating that the parties intended Ramirez to be a trustor of the DOT. (See Bailard v. Marden (1951) 36 Cal.2d 703, 708-709 [relief sought in reforming written instrument is to make it conform to the real agreement or intention of the parties].) In this regard, Plaintiff acknowledges that the DOT was entered into solely between WAMU and Landin and makes no mention of Ramirez. (See UMF, No. 7.) Moreover, Plaintiff submits evidence indicating that Ramirez wanted nothing to do with the Property or the 2006 loan and, for this reason, executed the Quitclaim Deed. (See UMF, No. 14.) Given that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Ramirez intended to agree to the terms of the DOT, Plaintiff does not establish that it is entitled to the addition of Ramirez to the DOT. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of the third cause of action for reformation is DENIED.

F. Affirmative Defenses

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication on the ground that there are no affirmative defenses to the causes of action in the FAC. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); See’s Candy Shop, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (Silva) (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900.) While Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of all affirmative defenses, it makes no attempt to meet its initial burden to show there are no triable issues of material fact as to the affirmative defenses asserted in the answer to the FAC. Instead, in its memorandum, Plaintiff merely indicates that it does not have the burden of negating any of Defendants’ affirmative defenses. Accordingly, as Plaintiff does not meet its initial burden to show there are no triable issues of material fact as to any of Defendants’ affirmative defenses, the motion for summary adjudication of Defendants’ affirmative defenses is DENIED.

The Court will prepare the order.