Case Number: BC536289    Hearing Date: July 25, 2014    Dept: 93

Defendant Noah Oakley Landis-Harde’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations is GRANTED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Cal. Civil Code § 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied . . . . ” Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.
In Taylor, the California Supreme Court held that driving while intoxicated can, under certain circumstances, support an award of punitive damages because it evidences malice. 24 Cal.3d at 892. Specifically, the complaint in Taylor alleged that
[Defendant ]Stille is, and for a substantial period of time had been, an alcoholic “well aware of the serious nature of his alcoholism” and of his “tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity, or inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol”; and that Stille was also aware of the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated.

The complaint further alleged that Stille had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions; that at the time of the accident herein, Stille had recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction; that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge. Id. at 893. Furthermore, in Dawes v. Superior Court (Mardian), the Court of Appeals noted that facts on this level are distinguishable from facts that merely allege driving while intoxicated. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89-90. “Ordinary intoxicated driving” may create a risk of injury to others that is foreseeable, but not necessarily probable. Id. In Dawes, the defendant was alleged to have made a “decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June.” Id. at 89. These allegations also support a claim for punitive damages. Id. at 89-90.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Landis-Harde was driving while intoxicated, as follows:
Sometime prior to the accident, Defendant Noah Oakley Landis-Harde voluntarily became intoxicated and knew from the time he began drinking that he would operate a motor vehicle while he was intoxicated and that with this state of knowledge and violation, Defendant, did, in fact, become intoxicated. Defendant’s intoxication was willful, reckless and in conscious disregard for the safety of others and while in such a state, Defendant willfully drove his car while in that condition in a willful, reckless and conscious disregard for the safety of others, despite the unreasonable safety hazard he was creating.

Complaint, p. 3, ¶ 11. These allegations essentially amount to generalized and conclusory statements that Defendant Landis-Harde was aware of the obvious and apparent consequences of his conduct unsupported by any specific facts regarding his conduct. As a result, the allegations constitute assertions of ordinary intoxicated driving, and do not rise to the level of malicious conduct as articulated in Dawes and Taylor. Under Plaintiffs’ argument, every motor vehicle case that involved intoxicated driving would warrant punitive damages because the dangers of such driving are well known. This, however, is not the law. There are no allegations in the Complaint that demonstrate Defendant Landis-Harde’s conduct rises to a level of malice contemplated by Taylor and Dawes. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike the punitive damages allegations from the Complaint. Plaintiff is granted 20 days’ leave to amend the complaint. Moving party is ordered to give notice.