Case Name: Nirali Patel v. Board of Trustees of the California State University, et al.
Case No.: 16-CV-291359

This is a disability discrimination, retaliation, and harassment action brought by plaintiff Nirali Patel (“Plaintiff”) against defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University (“Defendant”).

According to the allegations of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Defendant and San Jose State University (“SJSU”) employed Plaintiff as an administrative coordinator for several years. She was well qualified for the position and able to meet the terms of her employment. In late 2012, Plaintiff began to suffer from medical conditions, both physical and mental disabilities. Her symptoms and treatments limited many of her major life activities.

Beginning in 2013, Plaintiff repeatedly asked for accommodations, such as a modified work schedule, job reassignment, and/or telecommute opportunities, but SJSU failed to provide her with any of these accommodations. Instead, SJSU began to harass and retaliate against her by: (1) making false and defamatory statements about her; (2) issuing a sham letter of reprimand and maintaining it in her permanent file; (3) holding her to different standards than non-disabled employees; (4) placing her under surveillance; (5) unlawfully deducting money from her paycheck or withholding it entirely; (6) giving her an unfair workload; (7) denying her tuition fee waiver; (8) issuing a proposed suspension; and (9) placing her on unpaid leave.

In 2014, Plaintiff filed administrative complaints of disability discrimination and retaliation internally with SJSU and with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the “DFEH”). She filed further charges with the DFEH after she experienced other adverse employment actions and was laid off. The DFEH issued Right-to-Sue Notices in response to her complaints. After exhausting her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action.

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against Defendant pursuant to the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”): (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodation; (3) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process; (4) retaliation; (5) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; and (6) harassment.

Currently before is Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to her requests for admission. Both parties seek monetary sanctions in connection with this motion.

I. Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission

Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant to provide further responses to her first set of requests for admission (“RFA”), specifically Nos. 7, 12, 18, 19, 20, and 21, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290 allows a party to move for an order compelling a further response to requests for admission if the party deems that an answer is evasive or incomplete and/or an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).)

The statute does not require any showing of good cause in support of a motion compelling further responses to requests for admission. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290.) The burden is on the responding party to justify any objections or failure to fully answer. (See Cembrook v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 427 (“Cembrook”).)

A. Objections

Defendant objected to each request as being so vague and ambiguous as to render the demand burdensome and oppressive. Defendant does not attempt to justify this objection as to RFA Nos. 20 and 21, and thus its objection to these requests is overruled. With respect to the other RFAs, it attempts to justify this objection, arguing that the requests are “ambiguous – and thus necessarily burdensome and oppressive because RFA admissions are deemed conclusively established to the exclusion of contradictory evidence.” (Opp. pp. 4:5-7, 5:18-20, 6:21-23, 7:23-25.)

When the nature of the information sought is apparent, it is improper to refuse to respond to discovery on the ground of vagueness and ambiguity. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) The responding party has an obligation to answer in good faith as best as it can. (Cembrook, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 430 [ambiguity is not a ground for an objection to a request for admission unless it is so ambiguous that the responding party cannot in good faith frame an intelligent reply].)

Here, the requests appear to be certain enough to allow Defendant to fashion substantive answers. What Defendant seems to truly take issue with, using the ground of ambiguity, is Plaintiff’s motive for asking each of these requests. But the appropriate inquiry in evaluating a vagueness objection is whether Defendant can intelligently and in good faith frame an answer to the request. As the nature of information sought is in these requests is abundantly apparent, Defendant’s objection lacks merit.

Defendant further objected to the requests on the basis they are unduly burdensome and oppressive. It only attempts to justify this objection as to RFA Nos. 20 and 21. As such, its objection on this basis with respect to RFA Nos. 7, 12, 18, and 19 is overruled.

“[S]ome burden is inherent in all demands for discovery.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418 (“West Pico”).) To justify an objection based on undue burden, a party must make a particularized showing of facts demonstrating hardship, including “evidence showing the quantum of work required.” (Id. at pp. 417-418.) Specifically, a party must demonstrate that the amount of work is so great and the utility of the information sought so minimal that it would defeat the ends of justice to require the answers. (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19.)

RFA Nos. 20 and 21, both of which essentially ask whether Defendant deducted more than 25% of Plaintiff’s monthly net paychecks to recoup alleged overpayment, Defendant states these requests are burdensome and oppressive because: (1) Plaintiff fails to identify specific payroll transactions to examine; and (2) the requests are posed against the backdrop of Plaintiff-identified transactions that all reflect the authorized 25% recoupment deduction. This argument is unpersuasive. Defendant does not provide any particularized facts showing how answering these requests would be unduly burdensome. Nor does it adequately show that the amount of work it would take to properly answer this request is too great and the utility of the information sought is minimal. As such, its objection to RFA Nos. 20 and 21 on this basis is unjustified.

Defendant additionally objected to RFA No. 18 on the basis it seeks information protected by individual privacy rights and related privileges. This request asks Defendant to admit or deny that it allowed a specific employee to negotiate a repayment plan when she was overpaid.

Defendant contends the request would disclose the third-party’s personal payroll information and her disabled or non-disabled status and thus implicates the third-party’s privacy rights. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that RFA No. 18 seeks to minimize and avoid this intrusion by establishing this fact without additional or more intrusive discovery. She also states that courts allow for discovery of co-worker personnel files in employment discrimination cases to find relevant evidence of an employer’s treatment of similarly situated employees.

In ruling on objections to discovery based on third-party privacy rights, courts apply a three-part test. (See, e.g., Alch v. Super. Ct. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1423-1425.) The first inquiry is whether the discovery sought actually implicates privacy interests. (Ibid.)

Disclosing a third-party’s personal payroll information or disability status could implicate the party’s privacy rights. (Id. at pp. 1433-1434.) However, as phrased, answering RFA No. 18 would not require Defendant to divulge this information. Thus, Defendant’s objection lacks merit.

In sum, all of Defendant’s objections are overruled.

B. Substantive Responses

In addition to its objections, Defendant provided substantive responses to all of the RFA at issue. Plaintiff states these responses are incomplete and/or evasive.

Each answer to a request for admission must be as “complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Id. at § 2033.220, subd. (a).) In response to a request for an admission, the responding party may admit, deny, or state that the party lacks sufficient information or knowledge to either admit or deny the matter involved in the request. (Id. at subd. (b).) A denial, however, must be unequivocal. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Calif. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268.) When the responding party lacks of information or knowledge to admit or deny a request, the responding party must affirm in the response “that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Id. at § 2033.220, subd. (c).)

Defendant initially states in its substantive responses to each request that it “has insufficient information with which to admit or deny this request, as phrased, and on that basis the request is denied.” (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement (“Sep. Stmt.”), pp. 2:5-6, 3:16-17, 5:10-11, 6:23-24, 7:27-28, 8:6-7.) Then, inconsistently, it goes on to admit to aspects of each request.

Defendant’s initial denial in each request is not code-compliant. If Defendant cannot admit or deny the requests due to a lack of information or knowledge, then it is required to state a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter. (See Code Civ. Proc., at § 2033.220, subd. (c).) Defendant failed to do and its denial is incompatible with the portions of its answers consisting of admissions.

The Court will now turn to the admission component of each request. RFA No. 7 requests Defendant admit or deny that it gave fee waivers to other, non-disabled employees in its counseling department. Defendant admitted that “absent a mistake fee waiver requests are only approved in cases in which the request meet fee waiver requirements – the presence of absence of disability has nothing to do with fee waiver requirements or a decision to approve or deny a fee waiver request.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 2:6-9.)

Plaintiff argues her request is not ambiguous and does not concern what motive Defendant had in approving fee waivers requests. She also cites various cases for the proposition that she can conduct discovery for relevant evidence of Defendant’s treatment of other similarly situated employees. In opposition, Defendant argues the RFA is ambiguous because it “has no reasonable means to reconstruct a non-speculative history of fee waiver applications to determine the disabled or non-disabled status of applicants that were granted or denied fee waivers” as the disability status of a fee waiver applicant has nothing to do with the fee waiver decision. (Opp., p. 4:14-19.) Defendant concludes that its response admitting the foregoing is sufficient as it employs an authorized qualification to allow it to respond to a more clearly defined request.

Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. If it truly cannot tell, despite a reasonable inquiry, whether it has given fee-waivers to non-disabled employees in its counseling department, then it can appropriately state as such pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220, subdivision (c). Whether or not Plaintiff’s disability is not readily apparent is not at issue in the request. Nor does the request assume that tuition fee waiver decisions take into account those who are or are not disabled. Defendant merely attempts to evade directly answering because it believes the motive behind the request sheds an unfair light on its fee waiver application process. But Defendant’s potential admission that it gave fee waivers to non-disabled employees in its counseling department would not preclude it from presenting evidence that the application process does not consider the disabled or non-disabled status of the fee waiver applicant or that the fee waiver decision maker does not know which employees have a disability. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant’s answer is evasive.

RFA No. 12 requests Defendant admit or deny that it posted an ad for Plaintiff’s current position to the public before offering it to her. Defendant admitted that “to the extent this request refers to Plaintiff’s starting administrative position in the SJSU College of Science, and to Resources regarding a related job positing, [Defendant] admits that Plaintiff initiated the discussion after the initial date of the job posting.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 3:17-21.)

Plaintiff argues this request concerns the issue of to whom, and in what order, notice was given of the job opening, both of which are relevant to her claims of failure to accommodate and interact in good faith. She concludes that Defendant’s answer is evasive because it does not clearly answer the request. She additionally states that there is no ambiguity, as the request clearly references her current position and makes no suggestion that Defendant was required to ignore the rights of other potential job applicants. In opposition, Defendant argues its response clearly identifies which job posting its answer applies to and that Plaintiff initiated a discussion regarding the position after the date the job was posted. It concludes its answer is full, complete, and accurate with a reasonably qualified characterization.

The Court finds that Defendant’s answer is evasive. (Sep. Stmt., p. 3:20-21.) Stating that Plaintiff initiated the discussion after the initial date of the job posting does not clearly answer whether or not it offered the position to her before posting the ad to the public.

RFA No. 18 requests Defendant admit or deny that when it overpaid Jennifer Morazes, it allowed her to negotiate a repayment plan. Defendant admitted that “CSU is informed and believes that absent a mistake repayment plan requests are addressed with reference to applicable repayment plan procedures – and without reference to the presence or absence of disability.” (SS, p. 5:11-13.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s answer is evasive because the request is simply a factual statement which is either true or false and does not concern Defendant’s repayment plan procedures. It states that the purpose of this request is to show that she was not afforded an opportunity to negotiate repayment plans like other similarly-situated, but non-disabled employees. Defendant argues that its response is full, complete, and accurate with a reasonably qualified characterization.

The Court finds Defendant’s answer to this request evasive. Its response does not touch on the subject of whether it allows employees to negotiate their repayment plans. Similarly to its response to RFA No. 7, Defendant appears to avoid answering directly because it is concerned with the motive behind the request. However, its potential admission here would not preclude it from providing evidence later showing that its repayment plan procedures have nothing to do with the presence or absence of a disability.

RFA No. 19 requests Defendant admit or deny that beginning in March 2014, it failed to pay Plaintiff with payroll checks. Defendant admitted that “in February 2014 Plaintiff was notified that she had been overpaid, and that in March 2014 Plaintiff was notified of payroll recoupment steps that were implemented.” (SS, p. 6:24-26.)

Plaintiff argues Defendant’s response is evasive because this request is merely a factual statement which is either true or false and does not concern whether Plaintiff was notified of payroll recoupment steps. She also contends that Defendant’s question of its significance should not allow it to evade an answer. Defendant argues this request places undefined importance on March 2014 and on payroll checks versus other forms of payment, such as payments through direct deposit. It concludes its answer is full, complete, and accurate in that it employs an authorized qualification that gives meaning to the March 2014 time reference and notes that she received a subsequent payroll deduction in response to a payroll overpayment prior to that date.

The Court finds Defendant’s answer to this request evasive. While Defendant may have used other forms of payment other than payroll checks to pay Plaintiff, that fact does not preclude Defendant from answering whether or not it failed to pay her with payroll checks starting in March 2014. Its admission that Plaintiff received a payroll deduction is not at issue in the request.

RFAs No. 20 and 21 concern payroll recoupment procedures that limit a recoupment deduction to 25% of an employee’s net pay. RFA No. 20 requests Defendant admit or deny that in some months, it deducted more than 25% of Plaintiff’s monthly net salary to recoup alleged overpayment. RFA No. 21 requests Defendant admit or deny that it violated its own policy not to deduct more than 25% of Plaintiff’s monthly net salary to recoup alleged overpayment. Defendant admitted in both requests that “absent a mistake the payroll recoupment amount should have been an amount not in excess of 25% of Plaintiff’s monthly net (gross minus mandatory deductions) salary.” (SS, pp. 7:28, 8:1-2, 9:7-9.)

Plaintiff argues Defendant’s answer is evasive because the requests are merely factual statements of misconduct which are either true or false and do not concern whether Defendant had a 25% cap in place. It also argues that if it were true that Defendant never deducted more than 25% from her paycheck, it should have simply denied these requests. Defendant argues its answer is full, complete, and accurate as it admits there is a 25% cap.

Once again, Defendant’s answers are evasive. Plaintiff does not seek to establish the fact that there is a 25% cap but whether Defendant deducted more than 25% in violation of its policy.

In sum, the Court finds Defendant’s denial of each request internally inconsistent with its subsequent admissions and all admissions evasive. Accordingly, further responses are warranted.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 7, 12, 18, 19, 20, and 21. Accordingly, Defendant shall serve further verified code-compliant responses to these requests, without objections, within 20 calendar days of this Order.

II. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

Both parties make code-complaint requests for monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. Plaintiff requests an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,340 against Defendant. Defendant requests an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,890 against Plaintiff and her attorney.

A. Defendant’s Request

Defendant requests monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290 on the ground that Plaintiff failed to act with substantial justification in bringing the instant motion.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290 provides that “[a] court shall award monetary sanctions against a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to requests for admission unless it finds that the party subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

Plaintiff is the prevailing party. As such, Defendant is not entitled to monetary sanctions under section 2033.290.

Defendant also requests monetary sanctions on the ground that Plaintiff failed to make a good faith attempt to meet-and confer before filing the instant motion pursuant to Code of Civil procedure section 2023.020.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.020 provides that a court shall impose a monetary sanction, irrespective of the outcome of the particular discovery motion, on any party or attorney who fails to confer as required. A determination as to whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate depends upon the particular circumstances and involves the exercise of discretion. (Obregon v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

A review of the meet and confer correspondence shows that Plaintiff’s counsel articulated the merits of his client’s position with candor, specificity, and support. (See Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.) After several exchanges occurred, it is clear an impasse had been reached. Thus, it was reasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to file the instant motion. As such, Defendant is not entitled to sanctions under section 2023.020.

Accordingly, Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff’s Request

Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290. Since she is the prevailing party and the Court finds Defendant did not act with substantial justification in opposing the motion and that no other circumstances exist which would make the imposition of sanctions unjust, she is entitled to monetary sanctions under section 2033.290.

In his declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel states he spent 1.5 hours meeting and conferring and 6 hours researching and drafting the present motion to compel. Given his rate of $300 an hour, he requests a total of $2,250 in attorney’s fees. The Court does not award sanctions for time spent meeting and conferring. As such, the award is limited to 6 hours at a rate of $300 an hour, which the Court finds reasonable, for a total of $1,800 in attorney’s fees. The Court also finds Plaintiff’s request for $90 in filing fees reasonable. Thus, Plaintiff is awarded monetary sanctions in the total amount of $1,890.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,890. Defendant’s counsel shall pay $1,890 to Plaintiff’s counsel within 20 calendar days of this Order.