Case Name:   Ping W. Chiang v. Mali Kuo, et al.

Case No.:       1-12-CV-226377

In this collections action, plaintiff Ping W. Chiang (“Plaintiff”) alleges that defendant Mali Kuo (“Defendant”) failed to make a single payment on a promissory note for $1,300,000 issued to Plaintiff on June 13, 2006.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 9.)  Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action, which asserts a single claim for breach of promissory note, on June 12, 2012.

Currently at issue is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to item no. 1.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)  To the extent that the request is granted, however, the Court should take judicial notice of the existence and content of the complaint only, and not of the truth of hearsay statements contained therein.  (See Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564 [a court may take judicial notice of the existence and content of each document in a court file, but cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements therein].)  Plaintiff’s request is DENIED as to item nos. 2-11, given that accusations against Defendant in other lawsuits are irrelevant to the Court’s resolution of Defendant’s motion.  (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [only relevant matters are subject to judicial notice].)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence that Plaintiff provided any consideration in exchange for the promissory note at issue and, alternatively, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff contends that the note was used to consolidate and refinance existing debt owed by Defendant to Plaintiff, and his claim is not time-barred.

In support of her motion, Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and discovery responses, and characterizes this evidence as admitting that Plaintiff did not loan Defendant $1,300,000 in 2006.  In reality, however, Plaintiff contends in his responses that the $1,300,000 note was issued in order to refinance debt Defendant already owed him.  (See Mot., Ex. 5, Plaintiff’s Responses to Special Interrogatory nos. 6 [“Mali Kuo was indebted to Ping Chiang and refinanced her debt on the terms of the $1.3M note.”], 26-27 [“Prior to signing the $1.3 million promissory note, Mr. Chiang loaned money to Ms. Kuo.”].)  Defendant also points out that Plaintiff has produced a spreadsheet summarizing the alleged prior loans made to Defendant.  (See Mot., Ex. 4, PC000021-22.)  Nevertheless, Defendant contends that because Plaintiff has not produced documentation from a bank evidencing the prior loans, summary judgment must enter.

This argument misconstrues Defendant’s burden on summary judgment.  Unlike federal law, the law in California “continues to require a defendant moving for summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855.)  While the moving defendant may introduce, for example, “admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” (id.), here, Plaintiff has made no such admission.  Although Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s evidence is weak without documentation from a bank, the Court does not weigh evidence on summary judgment.  (Melorich Builders v. Super. Ct. (Serabia, et al.) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 931, 935.)  Defendant’s own submissions demonstrate that Plaintiff has some evidence of consideration supporting the promissory note at issue.  (See Civ. Code, § 1606 [“An existing legal obligation resting upon the promisor … is also a good consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of the obligation, but no further or otherwise.”]; Brody v. Gabriel (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 644, 646 [“[T]he extension of time in which to pay money due confers upon the debtor an advantage or benefit which in itself constitutes a sufficient consideration for the execution of an instrument by him…”].)

Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet her initial burden on summary judgment based on her argument that Plaintiff has no evidence of consideration.

Defendant also contends that the statutes of limitations on the prior debt alleged by Plaintiff expired before the parties executed the promissory note at issue and argues, without citing to any legal authority in support of this conclusion, that the prior debt “cannot be ‘revived’ by the alleged promissory note of June 13, 2006.”  (Mot. at p. 8.)  As urged by Plaintiff, however, this argument lacks merit.  The statute of limitations applicable to the promissory note itself, which the parties agree is six years, governs Plaintiff’s claim.  (See Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3118; Rodgers v. Byers (1900) 127 Cal. 528, 530 [“[W]hen the statute of limitations has barred the remedy upon the original obligation, and … a promise made after such time is relied upon, the action is not upon the original obligation, but … is upon the new express promise.”].)

In light of the above, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.