Case Name: Subramonya Ayyar, et al. v. Kannan Ayyar, et al.
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-284138

These related cross-actions arise from a dispute among siblings over their elderly parents’ care and finances. Currently at issue are plaintiffs’ motions (1) to compel defendant Kannan Ayyar to provide further responses to form and special interrogatories and (2) to compel Kannan to provide further responses to requests for production of documents, as well as (3) Kannan’s motion to compel plaintiffs’ depositions.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On April 1, 2015, the parents, plaintiffs Subramonya and Bavani Ayyar, filed suit in Los Angeles County through their children and guardians ad litem, Balan Ayyar and Priya Ayyar. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs’ other children, defendants Kannan Ayyar and Rajan Ayyar, used undue influence to convert plaintiffs’ assets for their own personal benefit. On June 17, 2015, the Los Angeles court issued an order approving the parties’ stipulation to transfer venue to Santa Clara County.

According to a declaration submitted on behalf of Balan, he and Kannan agreed to work together to oversee the health and recovery of their parents after Subramonya and Bavani were neglected by Rajan. (Decl. of David L. Weisberg ISO Plaintiff’s Mots. To Compel, Ex. 15, ¶ 6.) In February 2014, Balan and Kannan executed durable powers of attorney and became dual agents over Subramonya’s finances. (Ibid.) The family agreed that Kannan would travel to India to determine the extent of and provide an accounting of Subramonya’s Indian assets, which Subramonya believed were worth over $1.1 million. (Id., ¶ 8.) Balan gave Kannan a bank statement from Subramonya’s Bank of India Account that reflected assets worth around this amount. (Id., ¶ 10.) Kannan traveled to India in March of 2014, but has refused to provide an accounting and, suspiciously, represented that the assets were actually worth only about $500,000. (Id., ¶¶ 11-12.) Then, in August 2014, Subramonya and Bavani (who had been living with Balan) visited Kannan in Campbell, California. (Id., ¶ 13.) They had planned to stay for only a week while Balan moved, but they did not return as planned and Kannan refused to allow Balan to communicate with them. (Id., ¶ 13.) Balan and Priya travelled to Kannan’s home to check on their parents, who reported that Kannan had been gone for days, leaving them uncared for. (Id., ¶ 14.) Subramonya and Bavani willingly left with Balan and Priya to live near Priya in southern California. (Ibid.)

On September 24, 2015, Kannan filed a cross-complaint against Balan and Priya. Kannan alleges that his parents moved to his home in Campbell at their own request. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 8.) At that time, they revoked their previously-executed powers of attorney and executed new estate planning documents, including an advance health care directive and durable financial power of attorney naming Kannan as their agent to manage their financial matters in the event of their incapacity. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs’ attorney, Naomi Comfort, notified Kannan’s siblings of these changes. However, on January 31, 2015, Balan and Priya took plaintiffs against their will from Kannan’s residence to a location unknown to him. (Id., ¶ 17.) They obtained orders appointing themselves guardians ad litem for purposes of prosecuting the underlying action, without notifying the Los Angeles court that plaintiffs had previously executed powers of attorney in favor of Kannan. (Id., ¶ 20.) In August of 2015, Kannan learned through interrogatory responses that Balan and Priya had moved plaintiffs to a senior facility in Santa Monica. (Id., ¶ 24.)

Kannan’s cross-complaint sets forth the following claims: (1) trespass to real property (individually and on behalf of plaintiffs); (2) trespass to personal property (individually); (3) false imprisonment (on behalf of plaintiffs); (4) financial elder abuse (on behalf of plaintiffs); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (on behalf of plaintiffs); (6) declaratory relief (individually and on behalf of plaintiffs); and (7) accounting (individually and on behalf of plaintiffs).

II. Plaintiffs’ Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses by Kannan

Plaintiffs served Kannan with form interrogatories (“FI”s), special interrogatories (“SI”s), and requests for production of documents (“RPD”s) on August 6, 2015. After Kannan served his initial responses, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to Kannan’s counsel, requesting full and complete supplemental responses to a number of interrogatories, as well as non-“evasive” supplemental statements of compliance with a number of RPDs.

Kannan served supplemental responses on January 22, 2016. However, plaintiffs’ counsel maintained that the responses were still deficient. The parties continued to meet and confer, and agreed that plaintiffs’ motion to compel deadline would be extended to February 16, 2016. On that date, plaintiffs filed the instant motions to compel further responses to the following discovery requests: SIs 1, 5, 13, 37, 45, and 49; FI 17.1; and RPDs 1-3, 14, 60, 61, 68-72, 74-77, and 80.

A. Kannan’s Request for a Protective Order

As an initial matter, Kannan contends that Balan and Priya have violated the protective order in this action by reviewing plaintiffs’ estate planning documents, which Kannan produced with a “Highly Confidential” designation, and using the information contained therein for purposes of conservatorship petitions that they filed in Los Angeles County in November. In addition, he believes that “Confidential” information concerning a Fidelity Investments account owned jointly by himself and Subramonya—an account previously “known only to [Kannan]”—was used to wire over seven thousand dollars out of that account in February. Kannan asks the Court to issue a protective order restricting plaintiffs, Priya, Balan, and their counsel’s “use of discovery to non-private documents and information.”

While the Court takes seriously allegations that parties have violated a protective order, the evidence submitted by Kannan does not establish that Priya, Balan, or their counsel have done so here. There is no evidence of who reviewed what information in preparation for the filing of the conservatorship petitions in November, and there is no basis to conclude that the transfer from the Fidelity Investments account—which is owned jointly by Subramonya—was improper.

Plaintiffs’ counsel should be prepared to address this issue with the Court at the hearing on this matter. However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court trusts that Priya, Balan, and their counsel have complied with the existing protective order and will continue to do so in the future. Consequently, the Court will not issue the protective order that Kannan requests.

B. The SIs

As an initial matter, Kannan does not defend his objections to the SIs at issue, other than the privacy objections discussed below. The undefended objections are overruled. (See Coy v. Superior Court (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221 [party opposing discovery has the burden to justify its objections].)

SI 1 directs Kannan to identify all financial accounts held by Subramonya within the past five years. Kannan responded by interposing objections and identifying four accounts “[u]pon information and belief” in general terms: Boeing credit union savings and checking accounts, a Chase checking account, and a Boeing retirement account. In his supplemental response, Kannan explained that he “does not have any further information regarding these accounts as such information was no longer available to him after his parents were removed from his house.” He also stated that Subramonya “also has certain assets in India. Asit Mehta may be the accountant with knowledge of the extent of these assets.”

As urged by plaintiffs, this response is self-evidently incomplete. None of Subramonya’s Indian assets are identified even in general terms, although Kannan does not appear to dispute that he traveled to India to determine the extent of those assets and knows the accountant who is familiar with them. Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220, subdivision (c) provides that a party responding to an interrogatory “shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain [information outside its own personal knowledge] by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” “[A] responding party generally may not respond to interrogatories just by asserting its ‘inability to respond.’ ” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 406, italics original.) Here, Kannan does not indicate that he has no personal knowledge of Subramonya’s Indian assets. He also does not indicate that he attempted to contact Asit Mehta to obtain the information requested, nor does he contend that plaintiffs can just as easily contact Mehta. Consequently, his response to SI 1 is not complete.

In his opposition, Kannan argues that this information is protected by Subramonya’s right to privacy (an objection not set forth in his responses to SI 1). While Subramonya does have a right to privacy in his financial information, such information is directly relevant to and essential to the fair resolution of an action in which his children accuse one another of improperly controlling Subramonya and his assets. Furthermore, such information may be designated under the protective order in this action as appropriate. The privacy objection is accordingly overruled, and a further response to SI 1 is warranted. (See Britt v. Superior Court (San Diego Unified Port District) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 [discovery of private information must be permitted where the information is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit”].) The existing protective order adequately addresses Subramonya’s privacy interest in this information under the circumstances. (See Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Superior Court (Olmstead) (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371 [“[p]rotective measures, safeguards and other alternatives may minimize” a necessary intrusion upon an individual’s right to privacy].)

SI 5 instructs Kannan to identify his own financial accounts held within the past five years. Kannan responded to this SI by resting upon objections, including an objection based on his right to privacy, which he defends in his opposition papers.

Plaintiffs contend that this information is needed to prove their claim that Kannan converted Subramonya’s Indian assets for his personal use. While requests for Kannan’s financial information that are narrowly tailored to that claim may be appropriate, plaintiffs have not shown that identifying information for all of Kannan’s accounts is directly relevant the their claim and essential to the fair resolution of this action. Kannan’s privacy objection to SI 5 is accordingly sustained.

SI 13 requests identification of any stock owned by Subramonya within the past five years. As with SI 1, Kannan responded by interposing objections, identifying US stocks in general terms upon information and belief, and referring plaintiffs to Asit Mehta for any information about Indian stocks. Similarly, SI 37 asks Kannan to identify all assets owned by Subramonya in India within the past five years. Kannan asserted objections to the SI and stated, “[u]pon information and belief, Subramonya Ayyar owns stock and 1 piece of real property in India. Asit Mehta may be the financial/accounting firm with knowledge of the extent of these assets. Defendant does not have any further information regarding these accounts as such information was no longer available to him after his parents were removed from his house.” For the reasons already discussed with respect to SI 1, Kannan must provide a further response to these interrogatories.

SI 45 asks for the contents of any safety deposit boxes held in Subramonya’s name within the past five years, as well as the name and address of the holding institution. Kannan objected to this SI and stated, “Defendant is aware that Subramonya Ayyar secured a safety deposit box in a Bank of American [sic.] branch located in Seattle, WA. Defendant does not recall the address of the bank, and no longer has any access to information that contains this address. Upon information and belief, the contents of such safety deposit box are jewelry and gold coins. At the time the safety deposit box was acquired, Subramonya Ayyar insisted that the safety deposit box only be opened with Subramonya and Kannan present. Therefore, it is Defendant’s understanding and belief that the bank requires both Subramonya and Kannan’s presence to open the safety deposit box.” As urged by plaintiffs, this response does not indicate that Kannan made a reasonable effort to obtain information about the safety deposit box—which is admittedly in his own name—from Bank of America. Kannan’s privacy objection to this SI is overruled for the reasons already discussed, and a further response is warranted.

Finally, SI 49 directs Kannan to identify any transactions he conducted on Subramonya’s behalf pursuant to an executed durable power of attorney. Kannan objected to this SI and provided a substantive response identifying groups of transactions in general terms: transactions in India, transactions associated with the sale of homes in Lompoc, CA and Renton, WA, and transactions associated with paying down plaintiffs’ credit card debt. Again, Kannan did not indicate that he made a reasonable effort to obtain information about transactions in India. Nor does he indicate that he made a reasonable effort to obtain information about the other transactions, although he does state that transactions relating to the Lompoc house went through Subramonya’s Boeing Employment Retirement Union checking account, to which Priya and Balan now have access. While Kannan ultimately may be unable to identify every specific transaction at issue due to loss of information, he must make a reasonable effort to obtain this information and he must identify specific transactions to the extent he is able to do so. Kannan’s privacy objection is overruled, and a further response to this SI must be provided.

C. FI 17.1

FI 17.1 asks Kannan to identify the facts, witnesses, and documents supporting any response to a request for admission (“RFA”) that is not an unqualified admission. Plaintiffs move for further responses to the FI with respect to RFAs 4-7 and 9-14.

RFAs 4 and 5 ask Kannan to admit that he breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by failing to provide them with an accounting of their assets in India, and to admit that he did not advise plaintiffs of the nature and extent of their assets in India while he was Subramonya’s attorney of fact under an executed power of attorney. Kannan denied these requests, and responded to FI 17.1 as to both of them by providing a narrative account of his activities and communications with Subramonya respecting Subramonya’s Indian assets, indicating that Subramonya never requested an accounting; identifying the parties to this action and Asit Mehta as relevant witnesses; and identifying “Plaintiffs’ financial statements and documents, which Defendant believes are possessed by both Plaintiffs and their financial institutions.”

Plaintiffs contend that Kannan must identify specific transactions he conducted in India in response to this request, but such information is not required to support Kannan’s assertion that he did not fail to provide an accounting because none was requested. Plaintiffs also maintain that “defendant failed to identify the … Indian accountant and tax expert, failed to provide addresses for the locations, i.e. financial institutions, of Subramonya’s Indian assets, where they were held in the past and where they are currently located.” (Sic.) Again, such information is not called for by the interrogatory. Finally, plaintiffs argue that “defendant failed to identify the specific financial statements which would identify the Indian assets and where they went. Also there must be documents reflecting the hiring of the accountant and tax expert in India and any and all reports or correspondence from these individuals. Defendant failed to identify documents reflecting any and all accountings he provided to Subramonya regarding his assets in India.” All these documents may be relevant to this action, but they are not within the scope of FI 17.1 with respect to the RFAs at issue. A further response as to these RFAs is consequently unwarranted.

RFA 6 seeks an admission that Kannan conducted no transactions concerning Subramonya’s Indian assets while he was Subramonya’s attorney of fact under an executed power of attorney. Similarly, RFA 11 seeks an admission that Kannan conducted no transactions pertaining to plaintiffs’ finances while he was Subramonya’s attorney in fact, and RFA 12 asks Kannan to admit he conducted no transactions pertaining to plaintiffs’ finances in the past three years. Kannan denied these requests, and responded to FI 17.1 in a similar fashion as he did with respect to RFAs 4 and 5. Plaintiffs seek further responses based on the identical argument they presented with respect to RFAs 4 and 5. With respect to these RFAs, plaintiffs are correct that the FI calls for the identification of specific transactions, of all of the multiple “experts” Kannan indicates he worked with in India on Subramonya’s behalf, and of all specific relevant documents that Kannan is aware of. Again, while he may not be able to identify every transaction and document that exists, Kannan must make a reasonable effort to obtain the needed information from third parties and provide this information in a further response.

RFA 7 asks Kannan to admit that he breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs with respect to the Lompoc property. Kannan denied the request, described his activities with respect to the Lompoc property, identified the parties to this lawsuit and “Sean Russell” as witnesses, and identified the following documents: “Plaintiffs’ financial statements and documents including escrow statements, which Defendant believes are possessed by both Plaintiffs and their financial institutions. In addition, the deed of trust regarding Kannan’s loan [to Subramonya, which was secured by the Lompoc property], which upon information and belief, is under Plaintiff’s possession.”

Again, plaintiffs contend that Kannan must identify all transactions he conducted in connection with the Lompoc property in order to answer the FI, but this is not called for. They demand that Kannan identify the contractors, plumbers, realtors and other individuals involved in transactions conducted to the Lompoc property, but there is no indication that these individuals would have knowledge of whether or not Kannan breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs. Finally, they request the identification of specific documents reflecting improvements to the property, specific bank statements associated with transactions connected to the property, and “documents which would reflect the $60,000 payment made to defendant” in connection with his loan to Subramonya. None of these documents are called for by the FI, and a further response is not required as to this RFA.

RFA 9, which Kannan denied, requests his admission that plaintiffs were never provided with an accounting for the expenses associated with improvements to the Lompoc property. In FI 17.1, Kannan stated that he “was transparent with his parents concerning all expenses for the Lompoc property. All repairs and improvements to the Lompoc property were done in a well-managed and frugal matter [sic.], with his parents involvement and approval.” He identified the same witnesses and documents as he did with respect to RFA 7. Plaintiffs urge that the same information they sought with respect to RFA 7 is required with respect to this RFA, but, again, the FI itself does not call for an accounting. The further response that plaintiffs demand is not required.

RFA 10 asks Kannan to admit that plaintiffs were never provided with an accounting for the “alleged $50,000 loan made by [Kannan] to [Rajan] that was secured by a deed of trust on Plaintiffs’ Lompoc Property.” Kannan denied this request and indicated that he made no loan to Rajan, and instead loaned his mother $50,000, although he believes Bavani subsequently loaned $50,000 to Rajan. He identified “[t]he parties in this lawsuit” and “Plaintiffs’ financial statements and documents” as the relevant witnesses and documents. Plaintiffs contend that “Defendant needs to identify the names and addresses of the financial institutions and specifically identify the financial documents.” Again, however, these discovery requests do not themselves seek an accounting, but ask whether one was provided to plaintiffs. Kannan explained that the loan at issue did not exist, and no further response is required.

Finally, RFAs 13 and 14 ask Kannan to admit that he used Subramonya’s and Balan’s assets, respectively, to satisfy a judgment entered against him in a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Kannan denied these requests, stated that he “has used none of his parents’ assets to satisfy the judgment in question,” and identified the parties to this lawsuit and plaintiffs’ financial statements and documents. Plaintiffs correctly contend that defendant must identify any witnesses and his own financial documents that would confirm the judgment was paid using his own funds. While Kannan has a right to privacy in his financial information, the limited request at issue is directly relevant to and essential to the fair resolution of this action, and Kannan can designate any documents he ultimately produces under the operative protective order, redacting account numbers and other non-essential information.

D. The RPDs

RPDs 1, 2, 3, and 14 seek various documents related to Subramonya’s investment accounts. RPDs 68 and 69 seek all documents relating to transactions conducted on Subramonya or Bavani’s behalf pursuant to an executed power of attorney. RPDs 70 and 71 call for the production of estate planning documents related to Subramonya or Bavani’s assets that Kannan contends are revoked, and RPD 72 seeks any of Subramonya’s power of attorney documents that Kannan contends are revoked. RPDs 74 and 75 encompass any estate planning documents of Subramonya or Bavani’s that Kannan contends are currently in effect and RPDs 76 and 77 seek any executed power of attorney documents of Subramonya or Bavani’s that Kannan contends are currently in effect. Finally, RPD 80 seeks all documents provided to Kannan by Naomi Comfort or her office.

Kannan responded to these requests by interposing objections and indicating that he “has produced all responsive documents to this request that are in Defendant’s possession, custody or control.” Plaintiffs contend that these responses are “evasive,” because “Defendant must state that the production is either in whole or in part and … specify whether any documents are being withheld pursuant to [his] objections.” However, Kannan indicated clearly and without qualification that he has produced “all responsive documents.” Further responses to these RPDs are consequently unwarranted.

RPD 60 seeks any documents relating to assets held by Subramonya in India within the past five years. RPD 61 seeks documents concerning Bavani’s Indian assets. Kannan responded to RPD 60 by indicating that he has performed a diligent search and reasonable inquiry to locate responsive documents in his possession, custody, or control, but has been unable to locate such documents because no such documents were ever in his possession. He identified Asit C. Mehta Investment Intermediates Ltd. as the firm that has these documents, and provided the mailing address, telephone number, and fax number for this firm. Kannan responded to RPD 61 with a similarly code-compliant statement of inability to comply, indicating that he is unaware that any documents concerning Indian assets held by Bavani have ever existed. While plaintiffs appear not to credit these responses, they present no evidence that Kannan is withholding documents, and his responses to these RPDs are code-compliant. Again, further responses to these RPDs are not warranted.

E. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

Plaintiffs make code-compliant requests for monetary sanctions against Kannan in connection with both of their motions. However, plaintiffs did not prevail on their motion to compel further responses to the RPDs, and Kannan was substantially justified in opposing the motion to compel further responses to the SIs and FI 17.1, which was only partially successful. Accordingly, the Court will not award sanctions to plaintiffs. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Kannan also requests monetary sanctions, but his request is not code-compliant, since he does not provide a declaration setting forth the amount of sanctions requested along with facts supporting the request. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.)

F. Conclusion and Order

Kannan’s request for a protective order is DENIED.

The motion to compel further responses to the SIs and FI 17.1 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to SIs 1, 13, 37, 45, and 49, and FI 17.1 as to RFAs 6 and 11-14. Kannan shall serve verified, code-compliant further responses to these interrogatories, without objections, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this order. The motion is DENIED as to SI 5 and FI 17.1 with respect to RFAs 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10.

The motion to compel further responses to the RPDs is DENIED.

The parties’ requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.

III. Kannan’s Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Depositions

In addition to plaintiffs’ motions, Kannan moves to compel plaintiffs to appear for their depositions.

A. Discovery Dispute

On November 4, 2015, Kannan noticed plaintiffs’ depositions. Plaintiffs served objections to the deposition notices, stating that “[t]he noticing party has not shown good cause to take the deposition of Plaintiff, the deposition is an improper use of discovery and is intended to harass Plaintiff” and plaintiff “is entitled to a protective order dictating that the deposition should not be taken at all, or under specified terms and conditions and/or after other depositions have been taken.”

Kannan’s counsel sent plaintiffs’ counsel a meet and confer letter stating that Kannan had a right to take plaintiffs’ depositions and was happy to meet and confer about the mechanics of the depositions in light of plaintiffs’ age and physical condition. Counsel offered to take the depositions in one-hour increments and to meet and confer regarding the location of the depositions. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that plaintiffs’ physicians were being consulted to determine the impact of depositions on plaintiffs’ frail and declining health. Counsel also indicated that “[w]e have also been waiting for an accounting from Kannan and we will not produce Plaintiffs as deponents until that occurs.” Kannan’s counsel responded that it was improper to condition plaintiffs’ depositions upon the production of an “accounting” by Kannan, particularly because Kannan had responded to plaintiffs’ discovery requests and “[y]our clients have sued for an accounting, not requested such an item during discovery.”

Plaintiffs’ counsel ultimately indicated that plaintiffs would not appear for deposition due to their doctor’s opinion that it would jeopardize their health. Counsel enclosed two virtually identical letters from plaintiffs’ doctor, Grace I. Chen, MD. Dr. Chen wrote that given their dementia, plaintiffs are “easily agitated and flustered when asked questions about [their] health and finances. The anxiety can become overwhelming and lead to both physical and psychological conditions that may require urgent hospital care.” In Dr. Chen’s opinion, plaintiffs should “not be subjected to any stressful situations where [they are] subject to questioning.” The parties agreed that they would have until February 16, 2016 to file motions to compel and/or for a protective order regarding the depositions.

On that date, Kannan filed the instant motion to compel plaintiffs’ deposition, which plaintiffs oppose. In their opposition, plaintiffs ask the Court to enter a protective order precluding the depositions or, in the alternative, limiting their scope and duration, as well as ordering Kannan to provide an accounting.

B. Analysis and Order

The motion to compel is GRANTED. While the Court shares the parties’ concerns for plaintiffs’ health, they are key witnesses in this action and Kannan has a right to take their depositions. This right is not abridged by Kannan’s self-represented status, despite plaintiffs’ concerns that it will be more difficult for Kannan to conduct the depositions without experienced counsel. Dr. Chen’s vague opinion—which is identical as to each plaintiff—does not indicate the likelihood that unspecified severe “physical and psychological conditions” will be triggered by the depositions, and there is consequently no basis for the Court to find that this is likely. Kannan has offered to alter the mechanics of the deposition to accommodate plaintiffs’ conditions, and the Court expects that the parties will work together to minimize the impact of these proceedings on their parents’ health.

Plaintiffs’ request for a protective order is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs do not specify the terms of the “strict protective order” they contend is necessary to protect plaintiffs’ health, and the Court is in no position to invent such terms, which are also not addressed by Dr. Chen’s letter. Plaintiffs focus instead on the asserted need to compel Kannan to produce an accounting before the depositions proceed. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.020 expressly states that “the methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or another method, shall not operate to delay the discovery of any other party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.020, subd. (a).) The Court “should not [alter the timing of discovery] without good reason.” (Rosemont v. Superior Court (Turner) (1964) 60 Cal.2d 709, 714.) Plaintiffs do not contend that it would unfairly prejudice them to proceed with the depositions without an accounting, and even acknowledge that “Kannan may be technically correct in that his pattern of evasive behavior does not bear on his right to depose the Plaintiffs.” Particularly since the Court has now issued an order addressing the further discovery responses to which plaintiffs are currently entitled, there is no reason to delay plaintiffs’ depositions.

Kannan’s request for monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivisions (d) and (e) is DENIED. Section 2023.010 does not itself set forth any provisions regarding the issuance of a monetary sanction, but merely defines certain actions as misuses of the discovery process. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides that sanctions may be imposed for misuses of the discovery process “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title.” “This means that the statutes governing the particular discovery methods limit the permissible sanctions to those sanctions provided under the applicable governing statutes.” (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (Shanahan) (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422.) While Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (g)(1) provides for the imposition of a monetary sanction in connection with a motion to compel a deposition, the Court finds that plaintiffs acted with substantial justification in opposing Kannan’s motion due to their health concerns.

In light of the above, plaintiffs are ordered to appear for their depositions within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this order, or at another date mutually agreed upon by the parties. The parties shall meet and confer in good faith to accommodate plaintiffs’ health with respect to the depositions’ location, duration, and other mechanics.

The Court will prepare the order.