Case Name: Tabitha Lynn Newsom, et al. v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, et al.
Case No.: 16-CV-299973

This is a putative class action for violation of the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act (“CFDBPA”) brought by plaintiff Tabitha Lynn Newsom (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf all others similarly situated, against defendant Cavalry SPV I, LLC (“Defendant”).
According to the allegations of the complaint (“Complaint”), Plaintiff incurred a financial obligation in the form of a consumer credit account issued by Citibank, N.A. (the “alleged debt”). (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Subsequently, Citibank, N.A. removed the alleged debt from its books as an asset and treated it as a loss or expense. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Thereafter, in June 2016, Citibank, N.A. sold the alleged debt to Defendant for collection purposes. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
Defendant engaged Cawley & Bergmann, LLP (“C&B”) to collect the alleged debt from Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons (the “Class”). (Id. at ¶ 16.) In July 2016, C&B sent a written communication to Plaintiff, at Defendant’s request and on its behalf, regarding collected the amount still owed on the alleged debt. (Id. at ¶ 18.) This communication failed to provide the notice required by the CFDBPA. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts one cause of action against Defendant for violation of the CFDBPA.
Currently before the Court are the following motions: (1) Plaintiff’s motion to compel nonparty Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC’s compliance with a deposition subpoena; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant to provide further responses to her request for production of documents, set one.

Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC (“CPS”) opposes the motion to compel compliance with the deposition subpoena. Defendant opposes the motion to compel further responses to the RPD. All parties request monetary sanctions in connection with the motions.

III. Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena

Plaintiff served CPS with a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records (“Subpoena”) with a production date of January 6, 2017. CPS’s counsel served objections to the Subpoena and has refused to comply. Plaintiff moves to compel CPS to produce all documents requested in the Subpoena pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1987.1 and 2025.480.

If a nonparty disobeys a deposition subpoena, the subpoenaing party may seek a court order compelling the nonparty to comply with the subpoena under either Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 or section 2025.480. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1987.1, 2025.480.) Section 1987.1 authorizes a party to bring a motion to direct compliance with a subpoena. A court may then make an order directing compliance with the subpoena “upon those terms and conditions as the court shall declare.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) Section 2025.480 provides, in pertinent part, that: “If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).)

A. Request for Judicial Notice

In connection with her reply, Plaintiff requests judicial notice of: (1) a business entity detail for CPS from the California Secretary of State website; (2) a statement of no change filed with the California Secretary of State; and (3) a statement of information filed with the Secretary of State. This material is presented for the purpose of supporting the argument that CPS is subject to California’s subpoena jurisdiction.

The Court may take judicial notice of these documents pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h). Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) provides that official acts of the executive departments of states are proper subjects of judicial notice. Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h) provides that judicial notice may be taken of facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.
Courts have previously taken judicial notice of records from the office of the Secretary of State pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h). (See Pedus Building Services, Inc. v. Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 152, 156 [granting request for judicial notice of the official records of the California Secretary of State]; Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 753 [taking judicial notice of an agreement posted on a government agency’s website].) Additionally, these documents are relevant to the underlying issues to be resolved in the motion to compel CPS’s compliance with the Subpoena. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

Accordingly, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
B. Meet and Confer

CPS contends that Plaintiff failed to engage in meaningful meet and confer efforts before filing the instant motion.
A motion to compel compliance with a subpoena brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve the discovery matters at issue. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2025.480, subd. (b).) “A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel . . . . [R]ather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) A determination of whether a party’s efforts were sufficient to satisfy the meet and confer requirement involves the exercise of discretion. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

Here, on February 22, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to CPS’s counsel addressing the objections and requesting supplemental responses and production of documents, but received no further response. (Salmonsen Dec. at ¶ 5, Ex. C; Mayilyan Dec, ¶ 5, Ex. D.) CPS contends that Plaintiff failed to make a meaningful meet and confer effort because the letter her counsel sent did not address any specific documents or explain why the discovery was warranted. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s letter clearly stated her position with respect to CPS’s specific objection that the Subpoena is defective on its face because it is an out-of-state nonparty witness requesting business records located outside of California. (See Salmonsen Dec. at ¶ 5, Ex. C; Mayilyan Dec, ¶ 5, Ex. D.) She further addressed each objection CPS made with respect to each of the six document requests. (Ibid.) Because CPS’s response to each request was identical and consisted solely of objections, it is apparent that Plaintiff was stating her position with respect to each request. In sum, this letter shows that Plaintiff’s counsel presented the merits of his client’s position with candor, specificity, and support. (See Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in sufficient meet and confer efforts.

C. Good Cause

In the context of a motion to compel further responses relative to a request for production of documents propounded on a party, the applicable statute mandates that the moving party preliminarily establish good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b) [“motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand”].) In contrast, neither Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 nor section 2025.480 specifically contains any good cause requirement.
Consequently, a leading practice guide on civil procedure concludes that a showing of good cause apparently is not required on a motion to compel a nonparty to comply with a business records subpoena. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015), § 8:609.3.) However, the Fourth Appellate District read a good cause requirement similar to that of section 2031.310 into section 2025.480 “since it is unlikely the Legislature intended to place greater burdens on a nonparty than on a party to the litigation.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-224 (“Calcor”).) Subsequently, the Second Appellate District, citing Calcor, also applied a good cause requirement to a motion to compel a nonparty to comply with a subpoena brought pursuant to the Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 2029.010 et seq. (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-224.) The analysis provided by the Calcor court can similarly be read into section 1987.1 as it correspondingly governs a motion to compel a nonparty to comply with a subpoena. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff must show good cause for the documents sought by the Subpoena.

To establish good cause for the discovery sought, the moving party must make a fact-specific showing of relevance. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, p. 98.)
Discovery is allowed for any matters not privileged that are either relevant to the subject matter involved in the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 (“Gonzalez”).) “Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Ibid. [italics in original].) Courts liberally construe the relevance standard, and any doubts as to whether a request seeks information within the scope of discovery are generally resolved in favor of allowing discovery. (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)

Plaintiff’s subpoena contains six requests seeking the following categories of documents: (1) contracts, agreements, or similar documents which relate to the collection or attempted collection of accounts (Request No. 1); (2) contracts, agreements, correspondence, or similar documents which relate to the collection notice sent to Plaintiff (Request Nos. 2 and 3); (3) the creation, approval, and mailing of collection notices in the form of the notice sent to Plaintiff (Request Nos. 4, and 6); and (4) all mailing lists reflecting the names, addresses, and date of mailing of all persons who were mailed collection notices in the form of the notice sent to Plaintiff for a debt purported to be originally owed to Citibank, N.A. (Request No. 5.).

Plaintiff states that the documents at issue are relevant because, according to discovery responses served by Defendant, Defendant does not engage in any conduct to collect consumer accounts, but instead uses CPS to collect any and all defaulted consumer debts. She further contends that because CPS collects consumer debts on behalf of Defendant, all information relating to its business practices in collecting consumer accounts and its relationship with Defendant is relevant. She “believes that responsive documents are in the possession, custody and control of [CPS].” (Mem. of Ps. & As. at p. 3:18-19.) With respect to documents evidencing CPS’s connection to nonparty C&B, Plaintiff asserts these documents are relevant because C&B’s name and address are included in the heading of the collection letters it purportedly sent. She further points out that the letter directs all payments to be made online at C&B’s website. In opposition, CPS merely contends that the documents are not relevant because they will not have any bearing on this case.
Plaintiff’s argument is persuasive. The issue in this case is whether or not the collection letter for a consumer debt purportedly sent to others by Defendant provided the notice required by the CFDBPA. Since CPS collects consumer debts on behalf of Defendant, the documents within its possession and control evidencing the collection or attempted collection of accounts and involving the collection notice at issue are either relevant to Plaintiff’s claims or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1546.) As such, she establishes good cause for the discovery sought by Request Nos. 1-6.

D. Objections

If a motion is properly made, the burden is on the deponent to justify any failure to answer and/or produce documents. (See San Diego Professional Ass’n v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194, 199; Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

CPS’s main objection to the Subpoena is that it “is not subject to a California Court’s subpoena jurisdiction.” (CPS Opp., at p. 5:6.) CPS argues that not only does Plaintiff fail to show it actively conducts business in California, the documents she seeks are located outside of California and are therefore outside the subpoena powers of California. (Id. at p. 6:12-13.) In response, Plaintiff argues the objection is without merit because CPS is registered with the California Secretary of State, was served through its registered agent of process, and actively conducts business in California.

CPS cites to Coopman v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 656 (“Coopman”) for the proposition that an out of state deponent does not have to produce records kept outside the state, even if it has control of them. In Coopman, a party sought out-of-state documents from an out-of-state corporation from the president of the corporation. (Id. at pp. 657-658.) The president himself was a resident of California, but neither he nor the corporation were a party to the action and the corporation did not have any contacts with California. (Id. at p. 658.) The court found it could not compel the president to produce those documents because the corporation was not a party to the action over which it had jurisdiction and the owner of the records was not doing business within the jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 661.) The Coopman court examined numerous cases dealing with the power to compel records held outside the jurisdiction by process executed locally. (Ibid.) It found that enforcement was predicated “(1) upon the fact that the records belonged to a party to the action over whom or which the court had jurisdiction, or (2) the owner of the records was doing business within the jurisdiction and thereby subject thereto.” (Ibid.)

Here, CPS is not a party to the instant action. Nor is it clear that CPS is doing business within the jurisdiction. Designating a registered agent in California does not, by itself, show that CPS is doing business of California. (See Corp. Code, § 17001, subd. (ap) [definition of transacting intrastate business]; see also, Elkman v. National States Ins. Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1315-1316 [designating an agent for service of process is only one factor a court considers when determining if a corporation does business in California].)

The court in Coopman also noted that the party seeking the records was not without remedy, as she could still seek the aid of the out-of-state courts to secure the evidence that lay within that state. (Coopman, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at p. 662.) In 2007, the Uniform Law Commission drafted the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (“UIDDA”) which “sets forth procedures for litigants to pursue out of state discovery.” (Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. (2015) 289 Va. 426, 435 (“Yelp”).) Many states have adopted the UIDDA in whole or in part. (See e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-412.8 et seq.; Ariz. R. Civ. P., rule 45.1; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016), §§ 8:637-8:640.) California adopted the UIDDA in part and codified the procedures to facilitate service and enforcement of out of state subpoenas at Code of Civil Procedure section 2029.010 et seq. While there does not appear to be any California case law regarding the UIDDA, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently analyzed the territorial limits of the state’s subpoena power under the UIDDA regarding a non-party subpoena directing a foreign corporation to produce documents located in California in connection with an action pending in a Virginia court. (Yelp, supra, 289 Va. at pp. 432-438 (“Yelp”).) The court stated that the purpose of the UIDDA is to provide “a reciprocal and fair process that assists out-of-state litigants seeking discovery from non-parties and seeks to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among the states that enact it.” (Id. at p. 437 [quotation marks omitted].) The UIDDA contemplates that a state court will protect citizens subject to a subpoena from another state by providing for enforcement of the subpoena in their own state, while also respecting the territorial limitations of their own subpoena power. (Ibid.) As such, the court concluded that even though the non-party foreign corporation was registered to do business in Virginia and had a designated registered agent in Virginia, it was not empowered to enforce the subpoena directing the corporation to produce documents in California. (Id. at pp. 437-438.)

Similarly, even though CPS has a designated registered agent in California, its documents are located in another state and thus beyond the reach of a California court. (See id. at p. 437.) Plaintiff’s recourse to enforce the subpoena, as stated in Coopman, would be to comply with the subject state’s laws regarding subpoenas issued by a foreign jurisdiction. (See id. at p. 435; Coopman, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at p. 662.)

Accordingly, CPS’ objection is sustained. Plaintiff’s motion to compel nonparty CPS to produce all documents requested in the Subpoena is DENIED.

E. Monetary Sanctions

Both parties request sanctions in connection with this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1987.2 and 2025.480. Section 1987.2 provides that a court may award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing a motion under section 1987.1 if it finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).) Section 2025.480 provides that a court “shall impose a monetary sanctions . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

CPS is the prevailing party. As such, Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary sanctions under sections 1987.2 and 2025.480. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

With respect to CPS’s request, it makes a code-compliant request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of $4,470. However, the record reflects a total disregard or failure by CPS to respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer effort. Given the circumstances, the Court finds the motion was not brought in bad faith and the imposition of sanctions here would otherwise be unjust. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

IV. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD

Plaintiff served the request for production of documents, set one (“RPD”) on Defendant on October 10, 2016. Defendant served responses on November 23, 2016. After attempting to meet and confer with Defendant regarding the responses, Plaintiff now moves to compel it to provide further responses to the RPD pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides that a demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to an inspection demand if it deems that a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, and/or an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant to provide further responses to RPD Nos. 2 and 3 on the grounds that its objections lack merit or are too general and its answers are not code-complaint. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.210, subd. (a); 2031.310, subd. (a).)

A. Meet and Confer

Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to engage in meaningful meet and confer efforts before filing the instant motion.
A motion to compel further responses to a requests for production of documents must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve the discovery matters at issue. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) As discussed above, a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over. (Clement v. Alegre, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1294.) Whether a party’s efforts satisfy the meet and confer requirement involves the exercise of discretion. (Obregon v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.)

Here, on February 17, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel with substantive reasons why the discovery responses she received were insufficient. (Salmonsen Dec., ¶ 7, Ex. E.) Defendant’s counsel responded on March 3, 2017 asking if Plaintiff would agree to submit her claims to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of an agreement, which he attached. (Salmonsen Dec., ¶ 8, Ex. F; Mayilyan Dec., ¶ 3, Ex. B.) On March 7, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel informed Defendant’s counsel of documents he would need to review before responding to its request. (Salmonsen Dec., ¶ 9, Ex. G; Mayilyan Dec., ¶ 4, Ex. C.) Two days later, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel asking why he needed these documents. (Mayilyan Dec., ¶ 5, Ex. D.) Defendant did not receive a response and subsequently moved to compel arbitration on March 14, 2017. (Mayilyan Dec., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff then filed the instant motion.

A review of the meet and confer correspondence shows that Plaintiff’s counsel presented the merits of his client’s position with candor, specificity, and support. (See Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith because her counsel never responded to its follow up email asking him to explain why she needed specific documents in order to respond to the request to arbitrate. This argument lacks merit. Defendant never replied to Plaintiff’s lengthy email detailing why further responses were necessary; it merely asked in response if Plaintiff would agree to arbitration. (Salmonsen Dec., ¶ 8, Ex. F; Mayilyan Dec., ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Plaintiff was under no obligation to reassert her position. Defendant had plenty of time to respond to Plaintiff’s request for supplemental responses before she filed the instant motion, and yet made no attempt to do so. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in sufficient meet and confer efforts.

B. Good Cause

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b).) As stated above, the moving party must make a fact-specific showing of relevance in order to establish good cause for the discovery sought. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at p. 98.) Information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence and assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1546)
RPD No. 2 seeks all documents and electronically stored information (“ESI”) relating to or evidencing the credit card account originally owed to Citibank, N.A. RPD No. 3 seeks all documents and ESI relating to or evidencing the assignment, sale, or transfer of the Subject Account.

Oddly, Plaintiff’s assertion of good cause for the discovery sought is narrow and addresses only three categories of documents she purportedly needs to oppose Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. These categories are: (1) Bills of Sale; (2) unredacted purchase agreements; and (3) all other documents showing that the credit card account agreement applies to her and/or her account with the original creditor. It is unclear to the Court why she chose to approach the issue of good cause in this manner. With that said, she establishes good cause with respect to these specific records, all of which would fall within the scope of these requests. She argues that these documents are relevant to show what the terms of the credit card account agreement were, whether Plaintiff agreed to be bound by the terms, and whether the account was successfully transferred from the original creditor to Defendant. The Court agrees and Defendant does not contend otherwise.

It is otherwise evident that Plaintiff’s requests, more broadly speaking, are relevant to this case as the collection notice at issue was sent to Plaintiff due to a purportedly outstanding debt bought by Defendant. Thus, information evidencing the credit card account and alleged debt as well as the transfer of that account to Defendant is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1546.) Accordingly, there is good cause for the discovery sought by RPD Nos. 2 and 3.

C. Objections

A responding party has the burden of justifying any objections. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Defendant objected to the requests on numerous grounds including attorney-client privilege and work product privilege. The only objection it attempts to justify is its confidentiality objection with respect to RPD No. 3 regarding the purchase agreement between it and Citibank, N.A. As such, all other objections, except for those on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, are overruled. (See Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188-1189 [objections on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, although undefended, are preserved].)

With respect to its objection to RPD No. 3 on the ground of confidentiality, Defendant argues that the purchase agreement contains confidential, commercially-sensitive information that would reveal its internal business strategy. It provides no basis for this objection and an objection on the ground of confidentiality does not justify a failure to provide discovery. (See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 23.) Thus, the objection is overruled.

D. Substantive Responses

In substantively responding to an inspection demand, a party may agree to comply or represent he or she is unable to comply. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) In agreeing to comply with an inspection demand, the party must state whether it will comply in whole or in part and that all documents in that party’s possession, custody, or control will be produced. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)

Defendant provided the same substantive response to RDP Nos. 2 and 3. It stated as follows: “Defendant does not have any employees and does not engage in any conduct to collect consumer accounts. Defendant will produce responsive documents maintained by its servicing agent, Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, relating to the account at issue in this case, including documents sufficient to show the purchase of the account and documents obtained from the seller relating to the account.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 2:14-19, 8:24-28, 9:1.)

Defendant contends that “further production . . . is moot and harassing because [it] provided responsive documents with its motion to compel arbitration.” (Opp. at pp. 5:23-24; 6:19-20.) This is inconsequential in considering a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents. The written responses to RPD Nos. 2 and 3 are not code-compliant as Defendant does not state whether production will be allowed in whole or in part, or whether all documents in its possession, custody, or control will be produced. As such, further responses are warranted.

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED as to RPD Nos. 2 and 3. Accordingly, Defendant shall serve further verified code-compliant responses to RPD Nos. 2 and 3, without objections (except for objections on the grounds of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine which have been preserved), within 20 calendar days of this Order.

If any responsive document is withheld on the basis of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, Defendant must produce a privilege log identifying each document withheld and setting forth sufficient facts for other parties to evaluate the merits of the asserted objection. (See Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1188-1189; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c).)

F. Monetary Sanctions

Both parties request sanctions in connection with this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310. Section 2031.310 provides that a court “shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party. As such, Defendant is not entitled to monetary sanctions under section 2031.310. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

With respect to Plaintiff’s request, she makes a code-complaint request for monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $2,450. She is the prevailing party and the Court finds Defendant did not act with substantial justification in opposing the motion and that no other circumstances exist which would make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Thus, she is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions.

In his declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel states he spent 5 hours preparing the instant motion. In his supplemental declaration he states he spent an additional 2 hours drafting a reply. Given his rate of $350 an hour, he requests a total of $2,450 in attorney’s fees. The Court finds this amount reasonable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $2,450. Defendant shall pay $2,450 to Plaintiff’s counsel within 20 calendar days of this Order.