Case Number: BC562843 Hearing Date: August 04, 2015 Dept: 91
The motion for determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED.

This case arises out of a collision between vehicles operated by Ajaya Williams-Edwards and Tenha Brooks at approximately 3:30 pm on June 2, 2013, near Wardlow Road and Orange Avenue in the City of Long Beach, California. After colliding, the vehicles went into the nearby restaurant operated by Hole Mole Restaurant, Inc. It appears that persons inside the restaurant, including Travis Smith (“Travis”) and Dina Poppleton-Smith (“Dina”), may have been injured as well. Non-parties Richard San Nicholas (“San Nicholas”) and Isabell Lally (“Lally”) were also apparently injured as well.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a), in an action involving two or more joint tortfeasors or co-obligors, when one tortfeasor or obligor enters into a settlement with the plaintiff, the other tortfeasors or obligors are entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether the settlement was entered into in good faith. In other words, the Court must approve any settlement entered into by less than all joint tortfeasors or co-obligors. This requirement furthers two sometimes-competing policies: “(1) [t]he equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault and (2) the encouragement of settlements.” (Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487.)

In determining whether a settlement is made in good faith, the Court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor… for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)

The non-settling tortfeasors or obligors bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of good faith in the settlement. (Id., § 877.6 subd. (d).) In order to demonstrate lack of good faith, the non-settling party must show that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Section 877.6. (See Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 209, 213.) In making this determination, the Court must rely “on the basis of experience rather than speculation,” and “may enlist the guidance of the judge’s personal experience and of experts in the field.” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 959 [“Cahill”].)

In determining whether a settlement “out of the ballpark,” the Court considers the following five factors: (1) the plaintiff’s (roughly) approximated total recovery; (2) the settlor’s share of liability; (3) the size of the settlement at issue; (4) the distribution of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (5) the usual discount value when plaintiffs settle before trial; the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and finally, (6) whether there is evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injury the interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 [“Tech-Bilt”].) The considerations are generally referred to as the “Tech-Bilt factors.” As a practical matter, the Tech-Bilt factors must be evaluated according to what information is available at the time of settlement. (Ibid.)

Under the proposed settlement, Williams-Edwards, through her insurer Infinity Insurance, will pay: (1) $10,000 to Williams-Edwards; (2) $5,000 to Travis; (3) $5,000 to Dina; (4) $5,000 to Brooks; (5) $8,000 to San Nicholas; and (6) $2,000 to Lally. (LaScola Decl., ¶ 8.) In exchange, each of the recipients would dismiss all of their claims against her with prejudice. (Id., ¶ 9.) Williams-Edwards’ insurance policy from Infinity Insurance is $15,000 per person, and $30,000 in the aggregate. (LaScola Decl., ¶ 5.) Infinity Insurance tendered the full $30,000 to the six claimants (including the two non-parties), who accepted the amounts. (Ibid.) Apart from her auto insurance policy, Williams-Edwards has no appreciable assets. (Id., ¶ 9.)

Hole Mole’s opposition argues that Williams-Edwards’ settlement is grossly disproportionate to her share of liability and the damages claimed by the Smiths. Given that Williams-Edwards allegedly caused the accident by running a red light, (see Veh. Code, § 21453, subd. (a),) that may very well be the case.

However, “strict proportionate liability is not the sine qua non of a good faith settlement.” (Aero-Crete, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 203, 208 [ellipses omitted].) Indeed, the financial condition of the settling defendant is also quite relevant. (Ibid [quoting Tech–Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499].) “A disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.” (Ibid [brackets omitted]; see also Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 238.) When there are no assets to satisfy a judgment, there is little value in disapproving of the good faith of a settlement. (See, e.g., Schmid v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1249.)

Here, Williams-Edwards represents that she does not have any assets to satisfy whatever judgment entered against her, aside from her $30,000 insurance policy. Even if she were fully responsible for the Plaintiffs’ injuries, the parties would have no means to obtain anything more than what Williams-Edwards’ insurer has already paid out. The Court cannot find that this settlement is “out of the ballpark” of serving the Section 877.6 objectives for this reason.