Case Name: Gomez v. City of Mountain View, et al.
Case No.: 16-CV-290705

This is an action for false arrest/imprisonment and related claims by plaintiff Alejandro Gomez (“Plaintiff”) against defendants City of Mountain View (“the City”), County of Santa Clara (“the County”), State of California (“the State”), “John Doe Police Officer” (“Officer Doe”), and Does 1-25 (collectively, “Defendants”). In the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) false arrest against the County and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, “County Defendants”); (2) false imprisonment against County Defendants; (3) excessive force against the City, Officer Doe, and Does 21 through 25 (collectively, “City Defendants”); (4) battery against City Defendants; (5) negligence against City Defendants; (6) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 against City Defendants; (7) vicarious and direct liability against the State and Does 10 through 20 (collectively, “State Defendants”); and (8) false imprisonment against State Defendants.

Currently before the Court is the County’s demurrer to the SAC as a whole and to the first and second causes of action for uncertainty and failure to state a claim. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e)-(f).)

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Previously, in the FAC, Plaintiff asserted causes of action for: (1) false arrest against Defendants; (2) false imprisonment against County Defendants and State Defendants; (3) excessive force against City Defendants; (4) battery against City Defendants; (5) negligence against City Defendants; and (6) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 against City Defendants. After the Court sustained the State’s demurrer with leave to amend, Plaintiff filed the SAC.

In the SAC, Plaintiff continues to assert the same causes of action against City Defendants. (FAC, pp. 5:11-9:10; SAC, pp. 5:3-8:6. ) That being said, in the SAC, Plaintiff now asserts the first two causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment only against County Defendants, and adds two new causes of action against State Defendants. (SAC, pp. 1:1-5:2 & 9:1-14:5.) Plaintiff also adds several pages of new allegations related to the duties, acts, and omissions of the State, the County, and their employees. (Id., pp. 9-14.)
Plaintiff now alleges the following facts to support the claims for false arrest and false imprisonment: Does 1 through 10 acted as agents/employees of the County and Does 10 through 20 acted as agents/employees of the State. (SAC, pp. 3:9-16 & 9:7-9.) The efforts of Does 1 through 20 caused an order requiring Plaintiff to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code sections 290 et seq. (“Registration Order”) to be entered into databases maintained by the State’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”). (Id., p. 2:21-24.) On September 20, 2010, the court issued an order nunc pro tunc to recall/strike that order (“Recall Order”). (Id., p. 1:22-25.) Does 1 through 20 were responsible for entering the Recall Order into the DOJ’s databases, but negligently failed to do so. (Id., pp. 2:25-3:16, 9:7-10:8, & 12:21-24.) As a result, the Recall Order was not in the DOJ’s databases when Officer Doe of the City’s police department conducted a record check in 2015. (Id., pp. 2:5-15, 10:21-27, & 12:17-26.) Based on the erroneous information in the databases, Officer Doe requested and obtained a warrant, and he and the City’s other officers—Does 21 through 25—falsely arrested Plaintiff for violating the sex offender registration requirement on April 14, 2015. (Id., pp. 1:18-21 & 5:8-14, & Ex. A.) Thereafter, Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned, and ultimately found innocent. (Id., p. 4:8-9, & Ex. A.) The acts and omissions of Does 1 through 20 were a substantial cause of Plaintiff’s false arrest, imprisonment, and deprivation of constitutional rights. (Id., pp. 3:9-16, 4:10-19, 11:28-12:10, & 13:24-28.)
More specifically, to support his claims against State Defendants, Plaintiff alleges the following: The DOJ is the State’s agency that maintains criminal history and sex offender registration databases that are accessible to law enforcement throughout California. (SAC, p. 2:13-15.) Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117 require the DOJ to add reports received to appropriate criminal records. (Id., pp. 9:20-10:5.) The State’s employees, Does 10 through 20, had ministerial duties to maintain and update the databases. (Id., pp. 9:7-9 & 10:6-8.) On September 20, 2010, the court issued the Recall Order, and the DOJ received the Recall Order on or about the same date, but the State’s employees negligent failed to update the databases in violation of their mandatory duties. (Id., pp. 1:22-25 &12:15-13:8.)
To support his claims against County Defendants, Plaintiff further alleges the following: Penal Code section 13151 requires the court and the County’s employees to transmit information to the DOJ within 30 days of the issuance of a court order. (SAC, p. 10:9-13.) The DOJ received a record of the Recall Order on or about the same date that it was issued. (Id., 1:22-25 & 12:20-24.) Also, “Does 1 through 20, employees of various local and state employees,” have ministerial duties to maintain and update the DOJ’s databases. (Id., p. 2:16-19.) “By agreement[,] various local and state employees work together and are responsible for inputting relevant information and documents into said databases.” (Id., p. 2:19-21.) The County’s employees were responsible for entering the Recall Order into the databases, but negligently failed to do so, and therefore caused Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment. (Id., pp. 2:25-3:16.) Furthermore, Officer Doe requested an arrest warrant from the County’s District Attorney. (Id., p. 2:7-9.)

II. Demurrer for Uncertainty

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) It will be sustained only where the complaint is so incomprehensible that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

The County argues that its demurrer for uncertainty should be sustained because the allegations are ambiguous as to whether doe defendants acted as agents/employees of it or the State. Since Plaintiff clearly alleges that the County employed Does 1 through 10 (SAC, p. 3:9-11) and the State employed Does 10 through 20 (id., 9:7-9), the SAC is not so uncertain that the County cannot reasonably respond. Additionally, the County asserts that the SAC is uncertain because Plaintiff does not allege their identities or job titles. A plaintiff is not required to identity doe defendants or plead their job titles. Any uncertainty as to the doe defendants’ job titles may be clarified through discovery. Accordingly, the County’s demurrer for uncertainty to the SAC as a whole and the first two causes of action is OVERRULED.

III. Demurrer for Failure to State a Claim

“A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47.) On demurrer, courts admit all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Courts also admit facts in exhibits attached to the complaint, and facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged. (Mead v. Sanwa Bank Cal. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567-568; Hall v. Great Western Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 719, fn.7.)

In support of the demurrer for failure to state a claim, the County raises the following arguments: (a) Plaintiff has not satisfied the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act; (b) Plaintiff has not stated a viable direct liability claim under the Government Claims Act because he has not alleged a mandatory duty; and (c) Plaintiff has not stated a viable vicarious liability claim under the Government Claims because he has not pleaded sufficient facts to support common law claims for false arrest/imprisonment. Each argument is discussed in turn below.

A. Claim Presentation Requirement

Before filing a civil action for damages against a public entity, the plaintiff must submit a government claim that includes a “general description” of the obligation, injury, or damage incurred so far as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim. (Gov. Code, §§ 910, subd. (d) & 945.4.) To survive demurrer, the claim must fairly reflect the facts underlying each cause of action in the complaint. (Stockett v. Assn. of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 447.) A cause of action is fairly reflected in a claim even where the complaint elaborates or adds further detail so long as it is “predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by the defendants.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff attaches the claim he submitted to the County to the SAC. (SAC, Ex. D.) In the claim and the SAC, Plaintiff asserts claims against the County for false arrest and imprisonment based on the acts or omissions of unidentified public employees. (SAC, pp. 1-5, & Ex. D.) He consistently alleges that was arrested/imprisoned for failing to comply with the sex offender registration requirement on April 14, 2015. (Ibid.) In the claim and the SAC, Plaintiff states that the arrest/imprisonment were unlawful because the State and the County had stricken his registration requirement pursuant to the Recall Order. (Ibid.) Moreover, in both the SAC and an exhibit attached to the claim, Plaintiff discloses that the arresting officer requested a warrant and arrested him after a “record check” showed that he was required to register as a sex offender. (Ibid.) In the SAC, Plaintiff elaborates by pleading that the officer searched the DOJ’s database(s) during the record check, and unidentified employees of the County and the State failed to update databases to reflect entry of the Recall Order. (Id., pp. 1-3 & 9-14.) Since the claim and the SAC are predicated on the same fundamental actions or failure to act by the County and its unidentified employees, the allegations are fairly reflected in the claim. Therefore, for purposes of demurrer, Plaintiff has satisfied the claim presentation requirement.

B. Liability Under the Government Claims Act

The Government Claims Act provides that a public entity may only be liable for injury as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) By statute, a public entity may be vicariously liable for its employees’ acts or omissions (Gov. Code, § 815.2) or directly liable for breach of mandatory duty (Gov. Code, § 815.6). To state a claim against a public entity, the plaintiff must plead each material fact with particularity. (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.)

1. Direct Liability

Government Code section 815.6 provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” (Gov. Code, § 815.6.) As a threshold issue, the plaintiff must specifically identify the applicable enactment that imposes the alleged mandatory duty in the complaint. (Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1349; In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, 689.) “Once identified, determining whether the particular enactment at issue creates a mandatory duty is a question of law” for the court. (In re Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th, at p. 689.) “To support liability under section 815.6, a statute must impose a duty on the specific public entity sought to be held liable.” (Forbes v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 48, 54.)
In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that the County acted negligently and is liable under Civil Code section 1714. (SAC, pp. 1:7-17, 3:2-11, & 3:17-18.) Under the Government Claims Act, there is no common law direct tort liability for public entities based on their alleged negligence unless the claim is for negligent failure to comply with a mandatory duty imposed by enactment. (See Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897; see also Forbes v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th, at p. 53.) Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general legal duty of ordinary care for a negligence action. It does not impose any mandatory duty that may support a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6. (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for direct liability against the County based on allegedly negligent conduct in violation of Civil Code section 1714.

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117 impose mandatory duties on the State and its employees to update the DOJ’s databases. (SAC, pp. 2:12-19 & 9:6-10:8.) To support liability against the County, the enactments must impose a mandatory duty on the County. (See Forbes v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th, at p. 54.) Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117 only impose duties on the State. Since the enactments do not impose any duty on the County, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for direct liability against the County for allegedly violating duties imposed by Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117.

Plaintiff also states that the County is liable under Government Code sections 895 and 895.2. (SAC, p. 3:19-21.) Those provisions do not independently impose a duty; instead, they allow public entities to enter into agreements to transfer functions (Gov. Code, § 895) and subject public entities to joint and several liability when such agreements exist (Gov. Code, § 895.2). Plaintiff alleges that, “[b]y agreement, various local and state employees work together and are responsible for inputting relevant information and documents into said databases.” (Id., p. 2:19-21.) Read as a whole, the SAC supports the inference that an agreement exists whereby the State transferred its duty under Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117 to “various local . . . employees.” (Id., pp. 2:19-21 & 9:1-12:10.) To support a claim against the County, however, the existence of such an agreement must be pleaded with particularity. (See Lopez v. v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal.3d, at p. 795.) Since Plaintiff does not particularly allege that the County is a party to the agreement, he has not sufficiently stated that it may be liable for breach of the State’s duty to update or maintain the databases. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support direct liability against the County based on an agreement to transfer functions under Government Code sections 895 and 895.2.

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Penal Code section 13151 required the superior court and the County’s employees to furnish information to the DOJ within 30 days of issuance of the Recall Order. (SAC, p. 10:9-13.) To the contrary, Penal Code section 13151 only imposes a duty on the superior courts, not any employee of the courts or the County. As the County persuasively argues in reply, superior courts are part of the State, not the County. (See Hart v. Alameda County (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 766, 782.) Although some individuals working at the superior courts are employees of the County (e.g., Jones v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046), Penal Code section 13151 does not impose any duty on persons working at the courts. Thus, it does not support direct liability against the County. (See Forbes v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th, at p. 54.) In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff has not stated a direct liability claim against the County based on Penal Code section 13151.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the County’s Does 1 through 10 had “ministerial duties” to create, maintain, and update the DOJ’s databases, and its agents and employees were responsible for entering the Recall Order in the databases. (SAC, pp. 2:16-19 & 2:25-3:1.) In the SAC, Plaintiff does not identify an enactment imposing such a duty as required to state a claim for direct liability against it. (See In re Groundwater Cases, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th, at p. 689; see also Cerna v. City of Oakland, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th, at p.1349.) Accordingly, he has not alleged sufficient facts to support a direct liability claim against the County based on the assertion that the County’s employees owed ministerial duties.

To summarize, Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support a claim for direct liability against the County.

2. Vicarious Liability

Government Code sections 815.2 states that a public entity may be vicariously liable for its employees’ acts or omissions “if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) “Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person,” and his or her liability is “subject to any defenses that would be available . . . if he were a private person.” (Gov. Code, § 820.) A public employee is immune from liability for malicious prosecution (Gov. Code, § 821.6), but is not exonerated from liability for claims for false arrest or imprisonment (Gov. Code, § 820.4).

Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against the County for false arrest and false imprisonment based on the acts or omissions of its employees, Does 1 through 10. (SAC, pp. 1-5.) False arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts; false arrest is one way of committing a false imprisonment. (See Collins v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 671, 673.) The elements of a false imprisonment claim are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496.)

The County first argues that Plaintiff has not stated a claim based on the acts or omissions of the police officers who allegedly investigated and arrested Plaintiff because it did not employ those officers. This argument is well-taken. Although a plaintiff may state a claim for false arrest/imprisonment against the arresting police officers (Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 855-856), Plaintiff alleges that the police officers—Officer Doe and Does 21 through 25—were employed only by the City. (SAC, pp. 2:5-8 & 5:8-14.) Since Plaintiff does not allege that those officers were employed by the County, he has not alleged sufficient facts to support a vicarious liability claim against the County based on the officers’ conduct.

Next, the County contends that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim against it because he does not plead that its employees imprisoned him. Where a plaintiff was imprisoned in a county jail, a county may be liable for false imprisonment if the county sheriff/jailer knew or should have known of the illegality of the imprisonment. (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 717-719.) Plaintiff generally alleges that, beginning on April 14, 2015, he “was confined and falsely imprisoned by defendants.” (SAC, p. 4:8-9.) This general allegation is insufficient, since each fact must be pleaded with particularity. (See Lopez v. v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal.3d, at p. 795.) Even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged that the County’s employees imprisoned him, he does not allege that the County and/or its employees knew or should have known that the imprisonment was unlawful. Thus, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that the County is vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of the individuals that imprisoned him.

Lastly, the County argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts to support a claim based on the allegation that its employees failed to enter the Recall Order in the DOJ’s databases. As a general rule, all who take part in or assist in the commission of a false arrest or imprisonment are joint tortfeasors and may be joined as defendants. (Oppenheimer v. City of Los Angeles (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 551, 553.) A party may be liable if that party knowingly provided law enforcement with false or materially incomplete information that could be expected to stimulate an arrest. (Du Lac v. Perma Trans Products, Inc. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 937, 941; Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 7, 15.) In contrast, “an informant’s good faith and honesty may give immunity from liability where an arrest occurs based on faulty information.” (Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d, at p. 15.) Plaintiff does not allege that any individual employed by the County knowingly provided law enforcement with false or incomplete information. Therefore, he has not sufficiently alleged that the County is vicariously liable based on its employees’ failure to maintain databases.

In sum, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to show that the County is vicariously liable for false arrest/imprisonment.

C. Conclusion

Since Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts to support claims for direct or vicarious liability against the County under the Government Claims Act, the County’s demurrer to the SAC will be sustained. The remaining issue is whether to grant leave to amend. In this instance, leave to amend will be granted because Plaintiff has not had a prior opportunity to amend in response to the County’s demurrer and the SAC does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment. (See City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Accordingly, the County’s demurrer for failure to state a claim to the SAC as a whole and the first and second causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.