Salinas v. Sunding Brothers LLC, et al.		CASE NO. 113CV252360
DATE: 29 August 2014	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 10

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 28 August 2014.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 29 August 2014, the motion of plaintiff Angelica Salinas (“Plaintiff”) to compel amended responses to Requests for Admissions, Set One, was argued and submitted. Defendants Sunding Brothers, LLC (“Sunding”) and Jay Huang (“Huang”) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a formal opposition to the motion.  Both parties request sanctions.

Statement of Facts

According to the allegations of the first amended complaint (“FAC”), on 14 March 2011, Plaintiff entered into a one-year lease agreement with Community Housing Developers, Inc.  (See FAC, ¶ 8, exh. A.)  According to the terms of the agreement, after 13 March 2012, the lease agreement continues on a month-to-month basis.  (See FAC, exh. A.)  On 1 August 2012, defendant Sunding purchased the subject property, and an addendum to the lease agreement agreeing not to raise the rental rate for a period of one year was signed by Sunding representative defendant Huang.  (See FAC, ¶ 8, exh. B.)

Throughout Plaintiff’s tenancy, she experienced leaking from the ceiling, the collapse of the ceiling, a hole in the ceiling, water damage, mold and mildew contamination, damaged walls, damaged flooring, a cockroach infestation, unclean common areas and animal feces in common areas.  (See FAC, ¶¶ 12-13.)  Despite several requests to repair the defects and complaints with the city of Milpitas Code Enforcement, Defendants refused to repair the defects and instead, on 30 November 2012 served Plaintiff with a 60-day notice increasing her rent—despite the agreement to not increase rates for a year.  (See FAC, ¶¶ 14-18, exh. C.)

After Plaintiff informed Sunding of the agreement to not increase rates for a year, Sunding rescinded the rental rate increase on 6 December 2012, and instead served Plaintiff with a three-day notice to cure covenant or quit, falsely accusing Plaintiff of subleasing the unit and failing to maintain the yard free of animal waste.  (See FAC, ¶ 19-21, exh. D.)  On 11 December 2012, Defendants served a written notice requiring that plaintiff remove any pets from the premises unless the pets are medical service animals, despite Plaintiff having written permission approving Plaintiff’s pets from Community Housing Developers, Inc.  (See FAC, ¶ 22, exh. E.)

On 12 December 2012, Defendants served a three-day notice to cure covenant or quit, falsely accusing Plaintiff of harassment towards other tenants and employees of Defendants, and a ninety day notice of termination of tenancy.  (See FAC, ¶¶ 23, 25, exhs. F, G.)  Plaintiff complained to the Housing Authority and housing rights organizations to help mediate the dispute, but the mediation efforts were rejected by Sunding.  (See FAC, ¶ 24.)

On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed the FAC against Defendants, asserting causes of action for: tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability; contractual breach of the implied warranty of habitability; breach of contract; breach of quiet enjoyment; private nuisance; premises liability; retaliation in violation of Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (c); negligence; constructive eviction; violations of Civil Code sections 51, 51.5 and 52; violation of Government Code section 12955, et seq.; unfair business practices; retaliatory eviction; and, exemplary damages.

On 18 April 2014, Plaintiff served her Requests for Admission, Set One (“RFAs”) on Sunding.  On 21 May 2014, Sunding served its responses, admitting or denying each request, but objecting on the grounds of vagueness, ambiguity, overbreadth, attorney word product and attorney-client privilege.  On 29 May 2014, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Sunding, stating that the objections were made without merit.  On 31 May 2014, Sunding verbally responded that they would not withdraw their objections.  On 1 July 2014, the parties confirmed conversations regarding discovery disputes and Sunding was given until 1 August 2014 to file any motions to compel.

On 30 July 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Sunding to serve further responses to the requests for admissions without objections.

Discussion

I.             Motion to compel further responses

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to six requests for admissions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (a)(2), which states that a “party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that… [a]n objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (a)(2).)

Ordinarily, absent a claim of privilege or attorney work product, the party who seeks to compel a response has met his burden of showing good cause simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. Once good cause was shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify the objection.  The requesting party must take the initiative to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of any objection by moving to compel a further response.  The objecting party has the burden of justifying the objection.  (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal 2d 210, 220-221; Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 92, 98; Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2001) Discovery, PP 8:1495 to 8:1495.10, pp. 8H-24 to 8H-26.)

In opposition, Sunding asserts that its objections were appropriate since it admitted or denied each request, and Plaintiff did not meet or confer in good faith.

1. Meet and confer

Sunding asserts that Plaintiff did not meet and confer in good faith because its 29 May 2014 letter “failed to include any actual case law showing that Sunding Brother’s responses were improper… [and] Plaintiff’s counsel never discussed, or attempted to follow up regarding Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions after their July 9^th telephone call….”  (Sunding’s opposition to Pl.’s motion to compel (“Opposition”), p.5:13-20.)

A motion to compel further responses to requests for admissions shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”  (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2016.040, 2033.290, subd. (b).)

Here, it does appear that counsel for Plaintiff adequately met and conferred with counsel for Sunding.  Counsel for Plaintiff contacted counsel for Sunding on 29 May 2014, verbally discussed matters on 31 May 2014, confirmed matters on 1 July 2014, and apparently discussed the matters again on 9 July 2014.  Although counsel for Sunding may disagree that the instant motion has merit, such disagreement does not mean that the parties failed to meet and confer.  Moreover, contrary to Sunding’s assertion, the 29 May 2014 letter references numerous case and statutory authority that serves as Plaintiff’s basis for the instant motion.  Sunding’s arguments regarding the meet and confer requirement are without merit.

1. Separate statement

According to the Rule of Court 3.1345, a motion to compel further responses to requests for admission “must be accompanied by a separate statement.”  (Rule of Court 3.1345, subd. (a)(1).)  Here, Plaintiff has not filed a separate statement in support of her motion.  Although the Court could deny the motion based on this failure, the Court nevertheless will address the merits of Plaintiff’s motion as her arguments are fully developed in her moving papers and the lack of a separate statement will not prevent the court from addressing the merits of the motion.[1]

1. The motion is wholly unnecessary.

In response to Plaintiff’s six RFAs, Sunding provided responses with objections, but unqualifiedly denying or admitting each request.  Plaintiff seeks the removal of each objection in an “amended” response pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (a)(2).  Although perhaps technically authorized by the legislature, such a motion is completely unnecessary when a party has unqualifiedly denied or admitted each RFA.  A court cannot order further responses to a request for admission where there has been an unqualifiedly denial even if the facts involved are unquestionably true.  See Holguin v. Superior Court (1972) 22 Cal App 3d 812, 820 (“[A] court cannot force a litigant to admit any particular effect if he is willing to risk a perjury prosecution or financial sanctions” by denying them.”)

In reply, Plaintiff asserts that “the evidentiary basis of admissions is crucial to find out what exactly occurred and Defendant’s role in such actions.”  (Pl.’s reply brief in support of motion to compel further responses to requests for admissions, p.3:7-9.)  Again, however, Sunding has unqualifiedly denied or admitted each RFA.  Sunding’s response is “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits” (see Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220) and is not objecting to a part of a RFA (see Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.230).  Plaintiff has the information she needs from an RFA for trial purposes.

Defendant did not “[s]pecify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.”  Code of Civil Procedure, § 2033.220(b)(3.)  This Court can understand Plaintiff’s feeling that the objections “equivocate” or otherwise “water down” the affect of the admissions and denials.  But, as far as this Court is concerned, Sunding’s unqualified admissions or denials trump the “waffle factor” of any equivocation.

Accordingly, the motion to compel further responses to the RFAs is DENIED.

II.  Plaintiff’s request for sanctions

Plaintiff makes a code compliant request for monetary sanctions against Sunding’s counsel in the amount of $2,060.00.  However, Plaintiff did not prevail on her motion.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

III.  Sunding’s Request for Sanctions

Sunding requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $922.50 against Plaintiff and her counsel.  (See Opposition, p.7:5 (stating that “Plaintiff and her counsel should be sanctioned”).)  However, Sunding’s caption, and other portions of its opposition state that the request for monetary sanctions should be against Plaintiff only.  (See Opposition, caption, pp.1:26,6:22.)  Sunding’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel is not code-compliant.

Sunding prevailed on the motion.  However, imposition of monetary sanctions in this situation would be unjust as the Legislature may technically authorize the filing of a motion in the instant situation.  Accordingly, Sunding’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

 

Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Requests for Admissions, Set One is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Sunding’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

 

 

________________­­­____________ DATED:

_________________________­­­________________________ HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara

 

[1] The court has discretion, but is not required to deny a discovery motion for failure to provide a code-compliant separate statement.  (See Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893.)

HOWEVER: This court is struggling with the concept that “the more bad behavior that this Court tolerates, the more it is going to get.”  The language of the law in motion statutes are clear and this Court questions whether giving a fuzzy reading to them in order to reach matters on the merits will not encourage better craftsmanship of law and motion and discovery papers  The word “must” indicates the inclusion of a separate statement is not optional or a suggestion.  “The separate statement is not merely a technical requirement; it is an indispensable part of the summary judgment or adjudication process.  Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers, but rather to afford due process to opposing parties.”  (United Community Church v.  Garcin (1991) 231 Cal App 3d 327, 335; Whitehead v. Habig  (2008) 163 Cal App. 4th 896, 902; Magaña Cathcart McCarthy v. CB  Richard Ellis (2009) 174 Cal App 4th 106, 117.)