Frederico Paredez v. Michael Todd Williams		CASE NO. 112CV230995
DATE: 1 August 2014	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 4

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose.  Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.882.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 31 July 2014.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 1 August 2014, the motion of defendant Michael Todd Williams (“Defendant”) to enforce a subpoena issued to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter, was argued and submitted.  Plaintiff Frederico Paredez (“Plaintiff”) filed a formal opposition to the motion.[1]

Statement of Facts  

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 26 August 2010, at First Street and San Fernando Street in San Jose, California.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was driving a sports utility vehicle while intoxicated when Defendant rear-ended his motorcycle as he was stopped at a stoplight, causing injury to his person and property.

On 23 August 2012, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint alleging a cause of action for negligence and claiming wage loss, loss of earning capacity, loss of use of property, property damage, hospital and medical expenses, and general damages.

Discovery Dispute

On 5 June 2014, Defendant issued a subpoena to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter, seeking “any and all psychiatric, drug, and/or alcohol treatment, counseling and rehabilitation records, pertaining to the care, treatment, and examination of [Plaintiff], from the first date to and including the present.”  (Pinelli Dec., Ex. G.)  The following day, 6 June 2014, Defendant served Plaintiff with a notice to consumer regarding the subpoena issued to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter. (See id.)

On 20 June 2014, Plaintiff issued a formal written objection to the subpoena, objecting on the grounds of over breadth, relevancy, and privacy.  (See Pinelli Dec., Ex. F.)

Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiff’s counsel a meet and confer letter regarding the subpoena on 25 June 2014.  (See Pinelli Dec., Ex. E.)  Defendant’s counsel asserted that Plaintiff’s objections to the subpoena lacked merit because Plaintiff had put his medical and mental condition at issue based upon his deposition testimony and discovery responses.  Defendant’s counsel pointed out that Plaintiff “claims anxiety and depression[,] [. . .] that he needs medical care for life because of injuries sustained in the accident[,] [. . .] [and] psychological counseling as a future medical cost.”  (Id.)  Defendant’s counsel asserted that the “[d]iscovery may reveal that the reason for the life care plan plaintiff now claims is due in whole or part to psychiatric issues that are contained in the records.”  (Id.)  Defendant’s counsel requested that Plaintiff withdraw his objections to the subpoena and indicated that otherwise Defendant would file a motion to enforce the subpoena.  (Id.)  Defendant’s counsel did not receive a response to the 25 June 2014 meet and confer letter.  (See Mem. Ps & As., p. 5:2.)

On 2 July 2014, Defendant filed the instant motion to enforce the subpoena issued to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g).  Plaintiff filed papers in opposition to the motion on 22 July 2014.  Defendant filed a reply on 25 July 2014.

Discussion

I.             Legal Standard

A party requesting a consumer’s personal records may bring a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 to enforce the subpoena within 20 days of service of the written objections to the subpoena.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g).)  If a subpoena requires the production of documents, upon motion reasonably made, the court may make an order directing compliance with the subpoena upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

A showing of good cause is not required on a motion to compel a nonparty to comply with a deposition subpoena for document production.  (See Weil&Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2014), p. 8E-78.1 at  8:609.3.)  The objecting party must justify the objections to the subpoena or they will be overruled.  (See Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 254.)

II.            Objections

A.           Relevancy

Plaintiff objects to the subpoena issued to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter on the ground that it seeks irrelevant information.

The standard of relevance is broad under California law.  Discovery is allowed for any matter that is non-privileged, relevant to the subject matter, and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)  The “relevance to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” standards are applied liberally with any doubt generally resolved in favor of discovery.  (See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)  Moreover, for discovery purposes, information is “relevant to the subject matter” if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.  (See Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

Defendant argues that the records from Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter are “relevant to the issue of plaintiff’s present condition and if he had any pre-existing injuries or conditions that bear on his present condition.”  (Mem. Ps & As., p. 1:20-21.)  Defendant contends that Plaintiff has put his mental condition at issue in the present case.  To support his position, Defendant points out that Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he suffered hospital and medical expenses, and general damages.  (See Mem. Ps & As., p. 2:10-14; see also Pinelli Dec., Ex. A.)  Defendant also points out that Plaintiff stated in his initial response to form interrogatory 6.2, which asked for all injuries which Plaintiff attributes to the accident, that he “suffers from anxiety as a result of the collision.”  (Pinelli Dec., Ex. B, p. 10:13-18.)  Similarly, in his initial response to form interrogatory 6.3, which asked for any complaints that Plaintiff attributed to the incident, Plaintiff stated that he “suffers from bouts of anxiety and depression as a result of the collision” and the “[a]nxiety and depression come and go.”  (Pinelli Dec., p. 10:20-25, 11:1-9.)

Defendant further argues that “[s]ignificantly, and just recently, long after his deposition was taken and after the form interrogatory responses were made, [Plaintiff] claims he needs nearly $2,000,000 for future life care for his injuries including psychological costs in the tens of thousands of dollars.”  (Mem. Ps & As., p. 4:9-11.)  Defendant asserts that “[t]he scope of plaintiff’s claims has now expanded to include a very expensive life care plan and now it is critical to determine the nature and extent of plaintiff’s prior mental/medical history as they may be the reason or a reason why plaintiff is claiming a life care plan including psychological care.”  (Mem. Ps & As., p. 4:15-18.)

Conversely, Plaintiff argues that the subpoena seeks irrelevant information because his “psychological history is not related to any claim or defense in this case.”  (Opp’n., p. 2:8-9)  Plaintiff states that he “has repeatedly indicated to Defendant that he is not claiming psychological damages” and he “has not asserted future psychological care or even past psychological care due to the injuries which he sustained in the subject collision as part of his claims in this case.”  (Opp’n., p. 3:4-5, 10-12.)  Plaintiff does not explain his responses to form interrogatories 6.2 and 6.3, in which he states that he attributes injuries and complaints in the form of anxiety and depression to the accident.  (See Pinelli Dec., Ex. B, p. 10:13-18, 10:20-25, 11:1-9.)

In addition, Plaintiff argues at length in his opposition that the “report of a life care planner,” from which Defendant purportedly concluded that Plaintiff was seeking to recover damages for future psychological care, is inadmissible because it was provided to opposing counsel at mediation.  (Opp’n., p. 2:9-28, 3:1-15.)  Plaintiff further contends that the fact that the life care plan summary allocates 0.02 percent of Plaintiff’s future anticipated costs to medical care arising from pain induced depression is irrelevant because he “has not asserted future psychological care.”  (Opp’n., p. 3:6-12.)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion in his opposition papers, it appears that he has placed his mental condition, as it pertains to anxiety and depression, at issue in the instant case such that medical records pertaining to the same are relevant.  Irrespective of the purported “life care plan” or “report of a life care planner,” Plaintiff’s responses to form interrogatories 6.2 and 6.3 indicate that he is claiming injuries in the form of anxiety and depression as a result of the accident.  As articulated above, Plaintiff’s response to form interrogatory 6.2 states that he “suffers from anxiety as a result of the collision,” and his response to form interrogatory 6.3 states that he “suffers from bouts of anxiety and depression as a result of the collision” and the “[a]nxiety and depression come and go.”  Plaintiff does not address his responses to the form interrogatories anywhere in his opposing papers.  Therefore, based upon Plaintiff’s responses to the form interrogatories, the psychiatric records sought by the subpoena are relevant to the instant case.

B.           Privacy

Plaintiff argues that his psychological records are protected by his right to privacy.  (See Opp’n., p. 4:1-3, 15-16.)

The right of privacy established by the California Constitution protects an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.”  (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 40.)  However, the right to privacy is not absolute.  (See Vinson v. Super. Ct. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)  Where a serious invasion of the right to privacy is shown, the proponent of the discovery must demonstrate that the information sought is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859; see also Binder v. Super. Ct. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 893, 901 [holding “direct relevance” is a higher standard than the “relevancy to the subject matter” standard and requires something more than an assertion that the requested discovery might lead to admissible evidence].)  Once direct relevance has been demonstrated, the proponent of discovery must show that the information sought is not available through less intrusive means. (See Allen v. Super. Ct. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 449.)  The Court must then carefully balance the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right of civil litigants to discover facts, on the other. (See Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, at p. 371.)

California recognizes an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her mental health records.  (See Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 679.)  Here, the subpoenas seek production of Plaintiff’s mental health records and, thus, constitute a serious invasion of privacy.  Therefore, Defendant must establish that Plaintiff’s psychological and/or mental health records are directly relevant to the instant case.  (See Britt v. Super. Ct., supra, at p. 859.)

Defendant persuasively argues that Plaintiff’s mental health records are directly relevant to the instant case because Plaintiff stated in his responses to form interrogatories that he suffers from anxiety and depression as a result of the accident, and admits that he has a prior psychological history.  Plaintiff’s mental health records that demonstrate a pre-existing condition of depression and/or anxiety are directly relevant to the issue of causation and damages as they may show that Plaintiff’s claimed injuries were not caused by the accident and/or are attributable to some other source. (See Slagle v. Super. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 1309 (1989) 1314-1315; People v. Gillard (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 136, 151-152 [the existence of a prior injury is relevant to liability].)

Furthermore, the parties have not identified any less intrusive means by which Plaintiff’s mental health records may be obtained.

On balance, Defendant’s interest in obtaining directly relevant information regarding Plaintiff’s claims of anxiety and depression outweigh Plaintiff’s privacy interests.  Thus, Plaintiff’s privacy objection is overruled.

III.           Conclusion

As all of Plaintiff’s objections to the subpoena are overruled, Defendant’s motion to enforce the subpoena issued to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter is GRANTED.

Conclusion and Order

Defendant’s motion to enforce the subpoena issued to Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter is GRANTED.  Accordingly, Santa ClaraValleyMedicalCenter is ordered to produce the documents as described in the subpoena within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order.