This is an action for wrongful termination and defamation. Plaintiff Holger Doege (“Plaintiff”) was formerly employed as a Senior Research Scientist with defendant Gilead Sciences, Inc. (“Gilead”). Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that his supervisor, defendant Arvinder Dhalla (“Dhalla”), made a number of defamatory statements concerning his character and competence both prior to and following his termination as a result of their conflicts.

Gilead, Dhalla, and defendant Luiz Belardinelli (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the third cause of action for defamation on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action because the majority of the statements alleged were made outside of the applicable statute of limitations, while the remaining statements are covered by the common interest privilege for managerial communications, solely reflect Defendants’ subjective opinions, were not published by Defendants, or are not pleaded with adequate specificity.

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Plaintiff adequately pleads a claim for defamation that is not clearly barred by the statute of limitations based, at a minimum, on his compelled re-publication of Dhalla’s prior statements during a February 7th, 2012 meeting (see Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), ¶ 59) and on Dhalla’s statements following Plaintiff’s termination in 2012 (see TAC, ¶¶ 62-65).

With respect to the February meeting, Plaintiff adequately pleads that he was compelled to re-publish the underlying statements at issue pursuant to Gilead’s investigation of his dispute with Dhalla. (See Live Oak Publishing Co. v. Cohagan (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1284-1285 (hereinafter, “Live Oak”) [publication is found where the originator of a defamatory statement “has reason to believe that the person defamed will be under a strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement to a third person after he has read it or been informed of its contents;” this exception is typically applied “where a plaintiff is compelled to republish the statements in aid of disproving them,” for example, “where a derogatory statement is placed in a personnel file, [and] the employee must explain the statement to subsequent employers, who will surely learn of it if they investigate his or her past employment”]; Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 71, 77 [“If a plaintiff is aware of the facts giving rise to a cause of action which accrued before the cause of action on which he is suing based on the same defamatory matter as his earlier cause of action but based on a separate publication, the statute of limitations on the later cause of action does not run from the time of the accrual of the first cause of action.”].) Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to repeat Dhalla’s statements in order to disprove them to Gilead as part of its investigation. Defendants argue that this is insufficient because Plaintiff himself initiated the investigation at issue, and a plaintiff should not be permitted to manufacture a defamation cause of action in this fashion under Live Oak. However, Live Oak involved a different factual scenario, in which a newspaper published allegedly defamatory statements as a paid advertisement at the advertiser’s demand. (See Live Oak, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1283-1287.) In this case, while Plaintiff may have initiated the investigation, one can infer that he needed to do so in order to rebut Dhalla’s comments and protect his employment. The circumstances alleged by Plaintiff are comparable in this respect to the archetypal case where the self-publication exception discussed by Live Oak applies: where a plaintiff sets off an investigation of his employment history in connection with the process of applying to other jobs. (See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 787, 792-793 [reversing dismissal of libel and slander claims where police officer had repeated former employer’s defamatory statements to prospective employers while applying for new jobs]; cf. Live Oak, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1287 [“This is not a situation in which the statement would go unrebutted if Live Oak refused to publish the defamatory statement.”].)

Further, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled specific facts that demonstrate ill will on the part of Dhalla towards him to overcome the common interest privilege (see Civ. Code, § 47, subd, (c) [common interest privilege is conditional and may be defeated by a showing of malice]; Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1368 [same]), including that she yelled at him, criticized him for not doing experiments requiring the use of both hands despite being aware of his disability and consequent inability to do so, and assigned him tasks that would either exacerbate the disability or that she knew he could not perform given his condition (see TAC, ¶¶ 30, 40-41). In addition, the allegedly defamatory statements are not mere opinion given that they accuse Plaintiff, at a minimum, of dishonesty. (See TAC, ¶¶ 39(a), 59(a) [statements included that Plaintiff “was not being truthful in his communications about other employees]; cf. Jensen v. Hewlett Packard Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 958, 965-966 [evaluation indicated that employee “had been the subject of some third party complaints, was not carrying his weight, had a negative attitude in dealing with others, evidenced a lack of direction in his project activities and was unwilling to take responsibility for the projects he oversaw” and employee sued for defamation; court held that “unless an employer’s performance evaluation falsely accuses an employee of criminal conduct, lack of integrity, dishonesty, incompetence or reprehensible personal characteristics or behavior,” it cannot support a claim for defamation].)

As to the post-termination statements, it is clear enough that Plaintiff is referring in paragraph 65 to the statements alleged in nearby and related paragraph 62. The statements identified in paragraph 62 are the same statements Plaintiff pleads throughout the section of the TAC entitled “ALLEGATIONS REGARDING DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.” Consequently, it is clear that these statements form the basis for Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 65 and Plaintiff has pleaded their substance with enough specificity. (See Okun v. Super. Ct. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458 [“Less particularity is required when it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.”]; Scott v. Solano County Health & Soc. Order Servs. Dep’t, supra, 459 F. Supp. 2d at p. 973 [allegation that defendants “published false information about plaintiff’s performance and falsely accused plaintiff of dishonesty and lack of integrity,” though terse, “are sufficient to provide defendants sufficient notice of the issues to enable preparation of a defense”].) Defendants’ argument that the paragraph 65 allegations violate the statute of limitations because Plaintiff indicates only that the statements were made “as late as 2012” fails, because a demurrer based upon the statute of limitations lies only where the dates in question are shown on the face of the complaint. (See Union Carbide Corp. v. Super. Ct. (Villmar Dental Labs, Inc., et al.) (1984) 36 Cal.3d 15, 25 [“nothing appearing on the face of the complaint suggests that the action is barred by the statute of limitations”].) Finally, Plaintiff provides the information that leads him to believe Dhalla made these statements, which is all that is required to state a claim on information and belief. (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [allegations of information and belief must allege the information that leads the plaintiff to believe the allegations are true].)

Defendants also move to strike a number of statements from the TAC that they contend either (1) pertain to allegedly defamatory conduct that occurred outside of the applicable statute of limitations or (2) concern former defendant Luiz Belardinelli. In addition, Defendants move to strike all subheadings under the “General Allegations” portion of the TAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. (See PH II, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Ibershof) (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683 [motion to strike may not be used as “a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil defendant”].) The allegations at issue are pertinent to Plaintiff’s claims, since they relate to the history of his interactions with Dhalla that gave rise to Gilead’s investigation of these issues and Plaintiff’s termination. Consequently, they are not the appropriate subject of a motion to strike. (See Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”), § 431.10, subd. (b)(2) [allegation neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim is immaterial].) Although no claims against Mr. Belardinelli remain, he was involved in the events underlying Plaintiff’s complaint and it would be inappropriate to excise all references to him for this reason alone. Finally, the Court finds that it would be inappropriate to strike subheadings employed for organizational purposes.

Next, Defendants move for sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel pursuant to CCP section 128.7. The motion for sanctions is DENIED because there is no evidence that the TAC was presented for an improper purpose, contains claims that are frivolous or not warranted by existing law, or contains allegations or other factual contentions that lack evidentiary support.

Finally, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, made in his papers filed in opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions, is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request is unsubstantiated, is not presented in the form of a properly noticed motion, and does not comply with the procedural requirements of CCP section 128.7. To the extent that Plaintiff’s argument in footnotes to his opposition to Defendants’ demurrer that certain of Defendants’ actions “should form the basis for Sanctions” also constitutes a request for sanctions, such request is similarly DENIED.

If the tentative ruling is adopted, Plaintiff is ordered to prepare the written order for the Court’s signature. The order should be submitted to opposing counsel for approval as to form before it is submitted to the Court for signature (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312). Thank you.