Case Name: Robert Flowers, et al. v. Vidyut Gopal, et al.
Case No.: 2014-1-CV-266515

Currently before the Court is plaintiff Kumaran Santhanam’s (“Santhanam”) motion to compel defendant Parul Agrawal (“Agrawal”) and Vidyut Gopal (“Gopal”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to provide further responses to requests for admissions (“RFA”).

I. Factual Background

This is an action arising from a dispute among neighbors concerning the activities of Minor, the son of Defendants. In their operative complaint, plaintiffs Marci Flowers, Robert Flowers, Bindu Pothen, and Santhanam (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege the following: Plaintiffs are next-door neighbors of Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 12.) From 2007 until 2014, Minor, a developmentally challenged child, engaged in a course of violent and aggressive conduct toward Plaintiffs and their children which his parents did nothing to prevent. (Compl., ¶ 21, 23-25, 31-34, and 38.) In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert eight causes of action against Minor and Defendants for: (1) abatement of public nuisance; (2) abatement of private nuisance; (3) negligence; (4) trespass; (5) battery; (6) negligence – parental liability; (7) willful misconduct; and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

II. Discovery Dispute

On May 3, 2016, Santhanam served Defendants with identical sets of RFA. On June 2, 2016, Defendants served Santhanam with responses to the RFA, consisting of both objections and substantive responses.

On June 22, 2016, Santhanam sent opposing counsel an e-mail, requesting an opportunity to meet and confer via telephone. In response, opposing counsel asked Santhanam to provide a written letter, outlining his concerns with Defendants’ responses.

On June 25, 2016, Santhanam sent a detailed meet and confer letter, explaining that Defendants’ objections to the RFA lacked merit. Defendants’ counsel provided a letter in response, indicating that she did not have sufficient time to respond the meet and confer letter and agreed to extend the time to file a motion until August 11, 2016 to allow the parties additional time to meet and confer.

On June 28, 2016, Santhanam wrote opposing counsel another e-mail in which he explained that such a delay was unacceptable given that complete responses were necessary to limit the issues at trial. The following day, Defendants’ counsel sent an e-mail in response in which she accused Santhanam of failing to meet and confer in good faith.
On July 7, 2016, Defendants’ counsel sent Santhanam a detailed meet and confer letter in which she explained that Defendants’ objections were justified and Defendants would not withdraw them.

The parties having reached an impasse, Santhanam filed the instant motion to compel further responses to the RFA on July 8, 2016. On July 20, 2016, Defendants filed their opposition. Santhanam filed his reply on July 26, 2016.

III. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the RFA

Santhanam moves to compel Defendants to provide further responses to RFA Nos. 15-35 on the grounds that their objections lack merit and their substantive responses are incomplete and evasive.

A. Legal Standards

A party propounding requests for admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if it deems that an answer to a request is evasive and/or incomplete or an objection is without merit. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) The burden is on the responding party to justify any objections. (Coy v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

B. Objections

While Defendants assert several objections to the RFA, they only attempt to justify their objections on the grounds of relevance, overbreadth, vagueness and ambiguity, and the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. All other objections are therefore overruled. (See Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221 [stating that the burden is on responding party to justify objections].)

1. Relevance

Discovery is allowed for any matters that are not privileged, relevant to the subject matter involved in the action, and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The “relevance to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” standards are applied liberally with any doubt generally resolved in favor of discovery. (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.) Moreover, for discovery purposes, information is “relevant to the subject matter” if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. (Gonzalez v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

Defendants contend that that RFA Nos. 27-32, which asked them to admit that Minor entered onto certain person’s land or property without permission between 2007 and 2014, are irrelevant to the instant action because Santhanam does not explain their relevance in his motion. This argument is not well-taken. Defendants, not Santhanam, have the burden of demonstrating that the requests are irrelevant. (See Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221.) In any event, it is readily apparent that these requests are relevant as they could assist Santhanam in establishing Defendants’ knowledge of Minor’s allegedly dangerous habits, a prerequisite to the imposition of parental liability. (See Robertson v. Wentz (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1281, 1290 [providing that “[k]nowledge of dangerous habits and ability to control the child are prerequisites to imposition of liability”]; see also Singer v. Marx (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 637, 644 [stating that a parent may be liable “in failing to perform the duty of exercising reasonable control over a child known to possess and exercise dangerous proclivities toward other people”].) Accordingly, Defendants’ objections on this basis are overruled.

2. Overbreadth

A discovery request is overbroad where it seeks information that is both relevant and irrelevant to the subject matter of an action. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223 [providing that while the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is limited to admissible information or information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence].)

Defendants argue that each RFA is overbroad as to scope and time. In their opposition, however, they fail to explain how the scope how each request seeks information that is not admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As such, they fail to justify their objections, and therefore the objections are overruled.

3. Attorney-Client and Attorney-Work Product Privileges

“The attorney client privilege ‘authorizes a client to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from disclosing, confidential communications between attorney and client.’ [Citation.]” (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 785-786.) However, the privilege “only protects disclosure of communications between the attorney and the client; it does not protect disclosure of underlying facts which may be referenced within a qualifying communication.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 639; see also Benge v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 336, 349 [same].) In addition, an attorney’s “impressions, conclusions, or legal research or theories” are absolutely privileged from disclosure and all other attorney work product is subject to a qualified privilege. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030.) The attorney work product privilege applies only to the writing or work product of the attorney, not the underlying facts referenced by such work product. (Mack v. Sup. Ct. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10; see also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 996, 1004 [stating that the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts may not be concealed under the attorney work product privilege].)

Defendants argue that RFA No. 35, which asked them to admit that they have absolutely no grounds to defend this case, appears to seek privileged information. However, they do not articulate how a code-compliant response to this request would disclose an attorney-client communication or their attorneys’ work product. As such, Defendants’ objection to RFA No. 35 on these grounds is overruled.

4. Vagueness and Ambiguity

To justify an objection on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity, the responding party must demonstrate that the request at issue is totally unintelligible. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783; Standon v. Sup. Ct. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903 [stating that a vague and ambiguous objection is frequently considered a nuisance objection].) In other words, a vague and ambiguous objection should only be sustained when the nature of the information sought is not apparent. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 783.)

Defendants first contend that the term “battery” renders RFA Nos. 15-26, which asked them to admit that Minor committed “battery” on certain individuals, vague and ambiguous. While Defendants acknowledge that the RFA expressly define “battery” as a “harmful or offensive touching,” they assert that this definition is not legally accurate because it omits the other legal elements of a battery, namely, that the touching was intentional, without consent, and caused injury. (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526-527.) They argue that they should not be required to respond to these RFA because “requesting that an element of an unidentified individual’[s] potential legal claim for battery at some point in time has no legal value, as there would be absolutely no context for any admission…” (Opposition, p. 8:15-16.)

As an initial matter, Defendants’ argument regarding the “legal value” of an admission does not address whether the request at issue is so unintelligible that Defendants cannot respond, which is the subject of a vague and ambiguous objection. (See Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 783.) As such, this argument does not establish that their vagueness and ambiguity objections are justified. In any event, their argument that responses to RFA Nos. 15-26 lack “legal value” is not well-taken. The admission of these requests with respect to the alleged harmful or offensive touching of Santhanam’s children would establish the first element of his battery cause of action. (See Brown, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 526 [providing that a harmful or offensive touching is an element of a cause of action for battery].) In addition, Defendants’ knowledge of Minor’s harmful or offensive touching of others might assist Santhanam in establishing Defendants’ liability as Minor’s parents. (See Robertson, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1290; see also Singer, supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at p. 644.) Finally, Defendants’ concern that an admission of one to one of these request would be taken out of context is unfounded. It is well-established that a response to a request for admission is only as broad as the literal reading of the request itself. (Burch v. Gombos (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 352, 359.) As such, if Defendants admit that Minor committed a “battery” with respect to a particular individual, the scope of the admission is limited to the harmful or offensive touching of that individual. (See id. at pp. 355 [finding that party’s admission that it “had no evidence of recreational use of the disputed portion of Summit Road prior to March 4, 1972” did not preclude party from producing evidence it later obtained concerning recreational use of the property].) Accordingly, Defendants’ objections to RFA Nos. 15-26 on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity are overruled.

Next, Defendants assert that the definition of the term “trespass,” which the requests define as “entry to a person’s land or property without their permission,” renders RFA Nos. 27-32 vague and ambiguous. Defendants, however, fail to establish that any imprecision in this definition renders the requests totally intelligible. (See Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 783; Standon, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 903.) Accordingly, Defendants’ objections to RFA Nos. 27-32 on these grounds are overruled.

Third, Defendants claim that RFA No. 34, which asked them to admit that Minor is capable of acting “willfully,” is vague and ambiguous. This argument is not well-taken because the nature of the information sought by this request is readily apparent, namely, whether Minor has the capacity to commit battery. (See Ellis v. D’Angelo (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 315 [stating that an infant may be liable for battery only if he or she is “[]capable of intending the violent or the harmful striking of another”]; Singer, supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at p. 641 [stating that “[a]n infant who forcibly invades the person of another is liable for a battery regardless of an intent to inflict injury; the only intent which is necessary is that of doing the particular act in question”].) Accordingly, Defendants’ objection to RFA No. 34 on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity is overruled.

Finally, Defendants argue that RFA No. 33, which asked them to admit that “Minor’s behavior can be modified,” is vague and ambiguous. This argument is well-taken as it is not readily apparent what information Santhanam seeks by this request or how this request is related to a claim or defense in this action. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection to RFA No. 33 on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity is sustained.

5. Conclusion

In sum, all of Defendants’ objections to RFA Nos. 15-35 are overruled except for their objection to RFA No. 33 on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity, which is sustained.

C. Substantive Responses

Defendants did not provide substantive responses to RFA Nos. 15-16 and 26-35. As all of Defendants’ objections to RFA Nos. 15-16, 26-33, and 34-35 are overruled, further responses to these RFA are warranted. Since Defendants’ objections to RFA No. 33 on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity is sustained, no further response to that request is required.

Defendants did provide substantive responses to RFA Nos. 17-25. With respect to RFA Nos. 17-20, Defendants substantively responded by unambiguously denying the requests. In his moving papers, Santhanam does not articulate how these responses are evasive and incomplete. Accordingly, he fails to establish that further responses are warranted.

With regard to RFA No. 24, which asked Defendants to admit that Minor committed battery by striking Deanna Brazys on her head, Defendants substantively responded by stating that they denied the request because they have no personal knowledge or information regarding the subject matter of the request. Santhanam argues that this response is incomplete and evasive because Defendants do not state that they conducted a reasonable inquiry into the matter.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220, a response to a request for admission shall: (1) admit so much of the matter involved in the request as true; (2) deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue; and (3) specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b).) If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable the party to admit the matter. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (c).)

Here, Defendants state that they cannot admit the matter because of a lack of personal knowledge. As such, they are required to state that they made a reasonable inquiry into the matter and the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to allow them to admit the matter. Since Defendants have not done so, a further response to RFA No. 24 is warranted.

Finally, with respect to RFA Nos. 21-23, which asked Defendants to admit that Minor committed battery on several neighbors as well as an individual at the public library, Defendants substantively responded by stating that they did not have personal knowledge sufficient to admit or deny the matter. In addition, the responses state that they made a reasonable inquiry into the matter and the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to allow them to admit the matter.

Santhanam contends that the responses are incomplete and evasive because Defendants did not engage in a reasonable inquiry concerning the subject of the requests. In particular, he asserts that Defendants should have contacted these independent witnesses in order to respond to the discovery requests. This argument is not well-taken. While a party has a general duty to conduct a reasonable investigation to obtain responsive information, it must only furnish information from individuals under its control. (Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1504; Gordon v. Sup. Ct. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 157, 167; Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 782.) A party has no duty to obtain the information from independent witnesses. (Holguin v. Sup. Ct. (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 812, 821 [finding that a responding party was not required to interview individuals in the coroner’s office who participated in an autopsy in order to provide complete answers to interrogatories].) Since it is undisputed that the witnesses at issue are independent, Defendants had no duty to interview them. Accordingly, no further responses to RFA Nos. 21-23 are warranted.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Santhanam’s motion to compel further responses to RFA Nos. 15-35 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to RFA Nos. 17-23, 25, and 33. The motion is otherwise GRANTED. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days’ of the filing of the Court’s order, Defendants shall serve Santhanam with verified, code-compliant further responses without objection to RFA Nos. 15-16, 24, and 26-32 and 34-35.

IV. Requests for Sanctions

Both parties request monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. In addition, Santhanam asks the Court to impose non-monetary sanctions against Defendants’ counsel.

A. Santhanam’s Requests

Santhanam requests an unspecified amount of monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (d), which provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to requests for admissions, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Santhanam’s request is DENIED because he does not provide the required “declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.)

In addition, Santhanam asks the Court to disqualify Defendants’ attorneys under its inherent judicial authority. Santhanam’s request is DENIED. (Neal v. Health Net, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 831, 844 [stating that “an attorney may not be disqualified purely as a punitive or disciplinary measure”].)

B. Defendants’ Request

Defendants seek $2,385 in monetary sanctions against Santhanam under several statutes.

First, they argue that they are entitled to sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (d). Here, the motion is granted with respect to approximately half of the discovery requests at issue. As such, Santhanam acted with substantial justification in making this motion and therefore Defendants are not entitled to monetary sanctions under this statute.

Next, Defendants contend that they are entitled to monetary sanctions because Santhanam failed to meet and confer in good faith. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020 [stating that “[n]otwithstanding the outcome of a particular discovery motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct”].) In particular, they claim that Santhanam did not provide them with sufficient time to respond to his meet and confer letter. This argument is not well-taken. It is not readily apparent that additional time to meet and confer was necessary given the limited scope of the discovery dispute as well as the parties’ certainty concerning the validity of their positions. In this respect, the discovery at issue concerns standard objections to 21 requests for admissions, the parties previously litigated these same objections in a similar motion in June 2016, and Defendants reiterated in their meet and confer letter that each and every objection to the requests were justified and no further responses would be provided. As such, additional efforts at informal resolution were unlikely to bear fruit. (See Obregon v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431 [providing that the level of effort depends in part on the prospects for informal resolution].) Therefore, the Court finds that Santhanam adequately met and conferred before filing this motion. Accordingly, Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions on this basis is DENIED.